Prepared by:
Muhammad Daffa Aulia Ridwan

The Iran War of 2026 was to be used to put order back. Rather, it revealed the lack of control that is left. What started as a joint U.S. and Israel attack on Iran on 28 February 2026 became an action to end a long-held concern about The advances of Tehran towards its nuclear capabilities and influence in the region. However, instead of asserting dominance, the war has shown a different truth that U.S. influence in the Middle East is not absolute, and its conventional instruments are yielding less and less returns. Over the decades, Washington has been following a time-tested agenda in the region: ensuring influence, accessing strategic routes, and protecting allies. These priorities remain the same. The issue was that the environment in which they work has changed. The Middle East is now more fragmented, more independent, and more influenced by various actors in the world. Not only has America become dependent on negotiating the influence, rather than enforcing it despite its military power, but it is now also functioning within a system that mandates it. That’s how it should be within the past history with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

This contradiction is present in this tension that underlies the current U.S. policy. On the one hand, it can be clearly seen in the will to diminish long-term commitments, a kind of hydro-retaliatory shrink, which can be said to be a strategic pullback. Conversely, instances of crisis also provoke aggressive responses. It is exactly the same pattern we are witnessing in the war of 2026: a state tries to de-escalate, but is again and again lured into the battle when its credibility or its interests are questioned.

But the consequences of such a strategy are more and more counterproductive. This is demonstrated with the war itself. The first attacks were aimed at the Iranian leadership, military infrastructure and nuclear-related assets, as an attempt to weaken Iranian capabilities. But Iran did not react with the normal escalation. Rather, it depended on asymmetric warfare, missile attacks and drone attacks on various fronts; missiles were used to attack not only Israel but also the U.S. bases and other allied countries in the Gulf. More to the point, Iran proved its strategic advantage in the place where it is most needed: global energy. Interfering with the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran reminded the world that its ability to influence events is not eradicated by any military pressure. On the one hand, it strengthens Iran as one of the main actors in the system of the region and all over the world.

The war soon escalated into a wider conflict. Proxy networks were initiated, such as the Hezbollah and tacitly Eastern block (Russia, China, etc.), and Israel’s interest in contesting major power in the Middle East (weakening Iran) with their own means, they started a parallel war in the region. It is not the conventional war between states anymore because it is a networked war where influence is exerted in many ways by a number of actors. The sheer might of the military in such a situation is not a guarantee of a decisive victory.

And that is the main wrong estimation. U.S. strategy continues to be based on the premise that an excellent force has the ability to deliver strategic results. However, the Middle East today does not operate in such a manner. Power flow is decentralized, coalitions are prone to change, and smaller players have been able to create substantial costs for bigger rivals. Iran was also capable of surviving a cumulative pressure, which is not a one-off event, but an indication of how contemporary war operates in the area.

The larger geopolitical implications merely drive this point home. The Middle East is in a new period of instability brought about by the war. Energy channels have been shaken, world markets disrupted, and tensions heightened in regions. However, especially, the reaction of the states of the Middle East has been tentative instead of concerted. Even critics of Iran have not completely concurred with U.S. activities, as they are afraid of escalation and revenge. Meanwhile, other external forces like China and Russia have opposed U.S.-led efforts, which is an indication that the conflict cannot be confined to the region anymore. It belongs to a bigger geopolitical game, in which U.S. influence is no longer presumed. Even the U.S.’s own allies, such as European countries, have raised concerns about the war and have taken an ambiguous stance not to support it.

This begs an uncomfortable question: by what exactly have they been done?. The result indicates otherwise, in case the intention was to weaken Iran. The last thing that would have been desired is to stabilize the region, but that is the opposite of what has happened. And, had the goal been to strengthen American leadership, the war has rather shown its weaknesses. All this does not imply that the United States is no longer super-powerful. It is still the strongest military player in the region, has far-reaching alliances and a global presence. Yet no longer is power enough. The efficiency of such power, its capacity to achieve the desirable results, becomes more and more limited. The Iran War 2026 is not purely regional. It is reflecting a signal strategically. It demonstrates that in a complicated, multipolar setting, coercive strategies usually result in escalation, rather than resolution. It shows that alliances, however, continue to be significant, but they do not compensate enough for the changes in regional dynamics. And it highlights that these enemies, such as Iran, have changed so as to be much more difficult to contain using traditional methods.

And, assuming that there is a moral to be learned, it is an easy, yet disagreeable one: that the control is not so sure any more. To be effective, the U.S. policy can no longer afford to be reactive in its military efforts, but instead it should be more coherent, long-term, one that incorporates diplomacy, recognizes regional autonomy, and adapts to the realities of a multipolar world. Without such a change, nothing more is to be expected of future interventions; the same cycle is bound to be repeated: bold initiation, inconclusive culminations, a cycle of instability ever-deepening.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Prepared by:
Muhammad Daffa Aulia Ridwan