The Biden administration’s decision to provide Kyiv with access to US ballistic missiles, to be deployed against Russian territory, constitutes a substantial escalation in the ongoing conflict, which extends beyond the physical harm that might be inflicted by the deployed weapon.  Indeed, the significance of the act that compelled Moscow to revise its nuclear doctrine does not lie in the end of targeting Russian territory but in the mean itself.

As a fact, in recent months, the Ukrainian army has conducted several drone strikes against inland Russian military facilities, without significantly altering the rules of engagement between the warring parties. Nonetheless, the use of ballistic missiles, despite their inability to shift the balance of power on the battlefields, is a noteworthy change in the rules of engagement that extends beyond tactical considerations to encompass the entire strategic and geopolitical landscape.

Initially, this would represent a departure from conventional weapon systems by introducing strategic weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads, marking the first instance in history and representing a significant step toward nuclear escalation.

Secondly, this would shift the US and NATO strategy from a proxy war and buck-passing to limited direct involvement, as launching those missiles would necessitate the participation of US satellites and engineers. In this scenario, a Russian retaliation might not be limited to just Ukrainian targets. This could open the floodgates to an uncontrolled spiral of reprisal retaliation and counter-retaliations, escalating fiercely up the escalation ladder. 

Additionally, by such act, the White House would violate the principles that have traditionally guided the military doctrines of the US and the USSR (now Russia) and shaped the relationship between the superpowers. These principles are embodied in formal agreements such as SALT I and SALT II, as well as in the enduring, unwritten norms of nuclear deterrence.

Yet, the Biden administration appears to be taking this risky gamble based on two main assumptions. First, the over-reliance on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence as a restraining factor for Moscow. This perspective suggests that Russians would carefully weigh the consequences of any escalation against the US or its NATO allies, knowing that such actions could provoke a second strike against them.

 Second, the perception of Russia’s banking on Donald Trump’s presidency as a potential turning point in the ongoing conflict, and the US intent to leverage it. This is especially relevant considering the terms outlined in J.D. Vance’s proposed peace draft, which favors Moscow and could lead President Putin to be more tolerant of provocations from the current White House administration.

On the other hand, some might argue that access to US ballistic missiles is nothing more than a last desperate attempt by the current administration to save face in Ukraine before Trump’s presidency, under which the administration would be blamed for its losses. Regardless, in any case, the US is playing with fire amid dry bushes.