The Kurdish Question in the Middle East: A Comparative Perspective
By Beatrice Liverzani:
The Kurdish political landscape is shaped by a complex and evolving pursuit of self-governance across four states—Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—each of which presents distinct political, legal, and historical conditions. Despite shared linguistic and cultural markers, Kurdish political trajectories have diverged significantly, reflecting the interaction between post-imperial state formation, regional security considerations, and international legal norms as described by Gunter, (2014).
Historical Roots and the Absence of Kurdish Statehood
Kurdish aspirations for self-determination emerged prominently in the aftermath of the First World War, influenced by international principles such as Wilson’s Fourteen Points and early post-Ottoman treaties. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) initially envisaged the possibility of Kurdish autonomy, while the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) ultimately consolidated the territorial integrity of the new Turkish Republic and neighbouring states, effectively excluding Kurdish claims from the emerging international order (Gunter, 2014).
From the perspective of international law, this settlement embedded a structural constraint on Kurdish secession. The principle of territorial integrity became dominant, while external self-determination remained applicable primarily to decolonisation contexts. As a result, Kurdish claims were subsumed within the sovereignty of existing states, leaving autonomy and minority rights as the primary—though uneven—avenues for political recognition.
From a diplomatic standpoint, the post-Lausanne order did more than delimit borders; it institutionalised a regional norm that external actors have been reluctant to disrupt. Even major powers that have tactically cooperated with Kurdish actors, such as the United States in Iraq and Syria, have stopped short of endorsing Kurdish statehood. This reflects a broader international consensus: while minority protections may be encouraged, redrawing borders in the Middle East risks cascading instability. Thus, Kurdish aspirations are evaluated not only through legal doctrine but also through geopolitical risk calculus.
For regional governments, Kurdish self-determination is not viewed in isolation. It is perceived through the prism of precedent. Any concession that resembles secession could embolden parallel claims elsewhere, whether ethnic, sectarian, or regional. Diplomatically, this creates a shared, even if rarely coordinated, interest among Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tehran in preventing full Kurdish independence, even when their bilateral relations remain adversarial.
Iraq: Institutionalised Autonomy Without Sovereignty
Among the four scenarios, Iraq represents the most evolved form of Kurdish self-rule. Since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the early 1990s, Iraqi Kurds have exercised a substantial degree of de facto autonomy. This process was later consolidated following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which reshaped the country’s political system and formally recognised the Kurdistan Region within a federal framework. As Gunter (2014) argues, under the leadership of Masoud Barzani, who served as President of the Kurdistan Region from 2005 to 2017, the KRG expanded its institutional capacity, consolidating authority over regional governance, education, and security forces, including the Peshmerga.
This autonomy, however, has been shaped by internal political divisions, particularly the 1994 civil war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which exposed the challenges of Kurdish political fragmentation and competing centres of authority within the region (Gunter, 2014). Moreover, Kurdish identity within Iraq has historically occupied an ambivalent position in national narratives. As reflected in Iraqi Arabic-language literature, Kurdish experiences were often marginalised or portrayed as peripheral to Iraqi national identity, reinforcing perceptions of Kurds as outsiders or potential challenges to state unity (Zeidel, 2011).
Despite post-1991 political transformations and increased engagement between Arab and Kurdish regions, Kurdish representation in Iraqi cultural and political discourse remains uneven. According to Zeidel (2011), this suggests that while autonomy has been institutionalised at the political and administrative level, it has not fully translated into broader societal integration within the Iraqi national framework.
From a diplomatic perspective, the Iraqi case demonstrates the outer limits of what the international system is currently willing to tolerate. The 2017 Kurdish independence referendum illustrated this boundary clearly. Despite strong domestic support within the Kurdistan Region, regional states uniformly opposed the move, and international actors declined to recognise the outcome. Baghdad’s reassertion of authority over disputed territories, including Kirkuk, proceeded without meaningful external resistance.
This episode underscores a critical diplomatic lesson: autonomy may be negotiated, but sovereignty remains guarded by both regional consensus and international inertia. The Kurdistan Regional Government today operates within a delicate equilibrium—leveraging energy diplomacy, foreign investment, and security partnerships, while avoiding steps that would trigger collective regional pushback.
Turkey: Identity, Security, and Contested Integration
In Turkey, the Kurdish question has been primarily framed as an issue of national unity and internal security. As Loizides (2010) notes, Kurdish national identity developed comparatively late, shaped by geographic dispersion, internal fragmentation, and prolonged state policies aimed at linguistic and cultural homogenisation. The Turkish state’s Kemalist ideology historically denied the existence of distinct ethnic identities, restricting Kurdish language use and political expression, which paradoxically contributed to the consolidation of Kurdish ethnic consciousness (Loizides, 2010).
Kurdish political movements in Turkey have adopted varied strategies, ranging from armed resistance to political participation and civil society mobilisation. Influenced by Abdullah Öcalan’s concept of Democratic Confederalism, segments of the Kurdish movement have articulated alternatives to statehood, advocating decentralised governance, cultural recognition, and participatory democracy without formal secession (Gunter, 2014).
From a realist perspective, Turkey’s response reflects a prioritisation of territorial integrity and regime security. Loizides (2010) observes that while limited political openings, such as EU-related reforms, diaspora media, and legal changes, have facilitated expressions of Kurdish identity, Kurdish demands continue to be assessed through a security lens, constraining institutional accommodation.
However, realism alone does not fully capture Ankara’s evolving calculations. Turkey’s Kurdish policy is also shaped by its external diplomatic positioning—particularly relations with the European Union, NATO allies, and neighbouring Syria and Iraq. Periods of reform have often coincided with moments when Ankara sought to project democratic credentials internationally. Conversely, heightened security operations have tended to align with domestic political consolidation and regional instability.
Diplomatically, Turkey seeks to prevent the internationalisation of its Kurdish issue. It resists framing the matter as one of minority rights subject to external adjudication and instead asserts sovereign jurisdiction. This approach reflects a broader regional sensitivity: once internal identity conflicts become items on international diplomatic agendas, external leverage increases. Hence, Ankara’s consistent effort to define the issue primarily through a counterterrorism framework rather than as one of self-determination.
Syria: De Facto Autonomy and Recent Developments
In Syria, Kurdish political space expanded significantly during the civil war, as Kurdish-led administrations established de facto autonomous governance structures aligned with Democratic Confederalist principles (Gunter, 2014). These arrangements prioritised local councils, gender equality, and cultural recognition, while formally rejecting statehood claims.
Recent developments suggest a shift in the Syrian state’s approach. In 2026, Damascus issued a decree granting citizenship to stateless Kurds, recognising Kurdish as a national language and signalling an attempt to reintegrate Kurdish populations within a reconstituted state framework (Al Jazeera, 2026). These steps have taken place amid shifting military and diplomatic circumstances, including cooperation with Russia, and reflect the incorporation of Kurdish governance arrangements into broader processes of national consolidation.
The Syrian case introduces an additional diplomatic complexity: Kurdish actors have emerged not merely as domestic stakeholders but as intermediaries within broader geopolitical competition. Their cooperation with U.S.-led forces as local security partners, subsequent negotiations with Damascus, and tactical coordination with Russia illustrate how sub-state actors can acquire strategic relevance beyond their demographic weight.
Yet this relevance remains conditional. External powers have supported Kurdish-led administrations insofar as they serve immediate security objectives. Long-term political recognition, however, remains contingent upon reconciliation with central state authority. This reinforces a pattern observable across the region: Kurdish leverage increases during moments of state fragmentation but contracts as central governments reconstitute control.
Comparative Observations
Across all four cases, Kurdish political trajectories reflect the limits imposed by international norms, regional power balances, and domestic state structures. While Iraq demonstrates the possibility of sustained autonomy within a federal framework, Turkey and Iran continue to prioritise integration and security, and Syria’s evolving position remains closely tied to post-conflict state reconstruction.
From a diplomatic standpoint, the Kurdish question ultimately tests the flexibility of the Westphalian state system in the Middle East. It raises a recurring tension between stability and representation: regional governments prioritise territorial integrity, while Kurdish movements prioritise political recognition and self-administration. International actors, meanwhile, oscillate between normative support for minority rights and pragmatic commitment to existing borders.
The comparative evidence suggests that the future of Kurdish politics will not be determined by a singular breakthrough toward independence, but by incremental negotiations over autonomy, integration, and decentralisation. Where states perceive accommodation as strengthening stability, political space may expand. Where identity claims are securitised, political contraction is likely to follow.
In this sense, the Kurdish question remains less a frozen conflict than an evolving diplomatic negotiation embedded within broader regional transformations.
Bibliography
Gunter, M., M. (2014), “Unrecognized De Facto States in World Politics: The Kurds.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 20 (2): 161–178.
Loizides, N., G (2010), “State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 46 (4): 513–527.
Zeidel, R. (2011), “The Iraqi Novel and the Kurds.” Review of Middle East Studies 45 (1): 19–34.
Al Jazeera (2026), “Syria Grants Immediate Citizenship to Kurds in Wake of Gains against SDF.” January 29, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/29/syria-grants-immediate-citizenship-to-kurds-in-wake-of-gains-against-sdf.
*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
