“In Sudan, more than 40,000 lives have been lost, 13 million people displaced, and 30 million

are now in need of humanitarian assistance.”¹

“In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II

— claiming over six million lives — continues to rage. Driven by the struggle for vast mineral wealth, it has brought unimaginable suffering,

especially to women and children.”

— Panzi Hospital, 2025²

Executive Summary:

The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan cannot be attributed solely to ethnic or religious divisions. A comprehensive understanding requires consideration of multiple interrelated factors; chief among them, the exploitation of natural resources in these resource-rich states. This dynamic of domination and extraction predates colonization and continues to shape the political and economic landscapes of both countries today. In the current global context, the energy transition and the growing demand for critical minerals, driven largely by industrialized nations, have intensified competition over access to these resources. Minerals essential for green technologies and artificial intelligence have become strategic assets, further entrenching instability and fueling violence. A lasting resolution to these conflicts requires a fundamental re-evaluation of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. Without addressing the structural inequalities and exploitative practices underlying resource extraction, sustainable peace and development in the DRC and Sudan will remain unattainable.

Introduction:

The Berlin Conference of 1885 led to the division of Africa by European powers, with the aim of partitioning the continent for economic purposes, such as access to cheap labor and mineral resources, often acquired by force³. Among these territories were the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which at the time were composed of tribes and not yet organized according to the Westphalian system we know today⁴. The DRC gained independence from Belgium in 1960, while Sudan achieved independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom in 1956. These states, initially serving the needs of European powers, were thus granted independence, but some territories continue to face deadly conflicts. While independence may appear to have been achieved in the eyes of the United Nations, it is necessary to analyze it critically, as it results from complex historical processes shaped by the economic and political interests of former colonial powers.⁵

Sudan’s independence was not straightforward. Administered jointly by Egypt and the United Kingdom from 1899 to 1956, the country saw its lands and primary resources exploited by these powers, each pursuing its own interests.⁶ Even after 1922, Egypt claimed sovereignty, while the United Kingdom sought to maintain control. These rivalries contributed to the country’s ethnic and religious fragmentation, ultimately leading to the division of Sudan into North and South Sudan. The Egyptian nationalist movement demanded full independence for the Nile Valley, while the British sought to separate Sudan from Egypt to develop agriculture, particularly in the Gezira region north of Khartoum.⁷ This policy aimed to exploit the Nile’s waters for cotton cultivation, without Egypt being able to limit British access to these resources. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 officially granted independence to all externally dominated countries, consolidating Britain’s position over Sudan. However, this formal independence did not allow effective territorial control, as Sudanese authorities remained strongly influenced by former powers.

The case of the DRC shows similar patterns. As a former Belgian colony, the country was subjected to massive exploitation of its mineral resources by King Leopold II, to the detriment of the local population, leading to severe human rights violations, including slavery and mass violence. As Adam Hochschild emphasizes in King Leopold’s Ghost, this exploitation resulted in a veritable genocide.⁸ Darfur, rich in primary resources, constitutes another example where resources were at the center of crimes against humanity.⁹ These examples demonstrate that natural resources play a decisive role in humanitarian crises and armed conflicts.

Modern civil wars are defined as “an armed conflict between the government of a sovereign state and one or more organized groups capable of substantial resistance”¹⁰. Several factors have contributed to the increase in civil wars in the 20th and 21st centuries: decolonization, which left states with contested authorities; the end of the Cold War, which resulted in a decline in superpower financial support; and the reduction of peacekeeping operations coupled with the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Today, the main hotspots of civil wars include Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Chad, the DRC, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, and Ukraine.

Two main factors explain the outbreak of these conflicts: ethnicity and economy¹¹. Ethnicity is not a natural cause of conflict but a social and political construct. Anthony Smith defines an ethnic group as a collective sharing a common name, beliefs, and ancestry, shared cultural elements, collective historical memories, and attachment to a territory. Ethnicity is often instrumentalized to divide and mobilize populations for strategic purposes. The economic factor manifests as the “resource curse”: resource-rich states develop rentier economies at the expense of public institutions, limiting state control over their territory and favoring the emergence of rebellions. These mechanisms are particularly evident in peripheral, hard-to-access regions, such as certain areas of Sudan and the DRC, where post-colonial resource management has contributed to the persistence of civil conflicts¹².

Limiting the analysis to an ethnic dimension would be reductive: ethnicity is often used as a tool by elites to control populations and exploit resources at low cost. It is therefore important to ask: have these states truly benefited from their independence? Who truly profits from primary resources? What tactics are employed in these mining-related conflicts? The answers to these questions show that current civil conflicts are not generated by ethnic factors but by economic ones, with ethnicity serving as a political lever to divide and exploit resources cheaply¹³.

I.  Mineral Exploitation Made Possible by a Favorable Military and Political Context

A. The Role of Central Politics in the Countries in Question

1) A Political and Economic Transition (20th Century) – Benefiting Former Colonies

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, which granted independence to formerly colonized peoples, should not be interpreted as a guarantee of true political and economic autonomy¹⁴. The new states inherited profound political instability, exacerbated by the imposition of the Westphalian state system, which brought historically distinct tribes together on a single territory, sometimes with no social or cultural ties.¹⁵ This instability was reinforced by the installation of leaders and governors serving the interests of former colonial powers, ensuring the continuity of economic exploitation post-independence.¹⁶

This political and ethnic construction, inherited from colonization, often led to the exclusion of certain populations. In the United States, for example, a central role was played in the secession of South Sudan through joint support for the Sudanese government and the South Sudanese rebel movement (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement), culminating in the 2005 peace treaty.¹⁷ The official justification relied on a racial and ethnic discourse, attributing conflicts to a legacy of slavery. However, the understanding of Arab-Saharan slavery cannot be reduced to the European slavery lens, as Adam Hochschild emphasizes in King Leopold’s Ghost.¹⁸ Reducing the conflict to a racial opposition, as is often done, obscures the historical and economic complexity of the Sudanese crises.

The division of Sudan into North and South allowed former powers to strategically control the Nile and primary resources, to the detriment of local populations. Amir Idris, in Historicizing Race, Ethnicity, and the Crisis of Citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan, considers that the conflict results from a citizenship crisis: “Postcolonial states adopted definitions of indigeneity, inherited from the colonial era, to frame their own definitions of citizenship.” ¹⁹This approach excludes certain populations and fuels the foundations of civil wars. Citizenship comprises three dimensions: legal, political, and as membership in a political community. Idris emphasizes the third dimension, which is essential for understanding systemic exclusion and identity conflicts.²⁰

These identity and racial constructions were reinforced by colonial propaganda and the prejudices of Western missionaries and administrators, as illustrated by Reverend J. Lowrie Anderson, who considered Arabs practical and Blacks less stable and easier to influence.²¹ These views legitimized the division of Sudan and facilitated control over the populations and resources of the South. Similarly, the DRC, a former Belgian colony, saw its resources exploited by administrators trained to serve colonial interests, as Adam Hochschild shows for Leopold II’s Congo.²²

Territorial division also altered traditional land management systems. According to Jean- Philippe Colin and Charlin Rangé (Les dimensions intrafamiliales du rapport à la terre), land relations were historically structured around the family nucleus and neighborhood relations²³. The colonial state, by imposing centralized administration, disrupted this millennia-old system, transforming relationships with land and resources.

After independence, local politicians often pursued policies serving Western interests. Alden Young, in Transforming Sudan – Decolonization, Economic Development and State Formation, shows that the generation of independents (1954–1958), educated at Western universities such as Oxford, managed major economic projects like the Gezira Scheme, centralizing over 50% of state revenue and ensuring economic control aligned with interests inherited from colonialism²⁴. Even Sudanese economists, such as Sa’ad al-Din Fawzi, had to frame their analyses around unstable political and institutional constraints, with Northern elites favoring a vision of national development focused on economic growth rather than regional redistribution²⁵.

Finally, instability and limited development conditions are exacerbated by the influence of international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. While their goal is to assist financially struggling states, their policies impose market opening and economic liberalization, often to the detriment of local populations, particularly economic minorities²⁶.

2)  Central Powers Under the Grip of Corruption – To the Detriment of the Local Population

In Sudan, following the 2021 coup d’état, a military council led by two generals took control of the country. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the armed forces, de facto assumed the presidency, while General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo leads the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF, created in 2013,²⁷ originated from the Janjaweed militia that had fought rebels in Darfur and was accused of ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab population in the region (BBC). Dagalo strengthened this military force and involved it in international conflicts, notably in Yemen and Libya, while also developing local economic interests, such as controlling certain gold mines in Sudan.

The current conflict does not affect the entire Sudanese territory uniformly. Fighting is concentrated in strategic areas where the two leaders exercise control based on natural resources, notably gold and oil. Northern Sudan, for instance, contains agricultural zones along the Nile, while oil is mainly found in the South, and the strategic Red Sea port remains a key stake. This unstable situation turns the Sudanese state into an economic prey, where local militias profit from resources at the expense of the civilian population.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exhibits similar dynamics. Since 2016, Amnesty International has denounced corruption within central authorities and local military forces. ²⁸In the DRC, the Code of Conduct on artisanal mining defines in Article 21 artisanal mining as “any activity by which a Congolese national extracts and concentrates mineral substances using artisanal tools, methods, and processes, within an artisanal mining area limited in surface and depth, up to a maximum of thirty meters.” ²⁹The code specifies that only adults holding a valid permit may carry out this activity, under penalty of sanctions by the government.

However, these legal provisions are insufficient: they do not take into account the health and safety of miners, remain silent on cobalt handling, and impose no standards for mine construction or organization. Additionally, the government does not create enough Artisanal Mining Zones (ZEA), which forces miners to work in unauthorized areas or illegally enter industrial sites to access cobalt and other minerals. These regulations reveal a complete disconnect between the government and local realities.³⁰

A direct consequence of these gaps is child labor, a violation of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the DRC is a party.³¹ Arthur’s testimony, collected by Amnesty International, illustrates this point: “I worked in the mines because my parents couldn’t afford to pay for food and clothes for me. Papa is unemployed, and mama sells charcoal.”³² This exploitation occurs in a context of widespread structural corruption: local authorities profit from resource extraction, tolerating and effectively organizing illegal activities in the ZEA. Volunteers from Amnesty International and Afrewatch have observed mines controlled by police officers, who regulate access and supervise operations, thereby ensuring the continuity of an exploitation system supported by central authorities.³³

Whether in Sudan or the DRC, central powers serve only their immediate interests, to the detriment of local populations. The abundance of natural resources in these states, combined with elite corruption and a lack of institutional oversight, fuels conflicts specifically centered on competition for these resources, exacerbating political and social instability.

B.   Specific Typologies of Conflicts Related to Primary Resources

Currently, both the DRC and Sudan are experiencing bloody conflicts, largely linked to their abundant mineral resources. In this regard, Welsch notes that recent armed conflicts are often connected to the exploitation of natural resources. A study conducted between 1989 and 2002 across 54 countries showed that an abundance of mineral resources significantly increases the likelihood of internal armed conflict, whereas the productivity of “normal” production and the quality of governance reduce this likelihood. Relevant productivity variables include agricultural capital and human capital, rather than manufactured capital. In other words, “it is not the abundance of natural resources in general that fosters conflict, but the abundance of non-renewable resources” ³⁴. The availability of renewable agricultural resources, such as pastures, croplands, or forests, tends instead to reduce the incidence of armed conflict by increasing labor productivity.

These theoretical observations apply to the Sudanese and Congolese cases. In Sudan, during British colonization, the main issue was the exploitation of farmland near the Nile. After decolonization, new strategic resources were discovered, notably oil, and conflicts enabled the illegal exploitation of gold. The DRC, on the other hand, has been described by Sam Kean as “the richest country in the world and simultaneously the poorest.” It possesses all the primary resources needed for modern industries, artificial intelligence, and the energy transition. Yet, despite this wealth, it remains plagued by violent conflicts.³⁵ Focusing solely on ethnic or religious causes would be a simplistic reading: these violences are primarily the consequence of economic and historical factors.

Philippe Le Billon, in his theory of “political ecology,” distinguishes between conflicts related to resource scarcity, mainly renewable, and those linked to the abundance of non-renewable resources. In scarcity cases, actors fight to ensure survival. In abundance cases, conflicts are driven by greed, as resources provide armed groups with the “loot” necessary to acquire military equipment. These conflicts often become economic: the trade of natural resources structures the economy of armed groups and transforms a political agenda into a private agenda.

Sudan illustrates this transition. During British colonization, it fell under resource scarcity, with access to farmland near the Nile being the main concern. In the 1970s, and especially from 2010 onwards, gold became a new strategic resource, with the introduction of affordable metal detectors and the expansion of artisanal mining activities across the country, notably in the Eastern Desert, the Nile Valley, the Red Sea region, and Darfur, with the discovery of the Jebel Amir deposit in 2012. This abundance led to new political destabilizations and transformed the nature of conflicts, shifting them from territorial or agricultural issues to economic stakes linked to gold.

Zimmerman summarizes this dynamic by stating that “resources are not, they become.” The example of diamonds perfectly illustrates this idea: an industrial material with limited uses, its economic and symbolic value was socially constructed, turning it into a prized resource, a symbol of purity and eternal love. Today, diamonds have become the “best friend” of belligerents, fueling conflicts and the ruin of countries such as Angola, the DRC, or Sierra Leone. As Le Billon emphasizes, mining and conflicts in several African countries are not mere accidents: they are part of the historical continuity of colonization, where the primary beneficiaries are Northern countries, which organize an international trade in these resources while pursuing trade and foreign policies distinct from their domestic policies.³⁷

Thus, conflicts in these states cannot be separated from their history. According to Le Billon, these conflicts are not only motivated by scarcity or greed but are the historical product of social construction and a political economy of resources.³⁸ Geographic position, the creation of markets, and value chains—based on the social construction of desirable resources—determine the nature of these conflicts. These economic interests sometimes lead armed actors to succumb to greed and trigger coups or civil violence, as illustrated by the current Sudanese conflict or the 1997 coup in Congo-Brazzaville by Denis Sassou Nguesso against elected President Pascal Lissouba, closely linked to the control of oil rents.

C.    A Military Context Favoring the Lack of Empathy from External Actors

The causes of the Sudanese and Congolese conflicts are deeply historical, and one of the main reasons lies in the exploitation of natural resources. Philippe Le Billon emphasizes that the economic agenda related to these resources strongly influences the course of conflicts, particularly through their “criminalization” when financial motivations outweigh political ones.³⁹ This analysis applies equally to Sudan and the DRC, where belligerents and certain state authorities see their survival and power closely linked to mining, often at the expense of the local population.

The economic aspect incentivizes soldiers, local commanders, and political backers to maintain a profitable conflict. This logic generates a form of anarchy in which violent competition is exacerbated by the economic and political opportunities provided by the conflict: opportunities that are impossible to obtain in times of peace or even after a victory.⁴⁰ Peace becomes even more distant with the intervention of external powers seeking their own share of resources. Le Billon notes that “access to resources acts as a divisive factor among international actors.” This division intensifies when bilateral actors accommodate local anti-reform interests to secure commercial benefits, particularly for their companies.⁴¹

Thus, states become protectors of private interests, further complicating the conflict. In contemporary armed conflicts, flows of private capital play a more decisive role than foreign aid: they prioritize the commercial interests of transnational corporations over local populations.⁴² Notable examples include the French companies ELF and TOTAL, or the Canadian company Talisman, whose activities have been linked to conflicts and human rights violations.⁴³

This impunity in exploitation is facilitated by the permissive or cynical attitude of external actors, including certain advocacy NGOs. The absence of effective counterbalances and public exposure of abuses perpetuates a nearly uninterrupted cycle of violence⁴⁴. It is therefore essential that local and international NGOs fully play their role, demanding transparency and accountability from international companies, particularly when the resources they exploit are directly linked to conflicts.

II. The Green Transition in Northern Countries as a Source of Tension in Southern Countries

Global warming and the revolution driven by artificial intelligence have led to significant technological innovation in Northern countries. These transformations have triggered a green transition, encouraging these countries to produce and consume goods necessary for this energy transition, such as electric vehicles.

However, this transition often comes at the expense of Southern countries, where essential materials for this energy revolution are located, such as lithium and cobalt. Aware of the impacts of mining in contexts of corruption and weak regulation, several legislations have been implemented to limit resource-related conflicts. Among them, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010, United States) aims to prevent the financing of “conflict minerals” from the DRC by holding companies accountable for the supply chains of their suppliers⁴⁵.

Yet, this law has significant limitations. It only concerns the so-called 3TG minerals: tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold; thereby excluding other materials essential for the green transition, such as lithium or certain diamonds. Sudan, for example, is not covered by these provisions. To address these gaps and improve their image with consumers, companies have gradually incorporated “responsible sourcing” into their corporate social and environmental responsibility policies, based on the principle of due diligence. According to the OECD, “due diligence is the process that companies must carry out to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for the actual or potential negative impacts of their operations, supply chains, and other business relationships.”⁴⁶ This principle aims to hold companies accountable for how resources are extracted.

In practice, however, these measures are far from effective. The Congolese conflict, for instance, is exacerbated by the green transition toward a decarbonized economy led by Northern countries. The development of electric vehicles has increased the exploitation of non-conflict minerals, particularly cobalt, 60–70% of which comes from the DRC.⁴⁷ Despite the EU adopting a similar text to Section 1502 in 2014, the situation on the ground remains catastrophic, with resources continuing to be exported to wealthy countries while conflicts and human rights violations persist. Raphaël Deberdt and Philippe Le Billon identify five major limitations to the implementation of responsible sourcing. First, the scope of artisanal mining: this activity supports the livelihoods of over 40 million people worldwide. In eastern and southeastern DRC, the International Peace Information Service visited nearly 3,000 extraction sites in 2020 and found that tracing minerals through complex chains involving hundreds to thousands of suppliers is extremely difficult⁴⁸. Second, the geographical scope: Section 1502 only concerns nine countries bordering the DRC, immediately excluding other states affected by mining conflicts, such as Sudan.⁴⁹

Other identified limitations include market access, hindered by high taxes and corruption; the integration of certification mechanisms; and the ability of companies to implement technological solutions to ensure traceability and compliance. These obstacles illustrate that the green transition in Northern countries can exacerbate tensions in Southern countries, fueling resource-related conflicts and increasing economic and social imbalances.

Conclusion

Congolese and Sudanese conflicts cannot be reduced to religious or ethnic disputes. They are primarily the result of mining exploitation, directly inherited from colonization. Today, these countries face severe human rights violations, exacerbated by our massive consumption of resources. It is essential to rethink our relationship with others and adopt a comprehensive, in- depth analysis to understand the real causes of these conflicts.

The exploitation of land and resources in Southern countries led to colonization and the establishment of economic and political systems that sustainably disadvantage local populations. The absence of sustainable development policies, in which all parties could benefit fairly, fuels conflicts and weakens the affected states. This issue will become even more pressing in the future, especially in the face of global warming, where essential resources such as water will become increasingly scarce and sources of additional tension.

Books and Reports

1. International Monetary Fund. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa – Holding Steady. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2025.
2. Young, Alden. Transforming Sudan: Decolonization, Economic Development, and State Formation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
3. Hanotaux, Gabriel. Le Soudan perdu et reconquis: Histoire de la nation égyptienne. Paris: Académie française.
4. David, Charles Philippe, and Olivier Schmitt. La guerre et la paix. 4th ed. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2020.
5. République Démocratique du Congo. Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire commises entre mars 1993 et juin 2003 sur le territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo. August 2010.
6. Amnesty International. “This Is What We Die For”: Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt. London: Amnesty International, 2016.
7. Agence européenne pour l’orientation et l’information économiques. Lettre économique de l’AEOI: Soudan.September 2024.

Book Chapters

• Fazi, Thomas. “From Central Bank Independence to Government Dependence: Monetary Colonialism in the Eurozone.” In Economic and Monetary Sovereignty in 21st Century Africa, edited by Maha Ben Gadha, Fadhel Kaboub, Kai Koddenbrock, Ines Mahmoud, and Ndongo Samba Sylla. London: Pluto Press,

2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv244ssnb.11.

• Cross, Harry. “Banking, Business, and Sovereignty in Sudan (1956–2019).”

In Economic and Monetary Sovereignty in 21st Century Africa, edited by Maha Ben Gadha, Fadhel Kaboub, Kai Koddenbrock, Ines Mahmoud, and Ndongo Samba Sylla. London: Pluto Press, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv244ssnb.6.

1. De Beule, Filip, and Daniël Van den Bulcke. “China’s Opening Up, from Shenzhen to Sudan.” In The New Presence of China in Africa, edited by Meine Pieter van Dijk. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n2kj.4.
2. Ongolo, Symphorien, and Max Krott, eds. Power Dynamics in African Forests: The Politics of Global Sustainability.

Journal Articles

1. Mahé, Anne-Laure. “Soudan: Après la chute d’Omar el-Béchir, les défis de la transition.” Politique étrangère, no. 2019/4 (Winter 2019): 99–112. Paris: Éditions Institut français des relations internationales. https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.194.0101.
2. Mamdani, Mahmood. “Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 43, no. 4 (October 2001): 651–664. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2696665.
3. Idris, Amir. “Rethinking Identity, Citizenship, and Violence in Sudan.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2012): 324–

326. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41475022.

1. Idris, Amir. “Historicizing Race, Ethnicity, and the Crisis of Citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan.” Middle East Journal 73, no. 4 (Winter 2019): 591–

606. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26933113.

1. Sharkey, Heather J. “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race.” African Affairs 107, no. 426 (January 2008): 21–

43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27666997.

1. Vasiliev, A. M., D. A. Degterev, and T. M. Shaw. “Decolonization, Postcolonialism, Multiple Modernities, and Persistent East–West Divide in African Studies.”
2. Stoop, Nik, Marijke Verpoorten, and Peter van der Windt. “More Legislation, More Violence? The Impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC.” PLOS ONE.
3. Silná, Zuzana, and Zuzana Kittová. “International Trade in Conflict Minerals: Solutions for the EU Regulatory Framework.” Stavebnícky

Časopis (2014). https://doi.org/10.2478/stcb-2014-0059.

• Greenfield, Aaron, and T. E. Graedel. “The Omnivorous Diet of Modern Technology.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling.
• Deberdt, Raphaël, and Philippe Le Billon. “Conflict Minerals and Battery Materials Supply Chains: A Mapping Review of Responsible Sourcing Initiatives.” The

Extractive Industries and Society 8 (2021):

100935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.100935.

• Welsch, Heinz. “Resource Abundance and Internal Armed Conflict: Types of Natural Resources and the Incidence of ‘New Wars.’” Ecological Economics 67 (2008): 503–

513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.11.021.

• Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography20 (2001): 561–584. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-

6298(01)00015-4.

• De Gayffier-Bonneville, Anne-Claire. “La rivalité anglo-égyptienne au Soudan: Les enjeux de la décolonisation.” Relations internationales 2008/1, no. 133 (2008): 71–89. Éditions Presses Universitaires de France. https://doi.org/10.3917/ri.133.0071.
• Hanai, Kazuyo. “Conflict Minerals Regulation and Mechanism Changes in the DR Congo.” Resources Policy 74 (2021):

102394. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142072100059X.

• Elagiba, Nadir Ahmed, Muhammad Khalifa, Abbas E. Rahma, Zryab Babker, and Suad Ibrahim Gamaledin. “Performance of Major Mechanized Rainfed Agricultural Production in Sudan: Sorghum Vulnerability and Resilience to Climate since 1970.” Agricultural and Forest Meteorology. Elsevier.
• Dalla Via, Nicola, and Paolo Perego. “Determinants of Conflict Minerals Disclosure Under the Dodd–Frank Act.” RSM Erasmus University, Rotterdam; Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy.

News Articles

• England, Andrew. “Glimpse of Better Life Recedes as Investment in Sudan Slips Away: Despite Its Oil and Mineral Wealth, Conflict and Poor Leadership Have Held Back Africa’s Largest Nation.” Financial Times, September 7, 2004.
• Le Monde. “La communauté internationale se doit d’agir pour mettre fin aux souffrances du peuple congolais.” June 6, 2025.

BY: Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

The persistent dilemma confronting post-conflict societies concerns the sequencing of transitional imperatives. When should the attainment of peace be prioritised, and when should demands for justice prevail? The Syrian conflict, like other instances scrutinised within the transitional-justice literature, has wrought not only material destruction but also an erosion of social trust and communal cohesion. Consequently, tensions emerge between imperatives of negotiated stability and claims for accountability for grave international crimes[1].

This article interrogates the enduring tension between peace and justice in post-conflict transitions and applies comparative lessons to Syria’s emerging transitional architecture. Building on insights shared by practitioners and scholars during the PILPG[2] 2025 Peace and Negotiation Summer School course, dedicated to the Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, it draws on cases from Sierra Leone, the Balkans, South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda, demonstrating that durable transitional outcomes require a context-specific mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, domestically anchored design and strategic sequencing.

Conceptual framework: instruments and sequencing

Transitional justice is not merely an alternative to ordinary criminal justice; rather, it encompasses a spectrum of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with varying degrees of international involvement (or none), including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking mechanisms, institutional reform (comprising vetting and removal from office) or combinations thereof, depending on the context.[3] The literature identifies several potential trajectories: privileging peace; prioritising justice; pursuing a “peace with justice” or experiencing a growing judicialization of peace processes – that is, the increasing influence of courts and judicial bodies on political negotiations, with ambivalent consequences for accountability and for the prospects of reaching and sustaining peace.

Sierra Leone and the coexistence of restorative and retributive mechanisms

The protracted civil war in Sierra Leone, partly a spillover from the conflict in Liberia and heavily fueled by the struggle to control diamond resources, illustrates the practical and moral challenges of balancing the imperatives of immediate peace with the demands of criminal accountability. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty clause that facilitated a ceasefire but simultaneously left deep wounds and sparked considerable controversy over questions of justice. In practice, the transitional response was dual and parallel: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a restorative and narrative mandate, tasked with collecting testimonies, documenting violations and fostering processes of reconciliation; and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established to prosecute those bearing “the greatest responsibility” for the gravest crimes (a mechanism that avoided blanket impunity without derailing the fragile peace process.

This experience demonstrates that the coexistence of restorative (TRC) and retributive (Special Court) mechanisms can succeed when their mandates are clearly delineated and communicated, when practical coordination is ensured (procedural sequencing, witness protection, allocation of resources) and when meaningful space is created for both symbolic and material redress for victims. Ambassador Yvette Stevens and other observers have emphasized that this multi-dimensional approach, together with the clarity in the distribution of responsibilities between commission and court, was central to preventing the Lomé amnesty from devolving into a perceived culture of impunity in Sierra Leone.[4]

Memory, symbols and institutional confidence in Montenegro and the Balkans

If the Sierra Leonean experience illustrates the delicate balance between peace, truth and accountability in a context marked by resource-driven conflict, the post-Yugoslav Balkans, and particularly Montenegro, highlight a different but equally crucial dimension of transitional justice: the reconstruction of trust in the aftermath of mass atrocity and the role of institutional, symbolic and economic measures in shaping reconciliation and state-building. The post-1995 Balkans demonstrate that collective traumas (Srebrenica above all) rapidly erode social trust, and that if civic culture and historical memory are not actively nurtured, the reconstruction of confidence becomes a project spanning decades.

The Montenegrin case is particularly instructive, as it combined political, symbolic and economic elements: the decision – controversial yet strategic – to introduce the Deutsche Mark at the end of 1999, and subsequently the euro, was not merely an economic maneuver to stabilize prices and safeguard savings, but also a political act of symbolic autonomy vis-à-vis Belgrade. The subsequent Belgrade Agreement and the constitutional framework established in 2002 created a pragmatic arrangement of “one State, two economic systems”, which allowed for the functional separation of economic and political spheres during the transitional period. Igor Lukšić, a key actor in Montenegro’s transition, has emphasized the importance of early confidence-building measures, predictable institutional rules and political symbols capable of ensuring minority inclusion, thereby pre-empting historical revisionism and competing narratives.[5]

The Montenegrin experience suggests that economic and symbolic measures (currency reform, autonomous fiscal policies) can serve as instruments of political stabilization, provided they are coupled with institutional reforms and underpinned by a minimal consensus on clear and predictable rules.

Alternatives and trade-offs from South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda

Whereas the Sierra Leonean and Montenegrin cases shed light on, respectively, the balance between peace and accountability and the role of economic-symbolic measures in rebuilding trust, a broader comparative perspective highlights further variations. Other transitional contexts (South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda) offer additional insights into how different societies have sought to reconcile truth, accountability and reconciliation through distinct institutional and culture mechanisms.

In South Africa, the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission – led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and his colleagues – adopted the mechanism of conditional amnesty in exchange for full public disclosure. The public revelation of truth was conceived as a form of symbolic healing, essential for the moral legitimacy of the new democracy, even as it left unresolved criticisms regarding the lack of material punishment.

In Colombia, the 2016 peace accord introduces the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), which provides alternative sanctions and reparative measures for those who acknowledge responsibility. This pragmatic model of compromise sought to maximize truth-telling, victim participation and the reintegration of former combatants, while in many cases avoiding traditional custodial sentences.

In Rwanda, the Gacaca courts – deeply rooted in local communal practices – enabled the mass processing of genocide-related cases in a relatively short period of time, fostering community involvement and testimonial exchange. Yet they also attracted criticism for shortcomings in procedural safeguards and for the tensions they generated between local justice and international legal standards.

Comparative synthesis: no one-size-fits-all

Taken together, these cases underscore a crucial lesson: there is no “one-size-fits-all” model of transitional justice. Instruments such as conditional amnesty, alternative sanctions and community-based justice must be tailored to the cultural fabric, institutional capacity and expectations of victims in each specific context. As Ambassador Amina Mohamed has stressed, no matter how urgent a political settlement may be, peace will falter unless it is built on a foundation of inclusivity and accountability.[6] Above all, local legitimacy and victim participation emerge as non-negotiable conditions for the durability and credibility of transitional outcomes.

Syria: context and recent institutional developments

Today, Syria stands at a critical juncture between continuity of established practices and the opportunity to innovate a genuinely domestic transitional justice process. In May 2025, transitional authorities established a National Transitional Justice Commission (NCTJ) – mandated to “uncover the truth about the grave violations caused by the former regime, hold those responsible accountable in coordination with the relevant authorities, compensate the victims, and consolidate the principles of non-repetition and national reconciliation” – and a Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) to address over one hundred thousand missing and detained persons. As stated on Amnesty International’s official website, between 2011 and 2024, it is estimated that over 100,000 individuals were subjected to enforced disappearance in Syria.[7] The overwhelming majority were forcibly disappeared by the Assad government within its extensive network of detention facilities, while additional cases have been linked to armed opposition groups.[8] These data clearly underscore the existence of a profound vacuum that must be addressed within a transitional justice process which, as emphasized by relevant international actors, such as Amnesty International and the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), requires transparency, independence and meaningful victim participation.

Syria: sequencing and policy design

Turning these bodies into credible mechanisms demands careful sequencing and a calibrated mix of measures. The ordering of elections, judicial proceedings, refugee returns, and institutional reforms is not neutral: comparative experiences from Sierra Leone and Colombia illustrate that truth-telling, graduated sanctions and non-custodial measures are effective only when paired with credible demobilization and reintegration strategies. At the same time, some grave crimes will demand formal judicial accountability; restorative or administrative measures cannot substitute for prosecution where atrocity crimes are implicated. As the United Nations has emphasized, any transitional-justice process must be nationally owned and sensitive to local conditions, centred on victims’ needs and inclusive of all relevant stakeholders (notably women, youth and minorities).[9] Thus, international actors should support the domestic design and implementation of context-specific, victim-centred processes that address the root causes and structural drivers of violations and thereby contribute to prevention, sustained peace, development and reconciliation.

Syria: memory, participation and legitimacy

Memory and truth are inseparable from institutional capacity: the Balkans and Rwanda demonstrate that public narratives require documentation, witness protection and educational initiatives to prevent revisionism. As Joud Monla-Hassan stresses, transitional justice must be genuinely “Syrian-led”, informed by survivors, civil society and the diaspora[10]; only through meaningful inclusion can the new commissions build legitimacy and public trust. This point is salient given that the transitional authorities’ own legitimacy may be contested: the commissions must therefore demonstrate independence, transparency and representative composition from the outset if they are to earn popular confidence. 

Timing and constitutional framing

Finally, Dr. Paul R. Williams emphasizes the complexity of rebuilding political, legal and social infrastructures after decades of dictatorship and conflict, noting that a return to the pre-war status quo is neither feasible nor desirable. Williams stresses that processes such as refugee returns, elections, establishment of legal mechanisms and institutional stabilization must be carefully coordinated.[11] The transitional period should be time-bound, governed by an interim constitutional framework and guided by a clear public roadmap. Strategic sequencing of these measures is essential, as holding elections prematurely, without an appropriate political and legal foundation, risks creating power vacuums or undermining democratic legitimacy.[12]

Practical recommendations

Building on comparative lessons and the Syrian context, five practical priorities emerge: 1) codify the mandates and legal safeguards for the NCTJ and NCM to guarantee independence and victim-centredness; 2) adopt a publicly negotiated sequencing roadmap that sequences elections, accountability measures and refugee returns by political feasibility and security considerations; 3) design a calibrated mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, including hybrid or internationalized modalities for the gravest crimes; 4) mainstream psychosocial support, reparations and service delivery to tangibly demonstrate benefits to victims; 5) establish independent monitoring and transparency mechanisms (including public reporting and civic oversight) to sustain public trust.

A further step to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of Syria’s emerging transitional justice institutions would be to establish a formal data-sharing framework between the National Transitional Justice Commission (NTJC), the National Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) and the UN-mandated Independent Institution for Missing Persons (IIMP). Such cooperation, grounded in informed victim consent, strict confidentiality and independent oversight, would serve several purposes. First, it would prevent duplication of investigative efforts and inconsistencies across national and international databases. Second, it would accelerate the identification of the disappeared by enabling secure exchange of genetic, testimonial and documentary evidence. Third, it would strengthen transparency and public trust by linking domestic mechanisms with an internationally recognised body. Finally, a harmonised and victim-centred data system would improve families’ access to truth, reparations and psychosocial support, thereby transforming fragmented documentation into meaningful outcomes for survivors.

Conclusion

Syria’s transitional framework stands at a crossroads: it can either generate institutions lacking legitimacy or evolve into a process capable of healing collective wounds and rebuilding social trust. The outcome will hinge on ensuring inclusion, transparency and coherence between memory, accountability and reform. If grounded in meaningful engagement with victims and designed with strategic realism, Syria’s path could offer an innovative model of transitional justice for the wider region.

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[1] The core international crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) are: genocide (article 6), crimes against humanity (article7), war crimes (article 8) and crime of aggression (article 8 bis).

[2] The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) is a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance to parties involved in peace negotiations, drafting post-conflict constitutions, and war crimes prosecution/transitional justice.

[3] United Nations (UN), Guidance note of the secretary-general, “Transitional Justice. A Strategic Tool for People, Prevention and Peace”, 2023, p.2. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/03/202307guidancenotetransitionaljusticeen.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[4] Yvette Stevens, “Transitional justice – Lessons Learned from Sierra Leona” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability)

[5] Igor Lukšić “Case Study: Lessons Learned from Montenegro’s Transition” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[6] Amina Mohamed, “Legal Reforms and Constitution Building” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-governance-and-the-rule-of-law)

[7] Amnesty International, Syria: New Government must ensure Truth, Justice and Reparations for the disappeared, 2025. Available at: https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/syria-new-government-must-ensure-truth-justice-and-reparations-for-the-disappeared/#:~:text=He%20said%20the%20NCM’s%20core,by%20the%20rule%20of%20law.

[8] Ibidem.

[9] United Nations, OCHR: Transitional justice and human rights, 2025. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice

[10] Joud Monla-Hassan, “Domestic and Locally Owned Transitional Justice and State-Building Processes in Syria” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability#:~:text=international%20conferences—on%20the%20future%20of,and%20grounded%20in%20local%20realities) See also Nousha Kabawat, “To Syria’s New Justice Commissions: Victims Need You Now,” 31 July 2025, emphasizing that the new commissions must explicitly recognize violations wherever they occur, advocate for victims without discrimination or political pressure, ensure genuine independence, and reflect Syria’s full diversity in composition and decision-making so that all victims are represented and heard (available at: https://www.ictj.org/latest-news/syria’s-new-justice-commissions-victims-need-you-now#:~:text=independence%20by%20ensuring%20that%20no,see%20themselves%20represented%20and%20heard)

[11] Paul R. Williams, “Introduction to Post-Conflict State Building: Challenges and Opportunities”, presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[12] Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, Marie Forestier, Reimagining Syria: A Roadmap for Peace and Prosperity Beyond Assad, in Middle East Institute, 2025. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/reimagining-syria-roadmap-peace-and-prosperity-beyond-assad#:~:text=supported%20by%20a%20clear%2C%20public,framework%2C%20risks%20undermining%20democratic%20progress

Auther’s Bio

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso holds a bachelor’s in history, Politics and International Relations and is pursuing a master’s in law in Strasbourg with a focus on minority rights. She has over four years of experience in private tutoring. She helps students understand complex historical, political, and legal topics through clear explanations. Based in Catania, she supports learners at different levels.

She can be reached at : roberta.lazzaro15@gmail.com