Is Ukraine the New Berlin Wall?

By : Khaldoon Abdulla

After the end of World War II, Germany emerged as a focal point in the global balance of power. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 symbolized the geopolitical division between the two superpowers and the new bipolar world order. The wall’s fall in 1989 marked the beginning of a domino effect in the pro-USSR Bloc and the eastward expansion of NATO, which Russia, in decline, could not prevent.

As Putin rose to power with nostalgic and historical aspirations, he understood that repositioning Russia on the international scene required defining a Putin/Russian version of the US Monroe Doctrine amid ongoing NATO expansion, which made the use of force unavoidable. Indeed, from the wars in Chechnya in 1999, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022—not to mention the unconventional and indirect warfare in the Balkans and Caspian Sea regions—Russia has been defining its geopolitical sphere of influence. On the other hand, the US, by expanding NATO and the Liberal International Order, intended to exploit the geopolitical vacuum and use unipolarity to create a favorable and irreversible geopolitical balance.

Located in the heart of Eurasia, Ukraine serves as both a bridge and a buffer between East and West. Consequently, similar to Berlin during the Cold War, it has become the epicenter of new geopolitical tensions. Yet, Ukraine also possesses unique geographical, ethnic, cultural, and religious factors that could lead to division, emphasizing the “Berlin Wall Effect,” if such a term can be used.

Geographically, the post-Soviet state is divided by the Dnieper River into eastern and western blocs, with Kyiv located at the point of contact on the western bank. The West Bank of Ukraine is predominantly Ukrainian-speaking and ethnically Ukrainian, while the East Bank is mostly Russian-speaking and ethnically Russian. Consequently, the ongoing hostilities have exacerbated the pre-existing divisions within the Ukrainian identity.

As such factors were not absent in Washington’s and Moscow’s calculations, three potential interpretations of the situation involving the US, Russia, and Ukraine can be discerned. Since 1990, the US has sought to encircle Russia, believing that a future rising Russia, under encirclement, would succumb to self-consumption and destruction. Therefore, Ukraine has to act as a buffer for Russia and serve as a forward base for Western liberal institutions.

The Russian perspective saw Ukraine as a historical and geopolitical extension of Russia, acting as a gateway to its pivot to the West strategy, such as through the natural gas pipelines. Therefore, Russia’s interest lies in maintaining a strong influence over its neighbor. This was compounded by Ukraine’s failure to maintain a neutral position and pursue a multilateral/multi-dimensional foreign policy, which drew it into the center of the US-Russia security dilemma.

Currently, the US is exploiting Ukraine in a proxy war of attrition against Russia. Meanwhile, Putin, who never wished for a full-scale invasion, intends to integrate the eastern bank into Russia and install an affiliated regime in Kyiv on the adjacent side of the Dnieper. Consequently, this is a war for strategic depth at the expense of Ukraine, with neither side able to secure a decisive victory. Under these circumstances, a settlement in the balance of power ought to define the spheres of influence of the two camps and the new Berlin Wall.

Senior Research Fellow, AMEC

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