By Muad M Zaki. 

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center 

The assumption that Asian—or even Muslim—countries can continue to depend on an unreliable and unpredictable United States, or a visibly weakened Europe, as pillars of global stability must now be rigorously re-examined.

It is true that many Asians, including Muslims and others, were educated in politics, science, and numerous other disciplines in the West, and there remains genuine gratitude for that intellectual legacy. Yet the West that was once admired has steadily eroded due to its own strategic and ideological failures. The free marketplace of ideas and robust protection of free speech—once the cornerstone of Western political appeal—has largely vanished. Today, students paying premium tuition fees in many Western countries no longer encounter the intellectually open and pluralistic environments that earlier generations experienced. Instead, they face expanding regulatory, ideological, and institutional constraints on independent thought and expression.

For those who continue to argue that Asia somehow “owes” the West, the only obligation that remains is to remind Western policymakers why their systems were once respected—because at present, their governance trajectory is moving decisively in reverse gear.

The recent actions of the US neoconservative establishment in Venezuela—including the extraterritorial seizure of its leader and the hurried fabrication of legal justifications for what are fundamentally unlawful acts—underscore how selectively both international law and domestic US law are now applied. This should serve as a clear warning to every independent government that values the rule of law, or at minimum expects consistency and good faith from Washington.

If even long-standing US allies such as Canada and members of the European Union can no longer rely on American commitments, it is unrealistic for Asian states to assume that trade agreements or security arrangements engineered by the US will remain dependable. The strategic risk is simply too high.

Simultaneously, many Asian countries increasingly look toward China for economic partnership and security balance, albeit with unease stemming from Beijing’s long-standing non-interference doctrine. This presents China with a growing strategic dilemma. First, Beijing has effectively lost Venezuela, one of its most dependable economic partners in Latin America. If this lesson is not internalized swiftly, China risks a similar outcome with its most significant strategic partner in the Middle East: Iran.

Should this occur, it is entirely plausible that the US will escalate pressure on Asian states, coercing alignment regardless of domestic public opinion. Washington’s calculation, however, continues to rely on China maintaining strict adherence to non-interference—thereby allowing the US to incrementally encircle China, following a playbook previously deployed against Russia.

At present, China retains a strategic advantage in Asia. Across the region, there are credible political leaders prepared to accept China as a regional political and security anchor—provided China is willing to assume that role decisively. Yet as long as Beijing’s non-interference posture remains unchanged, Asian governments will continue to view open resistance to US pressure as a political and economic gamble, particularly when Chinese intervention is assumed but not guaranteed.

From Beijing’s perspective, substantial resources have rightly been devoted to people-to-people engagement and shared economic prosperity. However, the pace of this approach has not matched the speed or intensity of contemporary US geopolitical adventurism. While long-term societal engagement is essential, China could benefit from selectively adopting foreign-policy methods historically employed by Britain in Asia—particularly in distinguishing between leaders who view China merely as a financial resource for domestic patronage, and those who genuinely value China as a stabilizing regional partner.

As global geopolitics continue to deteriorate, Asia must adapt with realism rather than nostalgia—until, perhaps, the West eventually recognizes that perpetual confrontation and manufactured instability serve no one’s long-term interests.