07 Oct
by : Khaldoon Abdulla
Recently, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has witnessed a series of significant shifts that may seem chaotic and counterproductive. For example, the Kingdom aligned with China and Russia upon joining BRICS+ but subsequently signed the IMEC MoU countering China’s BRI. These fluctuations in Saudi Arabia’s relationships were not limited to its ties with the major powers but were also evident in its regional foreign policy, particularly with Iran and its allies in the region, raising doubts about the consistency of its foreign policy.
The main impetus behind Saudi foreign policy is the Iranian threat, exacerbated by its prominence and geographical proximity. Over the past decade, this threat has been further amplified by Iranian nuclear aspirations and the surge of its regional allies. This situation unfolded amidst the disintegration of the Gulf Cooperation Council, resulting in the isolation of Saudi Arabia, which found itself encircled by Iranian proxies in Yemen and the Fertile Crescent. For the past nine years, Iran has managed to hit Saudi soil with hundreds of missiles, mostly by the Houthis in Yemen, while the only retaliation the Kingdom could take was a prolonged war with the Yemeni insurgents.
Given this, the Kingdom, led by the Crown Prince (MBS), believes a defense treaty with the US is potentially the most effective safeguard for the Kingdom’s security. Yet, this must consider China’s and Russia’s strategic calculations globally and in the Middle East. MBS and the Saudi security establishment understand that despite Iran’s strategic partnership with Russia and China in various sectors, both major powers would be reluctant to jeopardize their national security by engaging in a war on behalf of Iran.
Leveraging this advantage, Saudi Arabia, in concert with its negotiations with the US, adopted a multidimensional foreign policy approach, establishing diplomatic ties with China and Russia to pursue four principal objectives:
First, to firmly assure the Russian and Chinese counterparts of the Kingdom’s unwavering stance of neutrality in the power dynamic between the US and China as well as Russia, stressing that any alignment with the US is strictly confined to regional objectives. Secondly, Saudi Arabia intends to utilize its growing ties with leading nations in the Global South to exert pressure on the US, which imposes stringent conditions on the Saudis, particularly about the normalization of relations with Israel, as will be elaborated upon shortly.
Thirdly, exploring potential Russian and, to a greater extent, Chinese mediation in the Saudi-Iran security dilemma. This strategy was initially fruitful but ultimately collapsed in the aftermath of the October 7th Gaza war. Fourth, contrary to the third objective, Saudi Arabia also intends to establish itself as a more valuable and stable ally to Moscow and Beijing, thereby weakening Tehran’s position in the regional balance of power.
Nonetheless, the Saudi-US negotiations did not witness distinctive progress, as the US sets normalization with Israel as a precondition for its security umbrella, which the Saudis insist must be in exchange for a two-state solution. Though Riyadh and Tel Aviv have never posed a threat to each other, the formal normalization of relations between the two parties could have severe impacts on the Kingdom’s symbolic role in the Muslim world, akin to Egypt after signing Camp David.
Therefore, the two-state solution acts as a balancing strategy for normalization in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, Israeli intransigence obstructs the progression of the deal. The outbreak of the war in Gaza has put Riyadh under immense pressure. On one hand, as Hamas is perceived by the Saudis as an ally to Tehran, their operations on October 7 represented an escalation of the Iranian threat, thus accelerating normalization. Conversely, the Israeli genocide in Gaza will make the consequences of any normalization disastrous for Saudi Arabia unless Israel agrees to a two-state solution, which is unlikely to happen.
Under these circumstances, the Kingdom is stuck between three complicated alternatives: first, the preferable yet most improbable scenario of convincing the White House to separate the security deal from normalization with Israel; second, to normalize relations with Israel and bear the consequences in exchange for a US security guarantee; third, to be left to bear with the surging Iranian regional influence and its nuclear aspirations.
Senior Research Fellow, AMEC
Twitter: https://x.com/KhaldoonA23445/status/1811337468525916284
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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.