Tourism Isn’t Collapsing—But the Model Is
By Muad Zaki, Senior Fellow at Asia Middle East Center (AMEC)
Global tourism is not disappearing. But the conditions that sustained it over the past two decades are shifting in ways policymakers can no longer ignore.
Travel behaviour is changing. Decisions are becoming more sensitive to perceived risk that is shaped not only by cost or convenience, but by geopolitical uncertainty and a broader sense of instability linked to recent tensions in the Middle East. For many travellers, long-haul leisure trips are no longer routine. They are conditional.
The implications are becoming clearer. Short-haul and regional travel are holding firm, in some cases strengthening, while long-haul discretionary travel is becoming more selective. This shift is driven less by policy than by perception, and perception tends to move faster than official reassurances.
For economies built on high volumes of short-stay international arrivals, particularly from distant markets, this creates structural exposure. What was once primarily a demand question is now also a connectivity question of whether travellers can move as easily, as predictably, and at the same cost as before.
Early signals from the aviation sector point in one direction. Airlines across Asia and Europe have begun adjusting schedules in response to tightening jet fuel supplies and rising operational uncertainty linked to Middle East tensions. Routes are being rerouted, capacity trimmed, and in some cases, flights reduced not only due to cost pressures, but because of constraints on fuel availability and logistics. Increasingly, carriers are planning for disruption rather than assuming stability.
These adjustments are not abstract. Reduced flight frequency, longer routing times, and higher operational costs feed directly into ticket prices and traveller decisions. For long-haul destinations, even small increases in friction—financial or psychological—can shift demand elsewhere.
Few countries illustrate this exposure more clearly than the Maldives.
Its tourism model has been highly effective under stable global conditions, attracting long-haul visitors willing to travel significant distances for short, high-value stays. But that same model depends on something less visible: confidence in global mobility and the reliability of long-distance travel networks. When either becomes uncertain, whether due to geopolitical tensions, fuel supply disruptions, or shifting airline strategies, the impact is immediate.
For a country such as the Maldives, where tourism underpins foreign exchange earnings and a large share of government revenue, this creates a specific form of vulnerability. A decline in arrivals does not remain contained within the tourism sector. It feeds directly into fiscal pressure, currency dynamics, and broader economic activity. The issue is not tourism itself, but concentration. Even moderate disruptions can produce outsized domestic effects.
In this context, even incremental adjustments that broaden the base of longer-term economic participation—alongside tourism—may help reduce volatility without undermining the sector’s core strengths.
This pattern extends beyond small island economies. Across parts of Southeast Asia, tourism has long been central to growth strategies, particularly in destinations such as Thailand and Indonesia. These economies are more diversified, but they are not insulated from shifts in global travel behaviour or from disruptions in the aviation networks that sustain it.
What distinguishes the current moment is not simply disruption, but the convergence of risks. Travelers are more sensitive to geopolitical developments. Airlines are operating with greater caution. Energy supply chains are under strain. Together, these pressures are beginning to reshape the assumptions on which tourism-dependent growth models rely.
Previous crises, from financial downturns to the COVID-19 pandemic, were treated as temporary interruptions. Tourism paused, then resumed. The expectation was continuity.
That reality now looks less certain.
Tourism is unlikely to disappear, but it is being recalibrated into becoming more regional, more selective, and less predictable.
Demand is not vanishing. It is shifting.
A growing share of global mobility is no longer defined by short-term visitors alone. Remote workers, digital professionals with foreign income, and a broader class of mobile residents are becoming more visible across destinations. While still smaller in absolute numbers, this segment has expanded significantly in recent years.
Their economic role differs in important ways. Instead of concentrated, one-off spending, their contribution unfolds over time through housing, services, education, and daily consumption.
A less visible constraint, however, sits beneath this shift, one rooted in political incentives.
In many developing economies, policy attention gravitates toward what is visible. Large-scale tourism investments—resorts, airports, flagship infrastructure—offer immediate political value. They are tangible, high-profile, and easily communicated as progress.
The alternative is quieter. Long-term residents and small-scale foreign entrepreneurs do not arrive in a single announcement. Their impact accumulates gradually through sustained demand for housing, services, and local businesses.
The imbalance is structural. Policy frameworks tend to privilege what is politically visible over what is economically stabilizing.
For policymakers across ASEAN, this distinction is becoming harder to ignore. Economic strategies that generate continuous, widely distributed benefits are more likely to be experienced directly by voters—even if they lack the visibility of large-scale projects.
Malaysia is well-positioned within this shift. Its cost structure, infrastructure, and relative stability make it competitive not only as a destination, but as a place to live and work.
The more fundamental issue is how success is measured. Tourism policy continues to prioritize arrival numbers, a metric that captures volume, but not depth.
A more relevant measure is duration and participation: how long people stay, and how they engage economically while they are there.
This shift does not require abandoning tourism. It calls for rebalancing it.
Tourism itself is not in decline, but the model that once made it reliably expandable is becoming less certain.
For countries that remain heavily dependent on short-stay, long-haul arrivals, that uncertainty translates into exposure—not only to demand cycles, but to the operational realities of global transport and energy systems. For those able to adapt, it presents an opportunity to rethink how external income enters the economy.
In Malaysia’s case, this raises a more fundamental question. Existing frameworks such as the Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) programme were designed for a different phase of global mobility, where which long-term residency was tied primarily to wealth thresholds and retirement migration. That model still has value, but it no longer fully captures the direction in which global movement is evolving.
What is emerging instead is a more fluid form of economic participation, where individuals are not necessarily relocating permanently, but are no longer strictly visitors. They move between countries, maintain foreign income streams, and integrate economically over time without fitting traditional categories of tourist, investor, or immigrant.
The strategic opportunity lies in recognizing this shift early. Rather than relying solely on legacy frameworks, policy can begin to accommodate a broader spectrum of economic residents whose contribution is continuous, location-flexible, and less dependent on traditional investment thresholds.
For policymakers, the distinction is increasingly clear. The question is no longer only how to attract visitors, but how to position the country within a global system where people and their income are becoming more mobile, selective, and sensitive to stability.
The shift is already underway. The countries that respond early will not simply compete for tourism, but they will shape the next phase of geo-economic participation.
*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
