Category: Article

How the Middle East Crisis Highlights the Importance of ASEAN’s Strategic Autonomy

By Muad Zaki,

Senior Fellow at Asia Middle East Center

The latest escalation in the Middle East offers an important reminder that modern conflicts rarely remain confined to the region in which they begin. In an era of globalized transportation networks, interconnected supply chains, and expanding military alliances, regional wars can rapidly produce worldwide consequences.

The recent confrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran demonstrates how quickly these ripple effects can emerge. Within days of the escalation, airspace closures across much of the Middle East disrupted one of the world’s most critical aviation corridors linking Europe and Asia. Airlines were forced to reroute or cancel thousands of flights, leaving passengers stranded and driving up travel costs across long-haul routes.

For Southeast Asia, such disruptions carry immediate implications. The Middle East serves as a major transit hub connecting European travelers with tourism destinations across ASEAN. When these routes are interrupted, the economic consequences spread quickly through the region’s tourism sector, aviation industry, and broader service economy.

Beyond these economic disruptions, the crisis also raises deeper questions about how military alliances and foreign basing arrangements can expand the scope of conflicts far beyond their original geography.

International Law and the Expansion of Conflict

Under the United Nations Charter, the use of force between states is generally prohibited except in cases of self-defense. Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of states to respond militarily if they believe they have been subjected to an armed attack.

Once a state invokes this right, however, the geographic scope of confrontation can expand quickly. If military operations are supported through infrastructure located in allied countries — including foreign bases, intelligence facilities or logistical hubs — those installations may become part of the operational landscape of retaliation.

This dynamic helps explain how regional conflicts can widen beyond their original battlefield. When military alliances involve shared infrastructure and operational support across multiple countries, retaliation may extend to facilities located outside the territory of the primary belligerents.

For Southeast Asia, this legal and strategic dynamic is particularly relevant. As security cooperation with extra-regional powers expands, infrastructure located within ASEAN states could become increasingly integrated into wider military architectures. In a major power confrontation, such integration may expose countries in the region to escalation risks that originate far beyond Southeast Asia.

Immediate Economic Ripple Effects

While the legal debates surrounding the conflict continue, the economic consequences were visible almost immediately.

Airspace closures across parts of the Gulf forced airlines to divert flights around the conflict zone, increasing travel times, raising fuel costs, and reducing flight capacity across long-distance routes.

Within days, global travel markets reacted. Airlines canceled flights, ticket prices increased, and tourism operators began warning of potential slowdowns in international travel.

For Southeast Asia, these disruptions are particularly significant. Tourism-dependent economies such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore rely heavily on visitors from Europe and the Middle East. When flights between these regions are disrupted, tourism flows decline and hospitality industries quickly feel the impact.

Maritime trade has also been affected. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints for both energy supplies and international trade. Rising tensions in the region have already prompted shipping companies to reassess routes and increase insurance premiums for vessels operating in the area.

For export-oriented Asian economies, disruptions to global logistics networks translate into higher transportation costs, delayed shipments, and increased uncertainty in supply chains.

In short, a regional military confrontation can rapidly produce global economic consequences.

Strategic Implications for ASEAN

For ASEAN policymakers, the deeper lesson from the Middle East crisis concerns the long-term risks associated with alliance structures and foreign military basing arrangements.

Southeast Asia has historically pursued a strategy of strategic neutrality. By avoiding deep alignment with competing geopolitical blocs, ASEAN has been able to maintain regional stability while engaging economically with multiple major powers.

This balancing strategy has allowed ASEAN states to benefit from economic ties with China while maintaining security cooperation with the United States and other partners.

However, neutrality can erode gradually.

Security agreements often begin as limited cooperation—joint military exercises, maritime patrols, or defense dialogues. Over time, these arrangements can evolve into deeper military integration involving expanded basing access, intelligence infrastructure, and logistical networks.

Once foreign military infrastructure becomes embedded within national territory, a country’s strategic autonomy may begin to narrow. In the event of conflict between major powers, such facilities could become integrated into broader military operations.

The Middle East crisis illustrates how quickly these dynamics can unfold. Within just days, the consequences of the conflict spread beyond the battlefield, affecting global travel networks, shipping routes, and economic markets.

For Southeast Asia, this underscores the risks associated with becoming structurally embedded within the military architectures of external powers.

Policy Advice for ASEAN

The unfolding crisis in the Middle East highlights the importance of preserving ASEAN’s strategic autonomy in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.

First, ASEAN governments should carefully reassess deeper participation in U.S.-led security arrangements that could gradually embed the region within external military architectures. While security cooperation may offer short-term benefits, foreign basing arrangements or operational military partnerships may expose ASEAN states to greater risks if conflicts between major powers escalate.

Second, ASEAN policymakers should review the region’s structural dependence on access to the U.S. consumer market. In an era where economic relations are increasingly shaped by geopolitical considerations, particularly as Washington’s Middle East policy remains closely aligned with Israel, overreliance on a single external market may create long-term strategic vulnerabilities.

Third, ASEAN should strengthen regional resilience by diversifying both its economic partnerships and its security dialogues. Greater engagement with neighboring powers, including China, alongside stronger intra-ASEAN economic integration, may provide a more balanced foundation for regional stability.

At the same time, ASEAN policymakers must recognize that threat perceptions within the region are not uniform. Several member states remain primarily concerned with maritime disputes in the South China Sea, while others place greater emphasis on maintaining neutrality amid intensifying major-power rivalry.

Recent developments in the Middle East also illustrate how the strategic priorities of external powers can shift during crises. In the current confrontation involving Israel and Iran, U.S. military resources have been deployed primarily to defend Israel and support Israeli security operations, even as tensions across the Gulf have raised concerns among Washington’s traditional regional partners. This dynamic highlights the reality that the security priorities of external powers are ultimately shaped by their own alliances and geopolitical calculations.

For ASEAN, these developments underscore the importance of reassessing long-standing assumptions about external security guarantees. Strengthening regional cooperation and maintaining strategic autonomy within Asia may provide a more stable foundation for Southeast Asian security than reliance on external powers whose priorities can change rapidly during international crises.

Preserving ASEAN’s long-standing strategic autonomy will require careful calibration of external partnerships so that Southeast Asia remains a center of stability rather than a frontline in great-power rivalry.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

24 FebArticle

From Ukraine to Taiwan: Why ASEAN Must Prepare for the Next Phase of Great-Power Proxy Politics

By Muad M Zaki.

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center

The conflict in Ukraine did not emerge in a vacuum. It was preceded by years of legislative positioning, security assistance, narrative framing, and political signalling that incrementally narrowed diplomatic space and hardened opposing camps. Today, similar instruments are being assembled in the Indo-Pacific, —this time around Taiwan.

For ASEAN governments, the danger is not limited to a potential cross-Strait crisis. The greater strategic risk lies in how intensified U.S.–China competition may instrumentalise Southeast Asia internally, weakening ASEAN cohesion through political fragmentation, selective alignment, and domestic interference. For Chinese policymakers, this trajectory signals that as more Western states diversify or recalibrate their strategic ties toward China, Washington’s incentives to fracture regional unity where it lacks control will only grow.

The Ukraine Precedent: Escalation Without a Single Trigger

Ukraine demonstrates how a major power conflict can be cultivated without an immediate casus belli. Long before February 2022, Ukraine had already become embedded in a web of external security cooperation, military training programs, arms transfers, sanctions regimes, and diplomatic commitments that made neutrality increasingly untenable.

Crucially, escalation occurred through policy architecture, not sudden decisions. Legislative acts, multilateral coordination mechanisms, and political signalling created an environment in which confrontation became structurally likely,—even if not inevitable.

This pattern matters because it shows how proxy dynamics are not accidental; they are built.

Taiwan as the Next Structural Flashpoint

Taiwan is now being positioned within a similar architecture. U.S. congressional initiatives, security cooperation frameworks, and strategic communications increasingly treat Taiwan less as a status-quo issue and more as a forward line in a broader containment strategy aimed at China.

This concern is not confined to analysts. In opposing the PROTECT Taiwan Act, Thomas Massie warned that such legislation mirrors the type of commitments discussed prior to the Ukraine war and risks drawing the United States into another foreign conflict through pre-commitment rather than deliberation.

For Beijing, Taiwan is an internal issue that has been deliberately internationalised. For Washington, Taiwan is increasingly framed as a test case for credibility, deterrence, and alliance leadership. These framings are fundamentally incompatible, —and that incompatibility generates risk for the entire region.

Why ASEAN Is Strategically Exposed

ASEAN’s vulnerability does not stem from weakness, but from centrality. As U.S. strategic focus shifts toward Asia, Southeast Asia becomes both a prize and a pressure point.

Three dynamics deserve particular attention:

Political Fragmentation as Strategy

Where direct control is limited, influence often shifts inward and—toward shaping domestic political outcomes. Support for particular political factions, civil society groups, media narratives, or elite networks can gradually polarise societies along external alignment lines. Over time, this erodes ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making model from within.

Selective Alignment Pressure

As individual ASEAN states deepen economic or strategic ties with China, external pressure will likely increase to pull them back into competitive blocs. This pressure may not take the form of overt coercion, but rather conditional partnerships, reputational framing, and internal political leverage.

Intelligence and Information Vulnerability

Foreign interference today rarely resembles Cold War espionage. It operates through influence operations, funding channels, narrative amplification, and regulatory pressure points. Without coordinated counter-interference frameworks, ASEAN states risk becoming laboratories for proxy competition.

The Canada Signal —and Why It Matters

Recent recalibrations by countries such as Canada and other traditional U.S. partners toward deeper engagement with China—particularly on trade, climate, and multilateral diplomacy—carry an unintended consequence: they reduce Washington’s leverage within its traditional alliance network.

Historically, when external alignment space narrows, competitive powers compensate by seeking advantage in regions where institutional cohesion is weaker or contested. ASEAN, by virtue of its diversity and non-alignment tradition, becomes a natural target.

For ASEAN policymakers, this means that external rivalry may increasingly manifest as internal stress rather than external confrontation.

Implications for Chinese Policymakers

For Beijing, the lesson of Ukraine is not simply about military escalation; it is about how political ecosystems are shaped long before conflict begins. As China’s global partnerships expand—including with Western middle powers—U.S. strategy is likely to focus less on direct containment and more on preventing the consolidation of alternative regional orders.

ASEAN unity, particularly when economically integrated with China, represents such an alternative.

This suggests that China’s long-term interests aligns with ASEAN institutional resilience, non-interference norms, and regional autonomy —rather than accelerated bloc politics that could legitimise external intervention.

What ASEAN Governments Should Do Now

This is not a call for alignment, but for strategic self-defence.

ASEAN governments should consider:

Strengthening internal cohesion mechanisms
Reinforce ASEAN’s consensus model and resist bilateral arrangements that undermine regional unity.
Enhancing counter-interference capacity
Intelligence services must adapt from counter-espionage to counter-influence through— tracking political funding, narrative coordination, and external leverage operations.
Preserving strategic ambiguity collectively
Neutrality is most credible when exercised as a bloc, not as individual states under pressure.
Separating economic cooperation from security rivalry
ASEAN should continue engaging all major powers economically while insulating domestic political processes from external strategic agendas.

Policy Recommendation

Ukraine shows the cost of becoming the arena through which great powers manage rivalry. Taiwan risks becoming the next test case. ASEAN must ensure it does not become the silent third.

The choice facing Southeast Asia is not between Washington and Beijing, but between regional autonomy and strategic fragmentation. Autonomy requires unity, vigilance, and the insulation of domestic politics from external influence, regardless of its source.

History is clear: proxy conflicts rarely begin with war, yet—and rarely end where they start.

Mr. Muad M Zaki

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

24 FebArticle

Example of Force: The United States and What Lies Ahead for ASEAN

By Abel Josafat Manullang
The international system we live in now has witnessed numerous tumultuous chapters in the past year alone. From the development in the Middle East to the ongoing war in Eastern Europe, one giant was present through it all: the United States.

Recently, the US has embarked on some voyages that caused ripples across the globe. The unilateral tariffs and the following transactional diplomacy that followed are the harbingers of what is to come from the US under its new administration.

However, these unilateral moves do not exclusively revolve around trade activities. The recent capture of Venezuela president in its own national territory and the recent blockade on Cuba’s oil access demonstrated just how unrestrained the US can be in advancing its interests.

These moves from the US signify a change in its approach to its pursuit of interests. It demonstrates how selective the US has come to value the many international institutions it has spearheaded and stood by in the past. In other words, it now relies on its example of force as opposed to the force of its example.

To add to this, the capriciousness of the US is also important to note, primarily in the way it defines its interests and security, which may result in abandonment of its past commitments. With such a giant on the horizon, not to mention one that many states have developed a reliance on, it will inevitably force changes to the way they manage their ties with the US.

The heart of the Indo-Pacific: ASEAN and Southeast Asia

The capricious nature of the US causes concerns for many states, including here in Southeast Asia. Other writers have posited that the same fate that befell Venezuela can also manifest in Southeast Asia. There exist some holes that can be poked by the US should it find the region and the timing fitting for its interests. This is further amplified by how some states there have leaned closer to either the US or China.

When talking about Southeast Asia, one cannot dismiss its regional bloc, ASEAN, which has witnessed various developments both internally and externally. For the former, ASEAN has come to cater to new fields in which the interests of its member states lie. The same goes for the latter, as it bridges its member states’ interests with those of the external partners. As a result, it is no surprise that ASEAN has come to have its centrality in the region.

While ASEAN’s centrality can still be felt with its vast network of partners, ASEAN must navigate the future with extreme caution in the strategic landscape. It is true that the US has its attention on accentuating its presence in the Western Hemisphere, but one cannot eliminate its presence in the Indo-Pacific as its object of interest, especially given the strong show of force it has there.

To add it up, its recent moves can be seen as warning shots for everyone, including Southeast Asia as the heart of the Indo-Pacific, that the US would take a no-holds-barred approach in pursuing its interests or responding to anyone it deems as a threat. For this, as Hoang Thi Ha and Aries A. Arugay note, it is important for the region to overcome its vulnerabilities lest the US use it as a pretext to accentuate its presence in the region. While the prior Cambodia-Thailand conflict was not used as a pretext for something akin to Venezuela’s case, the capricious nature of the US makes it best to reduce any leeway that can be capitalized.

Amidst the presence of a capricious and powerful giant, ASEAN’s relevance and centrality will be tested. This puts in more considerations, given the already enormous attention the region has received, specifically from the US and China. For all of China’s far-reaching presence, one cannot discount the presence and influence the US has as a Pacific power. To this end, ASEAN needs to maintain its centrality hand in hand with that of the US, considering the interconnectedness they share.

Additionally, ASEAN also needs to bolster its ties with its other partners. For this, ASEAN can benefit from the many strategic partnerships it has developed over the decades. They can serve as the foundation for more diversified ties that can cushion any tumults that emerge from the unilateral strides of the US or other partners. Such a feat is not only something that won’t cause alarm, given ASEAN’s record, but it also resonates with its other partners who seek to diversify their ties.

Now, with the long road ahead in 2026, ASEAN and its member states must brace themselves for the volatile landscape before them. Against such a rough sea, the states of Southeast Asia have the choice to use ASEAN as the very forum to harmonize and synergize their strides. Afterall, for all its shortcomings, ASEAN still has countless things to offer. However, it can only be materialized provided the member states have the willingness to navigate through their differences.

The fork in the road will then open the door for the question of whether ASEAN persist and maintains its cohesion as a regional bloc or will it succumb to the force of the great powers. The answer to this question will show itself over the coming months and years.

About the writer:

Abel Josafat Manullang is a writer at SiPalingHI! Media and a researcher of the Research Development House. He has developed numerous works surrounding maritime security and regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and other regions, which can be accessed through his Google Scholar page. Instagram: instagram.com/abel_jman

23 FebArticle

The Kurdish Question in the Middle East: A Comparative Perspective

By Beatrice Liverzani:

The Kurdish political landscape is shaped by a complex and evolving pursuit of self-governance across four states—Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—each of which presents distinct political, legal, and historical conditions. Despite shared linguistic and cultural markers, Kurdish political trajectories have diverged significantly, reflecting the interaction between post-imperial state formation, regional security considerations, and international legal norms as described by Gunter, (2014).

Historical Roots and the Absence of Kurdish Statehood

Kurdish aspirations for self-determination emerged prominently in the aftermath of the First World War, influenced by international principles such as Wilson’s Fourteen Points and early post-Ottoman treaties. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) initially envisaged the possibility of Kurdish autonomy, while the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) ultimately consolidated the territorial integrity of the new Turkish Republic and neighbouring states, effectively excluding Kurdish claims from the emerging international order (Gunter, 2014).

From the perspective of international law, this settlement embedded a structural constraint on Kurdish secession. The principle of territorial integrity became dominant, while external self-determination remained applicable primarily to decolonisation contexts. As a result, Kurdish claims were subsumed within the sovereignty of existing states, leaving autonomy and minority rights as the primary—though uneven—avenues for political recognition.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the post-Lausanne order did more than delimit borders; it institutionalised a regional norm that external actors have been reluctant to disrupt. Even major powers that have tactically cooperated with Kurdish actors, such as the United States in Iraq and Syria, have stopped short of endorsing Kurdish statehood. This reflects a broader international consensus: while minority protections may be encouraged, redrawing borders in the Middle East risks cascading instability. Thus, Kurdish aspirations are evaluated not only through legal doctrine but also through geopolitical risk calculus.

For regional governments, Kurdish self-determination is not viewed in isolation. It is perceived through the prism of precedent. Any concession that resembles secession could embolden parallel claims elsewhere, whether ethnic, sectarian, or regional. Diplomatically, this creates a shared, even if rarely coordinated, interest among Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tehran in preventing full Kurdish independence, even when their bilateral relations remain adversarial.

Iraq: Institutionalised Autonomy Without Sovereignty

Among the four scenarios, Iraq represents the most evolved form of Kurdish self-rule. Since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the early 1990s, Iraqi Kurds have exercised a substantial degree of de facto autonomy. This process was later consolidated following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which reshaped the country’s political system and formally recognised the Kurdistan Region within a federal framework. As Gunter (2014) argues, under the leadership of Masoud Barzani, who served as President of the Kurdistan Region from 2005 to 2017, the KRG expanded its institutional capacity, consolidating authority over regional governance, education, and security forces, including the Peshmerga.

This autonomy, however, has been shaped by internal political divisions, particularly the 1994 civil war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which exposed the challenges of Kurdish political fragmentation and competing centres of authority within the region (Gunter, 2014). Moreover, Kurdish identity within Iraq has historically occupied an ambivalent position in national narratives. As reflected in Iraqi Arabic-language literature, Kurdish experiences were often marginalised or portrayed as peripheral to Iraqi national identity, reinforcing perceptions of Kurds as outsiders or potential challenges to state unity (Zeidel, 2011).

Despite post-1991 political transformations and increased engagement between Arab and Kurdish regions, Kurdish representation in Iraqi cultural and political discourse remains uneven. According to Zeidel (2011), this suggests that while autonomy has been institutionalised at the political and administrative level, it has not fully translated into broader societal integration within the Iraqi national framework.

From a diplomatic perspective, the Iraqi case demonstrates the outer limits of what the international system is currently willing to tolerate. The 2017 Kurdish independence referendum illustrated this boundary clearly. Despite strong domestic support within the Kurdistan Region, regional states uniformly opposed the move, and international actors declined to recognise the outcome. Baghdad’s reassertion of authority over disputed territories, including Kirkuk, proceeded without meaningful external resistance.

This episode underscores a critical diplomatic lesson: autonomy may be negotiated, but sovereignty remains guarded by both regional consensus and international inertia. The Kurdistan Regional Government today operates within a delicate equilibrium—leveraging energy diplomacy, foreign investment, and security partnerships, while avoiding steps that would trigger collective regional pushback.

Turkey: Identity, Security, and Contested Integration

In Turkey, the Kurdish question has been primarily framed as an issue of national unity and internal security. As Loizides (2010) notes, Kurdish national identity developed comparatively late, shaped by geographic dispersion, internal fragmentation, and prolonged state policies aimed at linguistic and cultural homogenisation. The Turkish state’s Kemalist ideology historically denied the existence of distinct ethnic identities, restricting Kurdish language use and political expression, which paradoxically contributed to the consolidation of Kurdish ethnic consciousness (Loizides, 2010).

Kurdish political movements in Turkey have adopted varied strategies, ranging from armed resistance to political participation and civil society mobilisation. Influenced by Abdullah Öcalan’s concept of Democratic Confederalism, segments of the Kurdish movement have articulated alternatives to statehood, advocating decentralised governance, cultural recognition, and participatory democracy without formal secession (Gunter, 2014).

From a realist perspective, Turkey’s response reflects a prioritisation of territorial integrity and regime security. Loizides (2010) observes that while limited political openings, such as EU-related reforms, diaspora media, and legal changes, have facilitated expressions of Kurdish identity, Kurdish demands continue to be assessed through a security lens, constraining institutional accommodation.

However, realism alone does not fully capture Ankara’s evolving calculations. Turkey’s Kurdish policy is also shaped by its external diplomatic positioning—particularly relations with the European Union, NATO allies, and neighbouring Syria and Iraq. Periods of reform have often coincided with moments when Ankara sought to project democratic credentials internationally. Conversely, heightened security operations have tended to align with domestic political consolidation and regional instability.

Diplomatically, Turkey seeks to prevent the internationalisation of its Kurdish issue. It resists framing the matter as one of minority rights subject to external adjudication and instead asserts sovereign jurisdiction. This approach reflects a broader regional sensitivity: once internal identity conflicts become items on international diplomatic agendas, external leverage increases. Hence, Ankara’s consistent effort to define the issue primarily through a counterterrorism framework rather than as one of self-determination.

Syria: De Facto Autonomy and Recent Developments

In Syria, Kurdish political space expanded significantly during the civil war, as Kurdish-led administrations established de facto autonomous governance structures aligned with Democratic Confederalist principles (Gunter, 2014). These arrangements prioritised local councils, gender equality, and cultural recognition, while formally rejecting statehood claims.

Recent developments suggest a shift in the Syrian state’s approach. In 2026, Damascus issued a decree granting citizenship to stateless Kurds, recognising Kurdish as a national language and signalling an attempt to reintegrate Kurdish populations within a reconstituted state framework (Al Jazeera, 2026). These steps have taken place amid shifting military and diplomatic circumstances, including cooperation with Russia, and reflect the incorporation of Kurdish governance arrangements into broader processes of national consolidation.

The Syrian case introduces an additional diplomatic complexity: Kurdish actors have emerged not merely as domestic stakeholders but as intermediaries within broader geopolitical competition. Their cooperation with U.S.-led forces as local security partners, subsequent negotiations with Damascus, and tactical coordination with Russia illustrate how sub-state actors can acquire strategic relevance beyond their demographic weight.

Yet this relevance remains conditional. External powers have supported Kurdish-led administrations insofar as they serve immediate security objectives. Long-term political recognition, however, remains contingent upon reconciliation with central state authority. This reinforces a pattern observable across the region: Kurdish leverage increases during moments of state fragmentation but contracts as central governments reconstitute control.

Comparative Observations

Across all four cases, Kurdish political trajectories reflect the limits imposed by international norms, regional power balances, and domestic state structures. While Iraq demonstrates the possibility of sustained autonomy within a federal framework, Turkey and Iran continue to prioritise integration and security, and Syria’s evolving position remains closely tied to post-conflict state reconstruction.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the Kurdish question ultimately tests the flexibility of the Westphalian state system in the Middle East. It raises a recurring tension between stability and representation: regional governments prioritise territorial integrity, while Kurdish movements prioritise political recognition and self-administration. International actors, meanwhile, oscillate between normative support for minority rights and pragmatic commitment to existing borders.

The comparative evidence suggests that the future of Kurdish politics will not be determined by a singular breakthrough toward independence, but by incremental negotiations over autonomy, integration, and decentralisation. Where states perceive accommodation as strengthening stability, political space may expand. Where identity claims are securitised, political contraction is likely to follow.

In this sense, the Kurdish question remains less a frozen conflict than an evolving diplomatic negotiation embedded within broader regional transformations.

Bibliography

Gunter, M., M. (2014), “Unrecognized De Facto States in World Politics: The Kurds.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 20 (2): 161–178.

Loizides, N., G (2010), “State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 46 (4): 513–527.

Zeidel, R. (2011), “The Iraqi Novel and the Kurds.” Review of Middle East Studies 45 (1): 19–34.

Al Jazeera (2026), “Syria Grants Immediate Citizenship to Kurds in Wake of Gains against SDF.” January 29, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/29/syria-grants-immediate-citizenship-to-kurds-in-wake-of-gains-against-sdf.

23 FebArticle

Foreign Direct Investment: Why Asia Must Reframe Its Economic Strategy

By: Muad Zaki,

Senior Fellow at Asia Middle East Center (AMEC)

For much of the past decade, foreign direct investment (FDI) was treated by governments as a largely technical and economic matter. Policymakers focused on macroeconomic stability, incentives, infrastructure readiness, and regulatory predictability. The underlying assumption was that global capital flowed within a broadly stable international framework—one governed by shared rules, multilateral institutions, and predictable norms. That framework has now broken.

Across Asia, including Malaysia, growth strategies were built on openness to investment from multiple directions, the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and China. Non-alignment was not merely a diplomatic posture; it was an economic strategy made possible by an international system that rewarded neutrality and constrained unilateral coercion. For years, this allowed Asian economies to attract capital while remaining largely insulated from geopolitical confrontation.

Those conditions no longer hold. Foreign direct investment today operates in an international environment where prior assumptions about restraint, enforcement, and predictability have collapsed. Economic integration is no longer insulated from power politics. Capital flows are increasingly shaped by geopolitical pressure, strategic rivalry, and long-term alignment considerations, alongside traditional market fundamentals.

This reality was stated plainly at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, when Mark Carney declared that the post-Cold War rules-based international order has already ruptured. His assessment was not a warning about future risk, but a diagnosis of present conditions. Trade, finance, supply chains, and regulatory systems are now routinely used as instruments of pressure rather than neutral mechanisms of cooperation. For a country as closely integrated with the United States as Canada, this public admission carried particular weight. For small and middle powers, the implications are even more serious.

In this fragmented global environment, sovereignty is increasingly respected only when it aligns with the strategic priorities of major powers. The experience of Venezuela illustrates this reality. External pressure was accompanied by unusually explicit statements linking strategic objectives directly to access to natural resources. Whatever one’s view of Venezuela’s domestic politics, the precedent is clear: when strategic assets are involved, international legal norms and multilateral restraint can be sidelined.

A similar logic, —expressed without military force,— was evident in Greenland. U.S. interest in Greenland was framed around security and strategic necessity, prompting firm rejection by Greenlandic and Danish authorities. The episode demonstrated that even stable, developed territories are not immune to from external pressure when geography or resources carry strategic value. These cases matter not because they are identical, but because they reflect a broader pattern with direct implications for long-term economic and investment policy.

Any serious discussion of foreign direct investment in Asia must also acknowledge the central role played by China in the region’s economic development over the past decade. Chinese investment has been a major driver of infrastructure expansion, industrial capacity building, manufacturing growth, logistics connectivity, and energy development across Asia, including Malaysia. These investments have focused on long-term economic fundamentals, such as—transport networks, industrial zones, ports, energy systems, and production facilities, —that directly support national development strategies and regional integration.

From the perspective of Asian governments and policymakers, Chinese investment has been widely regarded as practical, development-focused, and economically complementary. It has addressed financing gaps in large-scale projects that require scale, patience, and long investment horizons, often in areas where other sources of capital were limited or constrained. Importantly, China’s approach to investment engagement in Asia has emphasised economic outcomes rather than ideological or cultural conditionality, allowing host countries to pursue growth and infrastructure modernisation while preserving domestic policy autonomy.

At the same time, multinational corporations are adjusting rapidly to this new global landscape. Large firms now maintain dedicated geopolitical risk and strategic foresight units that assess medium- and long-term scenarios. These teams do not ask whether the old international system will return. They ask how host countries will manage alignment pressures once strategic competition intensifies further. The central concern for investors is policy durability and—whether regulatory frameworks, market access conditions, and compliance obligations will remain coherent over five to ten years.

In this context, countries that attempt to indefinitely hedge between competing power centres may be perceived as facing future policy disruption. This is not a judgement on the legitimacy of hedging, but a reflection of the narrowing space for sustained neutrality in a world where economic relations are increasingly politicised.

The breakdown of shared rules has also transformed how major powers approach investment. Foreign direct investment is increasingly used as leverage. Market access, technology cooperation, and even security partnerships are tied to political expectations. Policy signals from Washington suggest that preferential treatment for U.S. firms may become more explicit, sometimes at the expense of Canadian or European investors. Security arrangements can further complicate this environment when they indirectly constrain economic policy and raise questions about long-term regulatory independence.

At the same time, strategic divergence between the United States and the European Union, alongside Canada’s public reassessment of its global posture, is reshaping global investment behaviour. European scrutiny of major U.S. technology firms reflects a broader effort to reclaim regulatory and political autonomy in an increasingly fragmented international system. For Asia, this fragmentation presents both risks and opportunities.

What this means for Asian policymakers is clear. Foreign direct investment frameworks designed for a stable, rules-based international order are no longer sufficient. Governments must move from a model of passive investment attraction to one of strategic investment management. This requires integrating geopolitical foresight into economic policy, providing long-term clarity and predictability to investors, strengthening regional coordination within ASEAN, and embedding safeguards that protect sovereignty while preserving openness to productive partnerships.

This is not about choosing sides. It is about reducing vulnerability to coercion in a world where coercion has become normalised. The greatest risk facing policymakers today is not misjudgement, but delay. The assumption that the global system will self-correct has already been overtaken by events.Foreign direct investment will continue to flow. But in the current global environment, how it is governed —and the strategic clarity that underpins it —will increasingly determine not only economic outcomes, but national resilience itself.

Mr. Muad M Zaki

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

10 FebArticle

Starlink and the Risks of Digital Power Politics in the Middle East

By Muad M Zaki.

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center

For more than a decade, U.S. strategy has searched for ways to influence political outcomes abroad without repeating the political and human costs of direct military intervention. Wars are expensive, electorally damaging, and increasingly unpopular across Western societies. In this environment, technology has been elevated as a substitute for force, capable of applying pressure, shaping narratives, and sustaining political movements without crossing the threshold of armed conflict.

The confrontation surrounding Starlink and Iran exposes the limits—and dangers—of that assumption. What began as a non-kinetic experiment in influence has not only failed to deliver decisive outcomes but, has also accelerated military escalation while raising fundamental questions about sovereignty, international law, and the reliability of shared communications infrastructure for allies as well as adversaries.

At its core, this is not a story about satellites or bandwidth. It is about whether privately owned technology can be selectively deployed to advance state objectives without undermining the legal order it claims to support.

The Strategic Appeal of Starlink

From a U.S. strategic perspective, Starlink appeared to offer something unprecedented: a transnational communications layer that does not rely on domestic infrastructure and is therefore difficult for states to control. Satellite terminals operate independently of national networks, creating the perception that connectivity could be sustained even when governments attempted to shut information flows down.

Strategically, this offered three advantages. First, circumvention without invasion. Political pressure could be applied without troops or airstrikes, avoiding escalation and the costs of kinetic force. Second, persistence. Because the infrastructure was external, it was assumed to be resilient to state countermeasures. Third, political insulation. As a privately owned commercial service, Starlink could be presented as neutral technology even when its effects aligned closely with U.S. foreign-policy objectives.

In practice, Starlink functioned as a pressure-sustaining infrastructure, capable of maintaining internal connectivity during periods of unrest while preserving external narrative access. This role reflected operational decisions about where, when, and for whom access would be enabled.

Domestic Constraints and Strategic Incentives

These assumptions cannot be separated from political realities in Washington. For President Donald Trump, the costs of direct confrontation with Iran are not abstract. Military escalation in the Middle East carries clear electoral risks, particularly ahead of midterm elections, when public tolerance for new conflicts is limited.

This has produced a visible split within the U.S. policy establishment. On one side are interventionist factions pressing for decisive action against Iran, even at the risk of regional war. On the other are “America First” voices that view foreign conflict as a political liability and urge concentration on domestic priorities. In this context, technology-driven pressure appeared to offer a compromise: influence outcomes without triggering a war that could destabilize domestic politics.

The Miscalculation

What was underestimated was not Iran’s technical capacity alone, but the breadth of its statecraft, particularly its anticipation that non-kinetic pressure would be paired with covert, intelligence-driven efforts to destabilize its internal security environment.

Rather than attempting to destroy satellites or escalate militarily, Iran focused on denying usability within its territory. States do not need to control infrastructure globally; they need only control the legal, physical, and electromagnetic environment in which it operates domestically.

Iran combined electromagnetic interference, criminal enforcement against unlicensed communications equipment, and physical deterrence through confiscation and penalties. These measures raised the personal cost of reliance on the system and sharply reduced its strategic utility. Importantly, they fall squarely within established principles of international law governing spectrum regulation and telecommunications.

The Neutrality Claim and the Gaza Test

The episode also exposes a deeper inconsistency in claims that Starlink operates as a neutral or humanitarian platform.

If satellite connectivity were genuinely deployed to protect civilians, journalists, and medical workers during crises, Gaza would represent the clearest possible case for its use. For more than two full years, Gaza has endured sustained large-scale civilian destruction, the collapse of medical infrastructure, mass displacement, and prolonged information blackouts, conditions widely recognized as genocide under international law by United Nations investigative mechanisms and reflected in proceedings before international courts under the 1948 Genocide Convention.

Yet during this two-year period, Starlink did not provide unrestricted, civilian-focused access to doctors, hospitals, journalists, or humanitarian organizations operating under siege. This absence is not a technical oversight or logistical delay. After two years, it can only be understood as a deliberate political choice.

Selective deployment across crises transforms a technology from a neutral humanitarian tool into a discretionary instrument aligned with geopolitical priorities.

Alignment With U.S. Policy and the Risks Ahead

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Starlink has been used selectively in ways that support U.S. foreign-policy objectives, including in contexts where those objectives conflict with international legal obligations. Under international law, particularly the Genocide Convention, states and relevant actors have a duty to prevent genocide where possible. Withholding a capability that could materially assist civilians during a legally recognized genocide, while deploying that same capability elsewhere to sustain political pressure, carries legal and normative significance.

History suggests that escalation rarely begins with overt military strikes. It is more often preceded by covert action, intelligence operations, and proxy dynamics designed to weaken a target state from within. The Syrian war offers a sobering precedent: networks activated for short-term leverage quickly escaped control, producing regional instability that far outlasted their original objectives.

A similar risk now looms in the context of Iran. Such tactics may appear to offer deniability and leverage, but experience suggests they carry profound risks.

Europe and Global Consequences

The most significant danger revealed by the Starlink–Iran episode is not escalation with Iran alone, but the normalization of digital infrastructure as an instrument of geopolitical coercion. When private technology platforms can be selectively enabled or withheld in line with strategic priorities, they cease to function as neutral commercial services and instead become extensions of state power.

For Europe, the implications are acute. European states are deeply exposed to energy volatility, inflationary shocks, misinformation and political fragmentation driven by external crises. Yet they are also increasingly dependent on U.S.-based private infrastructure that operates under American jurisdiction. The Starlink precedent raises an unavoidable question: if such technologies can be used selectively against adversaries today, what guarantees exist that they will not be leveraged tomorrow in moments of transatlantic disagreement?

This is not a hypothetical concern. The selective deployment of Starlink—active in some politically aligned contexts, absent during two years of legally recognized genocide in Gaza—demonstrates that access is shaped by power, not principle. Once that reality is acknowledged, trust in shared infrastructure inevitably erodes.

The danger ahead is not simply escalation with Iran. It is the normalization of a system in which communications infrastructure becomes another instrument of coercion—quiet, deniable, and increasingly difficult to trust—undermining the sovereignty of independent states and destabilizing the international order.

Mr. Muad M Zaki

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

20 JanArticle

Canada–China Engagement in a Shifting Global Order: A Strategic Reset with Broader Implications for Asia—and Beyond

By: Muad Zaki,

Canada’s renewed engagement with China is often described as a tactical response to near-term geopolitical pressures. That interpretation understates what is unfolding.

What is taking shape reflects a deeper recognition: the assumptions that once governed alliance predictability, trade continuity, and economic risk are no longer reliable. Middle powers are adjusting accordingly—not loudly, not ideologically, but decisively.

The recent visit by the Canadian prime minister to Beijing, and the steps toward normalization that followed, signal an understanding that stability can no longer be assumed. In an environment shaped by persistent volatility—much of it originating from policy unpredictability in Washington—strategic resilience is increasingly defined by diversification rather than alignment alone.

Strategic Realism in an Era of U.S.-Driven Volatility

For decades, Canada operated within a U.S.-led economic system assumed to be institutionally stable. That assumption has weakened. The United States government has increasingly relied on unilateral trade actions, transactional diplomacy, and policy reversals driven by domestic political cycles.

These measures have affected allies as readily as adversaries. For export-dependent economies, this volatility translates directly into risk—discouraging investment, complicating planning, and exposing domestic sectors to external political shocks.

Canada’s recalibration should therefore be understood not as a rejection of partnership, but as a rational response to structural uncertainty.

Why Asia, and Why China

Asia remains the principal engine of global growth, and China sits at the center of global production and trade networks. Engagement reflects economic structure rather than political alignment.

Stabilizing relations with China expands Canada’s strategic options, strengthens supply-chain resilience, and reduces exposure to abrupt external shocks. In a deeply interdependent system, optionality has become a core strategic asset.

From Risk Mitigation to Structural Rebalancing

Engagement with China may begin as risk mitigation, but its longer-term implications are potentially far more consequential.

History suggests that shifts in global order rarely begin with declarations. They emerge through accumulated decisions taken by states adjusting to instability. Over time, those adjustments reshape strategic gravity.

If sustained, Canada’s recalibration may come to be viewed as an early indicator of a broader transition—one in which middle powers move away from singular strategic concentration toward more distributed and pragmatic alignment patterns.

Agriculture and Strategic Payoff

For Canadian agriculture, the implications are immediate. China has long been a critical market for Canadian canola, seafood, pulses, and agri-food exports. Disruptions in this relationship previously exposed farmers to sudden market closures and price instability unrelated to fundamentals.

Normalization restores predictability. For producers, that predictability translates into planning certainty, market confidence, and resilience. In commodity markets, certainty is value.

Inflation Risk and Economic Stability

The significance of engagement lies less in past price effects than in future risk avoidance.

Trade instability—particularly when driven by U.S. tariff escalation—has repeatedly introduced inflationary pressure into global markets. By reducing exposure to such shocks, Canada lowers the probability that external political volatility will transmit directly into domestic cost-of-living pressures.

Engagement functions not as stimulus, but as insulation.

Strategic Signaling

Canada’s approach also sends a signal. In a period marked by policy volatility from Washington, calm and deliberate engagement communicates competence and strategic autonomy.

This posture reflects neither naïveté nor confrontation. It reflects a judgment that economic security in the current era requires diversification—even among allies.

A Test Case for Europe

Canada’s recalibration may resonate beyond the Indo-Pacific. For Europe, which faces similar exposure to U.S. trade volatility and strategic uncertainty, the Canada–China trajectory could serve as a reference point.

Historically, the European Union has adjusted incrementally to external shocks—trade disputes, sanctions spillovers, energy dependence—rather than through abrupt realignment. The concept of strategic autonomy emerged from precisely such reassessments.

Canada’s experience may help clarify whether engagement with China can be recalibrated without abandoning alliances or political values. The question is no longer whether diversification is desirable, but whether delaying it remains viable.

A Strategic Imperative for Beijing

For this recalibration to endure, the next move matters. China should treat Canada’s decision not merely as a diplomatic opening, but as a strategic moment requiring speed, visibility, and tangible delivery.

The current Canadian government has taken a political risk by moving toward normalization at a time when neoconservative currents in Washington are likely to respond with pressure and disruption. If early benefits are not felt domestically, momentum can stall.

China therefore has a clear interest in front-loading benefits in ways that ordinary Canadian businesses and citizens can feel quickly.

Accelerated market access for Canadian agri-food exports, fast-tracked approvals for small and medium-sized enterprises, expanded business mobility, and visible near-term purchasing commitments would translate diplomacy into an immediate economic signal. These steps do not require new ideology. They require execution.

Canada has opened the door. The strategic task now is to ensure the corridor is used before it is contested.

Canada’s renewed engagement with China reflects a clear-eyed response to structural change in the international system. It prioritizes economic stability, protects key export sectors, and reduces exposure to external policy volatility—particularly that originating from an increasingly unpredictable United States.

If sustained—and matched by decisive, visible follow-through from Beijing—this approach may come to be understood not merely as prudent diversification, but as one of the earliest long-term adjustments to a shifting global order.

In a world where unpredictability has become structural, adaptability is no longer tactical. It is strategic.

Mr. Muad M Zaki

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

05 JanArticle

Power Without Restraint: What Asia Must Now Confront

By Muad M Zaki.

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center

The assumption that Asian—or even Muslim—countries can continue to depend on an unreliable and unpredictable United States, or a visibly weakened Europe, as pillars of global stability must now be rigorously re-examined.

It is true that many Asians, including Muslims and others, were educated in politics, science, and numerous other disciplines in the West, and there remains genuine gratitude for that intellectual legacy. Yet the West that was once admired has steadily eroded due to its own strategic and ideological failures. The free marketplace of ideas and robust protection of free speech—once the cornerstone of Western political appeal—has largely vanished. Today, students paying premium tuition fees in many Western countries no longer encounter the intellectually open and pluralistic environments that earlier generations experienced. Instead, they face expanding regulatory, ideological, and institutional constraints on independent thought and expression.

For those who continue to argue that Asia somehow “owes” the West, the only obligation that remains is to remind Western policymakers why their systems were once respected—because at present, their governance trajectory is moving decisively in reverse gear.

The recent actions of the US neoconservative establishment in Venezuela—including the extraterritorial seizure of its leader and the hurried fabrication of legal justifications for what are fundamentally unlawful acts—underscore how selectively both international law and domestic US law are now applied. This should serve as a clear warning to every independent government that values the rule of law, or at minimum expects consistency and good faith from Washington.

If even long-standing US allies such as Canada and members of the European Union can no longer rely on American commitments, it is unrealistic for Asian states to assume that trade agreements or security arrangements engineered by the US will remain dependable. The strategic risk is simply too high.

Simultaneously, many Asian countries increasingly look toward China for economic partnership and security balance, albeit with unease stemming from Beijing’s long-standing non-interference doctrine. This presents China with a growing strategic dilemma. First, Beijing has effectively lost Venezuela, one of its most dependable economic partners in Latin America. If this lesson is not internalized swiftly, China risks a similar outcome with its most significant strategic partner in the Middle East: Iran.

Should this occur, it is entirely plausible that the US will escalate pressure on Asian states, coercing alignment regardless of domestic public opinion. Washington’s calculation, however, continues to rely on China maintaining strict adherence to non-interference—thereby allowing the US to incrementally encircle China, following a playbook previously deployed against Russia.

At present, China retains a strategic advantage in Asia. Across the region, there are credible political leaders prepared to accept China as a regional political and security anchor—provided China is willing to assume that role decisively. Yet as long as Beijing’s non-interference posture remains unchanged, Asian governments will continue to view open resistance to US pressure as a political and economic gamble, particularly when Chinese intervention is assumed but not guaranteed.

From Beijing’s perspective, substantial resources have rightly been devoted to people-to-people engagement and shared economic prosperity. However, the pace of this approach has not matched the speed or intensity of contemporary US geopolitical adventurism. While long-term societal engagement is essential, China could benefit from selectively adopting foreign-policy methods historically employed by Britain in Asia—particularly in distinguishing between leaders who view China merely as a financial resource for domestic patronage, and those who genuinely value China as a stabilizing regional partner.

As global geopolitics continue to deteriorate, Asia must adapt with realism rather than nostalgia—until, perhaps, the West eventually recognizes that perpetual confrontation and manufactured instability serve no one’s long-term interests.

Mr. Muad M Zaki

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

26 JunArticle

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: IS THE WEST’S CREDIBILITY AT STAKE?

In recent years, the notion of judicial independence – long perceived as a settled pillar of liberal democracy – has come under increasing strain. From political interference in Hungary and Poland to growing concerns in the United States, the very idea that justice can operate free from political pressure is being tested. This article explores how judicial independence underpins not only domestic rule of law, but also international credibility, economic trust, and diplomatic legitimacy. Is the West still fit to champion these values globally? To fully grasp what is at stake today, it is essential to revisit the historical foundations and the pivotal role judicial independence has played in shaping Western democracies.

I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE : PILLAR OF THE RULE OF LAW AND RELEVANT STANDARDS

Judicial independence stands as one of the most powerful embodiments of the foundational ideal of Western liberal democracies: the rule of law. Far from being a mere institutional arrangement, it is a centuries-old pillar rooted in the democratic architecture of the separation of powers – an idea most famously articulated by Montesquieu. Within this framework, the judiciary emerges not just as a branch of government, but as an autonomous authority, shielded from the influence of both the legislature and the executive. Crucially, this independence is not only external: the principle of internal independence ensures that no hierarchical interference distorts the impartial exercise of judicial power from within.(1)

Why is it important to discuss judicial independence today ? As Giacomo OBERTO, judge at the Court of Turin, points out, « every legal system recognizes, at least in principle, the independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches ; however, in practice, this independence cannot yet be considered a fully and durably achieved reality everywhere in the world and, upon closer inspection, not even within our own continent ».(2) Indeed, our era seems marked by a theory-practice gap that sometime diverges significantly from what might be described as a true international – or perhaps transnational(3) – legal framework protecting judicial independence.

This specific body of law, expressing the formal commitment of States to uphold and protect individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, is reflected in numerous regional instruments – for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (Article 6), and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges, adopted by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 10 July 1998 – as well as in universal ones, such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted in 1985, along with the Procedures for their Effective Implementation (1989), and the Universal Charter of the Judge. The latter, originally approved in 1999 by the Central Council of the International Association of Judges (IAJ), was most recently updated in 2017 in Santiago de Chile.

The recent failure to uphold the principles of judicial independence and impartiality recognized in these texts (and beyond)(4) in certain contexts has increased awareness of what might be described as a genuine crisis of judicial independence within the rule of law, both in Europe and the United States. Yet, the current landscape reveals a much more fragile reality: in several European countries, judicial autonomy is increasingly under threat, raising serious concerns about the erosion of the rule of law.

II. INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY THREATS : JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN DEFENSE AND CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL AUTONOMY

The essential nature of the judicial independence has been reaffirmed in several judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, such as in the cases of Yalçinkaya v. Turkey (2023), in which the Court notes « the perceived erosion of the independence of the Turkish judiciary and the concerns over undue interference by the executive »(5), and Baka v. Hungary (2016)(6). Repeatedly, the ECtHR emphasizes « the cardinal importance of maintaining the independence of national courts in order to ensure effective judicial protection » (Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 2020).(7) In the same judgment, the Court affirms that the three elements of independence, impartiality, and a tribunal « established by law » are interrelated through « the institutional requirements of Article 6 § 1, in that they are guided by the aim of upholding the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers » (Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021).(8)

Remaining within the European sphere, Gaetano DE AMICIS(9) reports that the Court of Justice of the European Union has progressively affirmed judicial independence as an essential component of the rule of law, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU(10). In landmark rulings, such as Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16)(11), it underlined that Member States are required to guarantee such independence as an indispensable condition for the proper functioning of the Union’s legal order.

Beyond the EU borders, on the American continent, the Trump-era United States has not been exempting from violations of the independence principle. Recently, District Judge Jeannette Vargas granted a motion by over a dozen Democratic state attorneys general to order a preliminary

injunction halting the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE)(12) access to the payment

system. Due to intense media pressure immediately exerted following the author’s decision, this case raises concerns regarding judicial independence and the security of judges.

These developments are far from isolated legal issues. They have far-reaching implications for democratic stability, the protection of fundamental rights, and the credibility of Western institutions as a whole.

III. JUDGES UNDER PRESSURE : CURRENT QUESTIONS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

From the entirety of these cases arise three essential questions that Fredrik Sundberg(13) raised during the conference on “The importance of Judicial Independence in Europe in the light of two case studies : Yalçinkaya v. Türkiye and Baka v. Hungary”, held on 17 February 2025 in Strasbourg. In that context, he asked himself : a) can national judges defend themselves against such attacks and pressures ? ; b) can the European Union or the Council of Europe effectively intervene to protect judicial independence ? ; c) is judicial independence truly essential, or can a democracy survive without it ?

As he himself invites us to observe, these three questions bring us back to the necessity of considering judicial independence not from an isolated perspective, but rather from its interaction with other components – such as politics – which remind us why it is important : it is the task of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, to act as a safeguard against abuses of power and to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, even (or especially) when majority governments neglect them.

In this perspective, it is also essential to invoke the principle of subsidiarity(14) on which the very existence of the European Court of Human Rights is founded and which may recall the principle of complementarity(15) that characterizes the functioning of the International Criminal Court. Thus, the dynamic that emerges from the interaction between national bodies and international bodies guarantees an additional justice option for the victims of state dysfunctions. And the essential nature of this observation has been demonstrated precisely by the interventions of the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court, whose (binding) judgments are designed to regulate the overreach of state actors.

In this same spirit, an open letter was recently published by a group of academics, legal professionals, and members of the national, European, and international criminal justice communities. Presented during the third colloquium in Paris in honor of Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty, under the theme Raisonner la raison d’État: Où en est l’Europe?, this initiative responds to the open letter signed on 22 May 2025 by nine heads of government from EU and Council of Europe member states—an alarming statement that, according to its critics, reveals an intention to challenge the authority of the European Court of Human Rights and, more broadly, to undermine human rights protections. The counter-letter expresses deep concern over these developments and calls on national, European, and international actors to reaffirm their commitment to safeguarding the independence of the judiciary and preserving the authority of the Strasbourg Court.

However, this dynamic does not end with judicial bodies and institutions alone. For example, within the European Union, an important role of monitoring and ensuring respect for the rule of law by Member States is played by the Commission. In the framework of infringement procedures, in fact, the European Commission can initiate legal actions against Member States that violate EU law, including in matters related to the rule of law – for example, judicial independence. The case of Poland is one such example : following the concerns raised in 2017, the Commission initiated a formal procedure for the risk of a serious breach of the rule of law. Only after the adoption of an action plan by the Polish authorities and the observation that this risk had subsided did it withdraw the reasoned proposal, while still maintaining the monitoring mechanism through the Rule of Law

Report.(16) This shows how European institutions can exercise effective political and institutional

pressure in defense of the Union’s fundamental values.

In light of this crisis, coordinated responses are urgently needed: the European Union, national institutions, and civil society all have a critical role to play in safeguarding judicial independence as a cornerstone of democracy.

IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AD AN INSTRUMENT OF TRUST, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In a globalized world, the guarantee of a judiciary free from interference is an essential condition not only for the protection of fundamental rights, but also for the stability of international relations. The connection is clear : a well-functioning judicial system inevitably attracts individuals and external partners who will have trust in it. The Court of Justice of the European Union itself tends to emphasize the close link between the principle of mutual trust and respect for the fundamental values of Article 2 TEU, describing it as a key for establishing and maintaining the mutual trust that underlies the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.

Indeed, it is above all true that an authoritative and impartial judicial system contributes to creating an environment of legal certainty and predictability, an essential requirement to attract foreign investment and stimulate international economic cooperation. This assertion is shared by the European Commission which, in the paragraph Perceptions of judicial independence of the already mentioned Report, observes that « well-functioning and fully independent justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for investments protection, and therefore contribute to growth and competitiveness ».(17)

In accordance with this logic, the 2021 Versi Maplecroft Human Rights Outlook report states that « for companies in ‘high’ risk jurisdictions, this [the growing political interference in the legal systems] could mean a lack of recourse in contract renegotiations, or unfair legal sanctions imposed

by governments to punish perceived slights or to achieve geopolitical aims ».(18) Furthermore,

beyond the economic and financial sphere alone, it « undermines the protection of human rights by enabling states to pursue political opponent, activists and journalists with legal penalties, while removing access to remedy for victims of violations ».(19)

Ultimately, what is at stake goes far beyond national judicial reforms: it is the integrity of the democratic project in the West that is being put to the test.

V. THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE OF TRUST

Thus, judicial independence bolsters a State’s credibility in multilateral settings, constituting an indicator of compliance with the rule of law and human rights. As the Italian Andrea ORLANDO recalls, in Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : independence, efficiency and responsibilities ”, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe point out that the independence of judges « is not a privilege for judges, but a guarantee of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing every person to have confidence in the justice system ».(20)

The question then becomes whether, in today’s world, this trust is being strengthened or weakened. Indeed, the crisis of independence in influential powers such as the United States of America – especially under the Trump administration – and Europe calls into question the stability of judicial system that has traditionally represented a model of democratic guarantee, and affects the international perception of the reliability of U.S. institutions. Judicial instability in key geopolitical contexts generates ripple effects, influencing diplomatic balances and global economic relations.

As judicial independence erodes in the very nations that once exported rule-of-law standards, a critical question emerges: can the West still lead by example? If trust in the judiciary falters domestically, its influence abroad is bound to wane. What is at stake is not only the impartiality of courts, but the moral authority of democratic systems on the global stage. Finally, it could be argued that the Western model of judicial independence is not the only possible one, nor necessarily the best in absolute terms. Could other, more ‘politicized’ or integrated judicial systems function effectively without compromising justice or the protection of rights?

1 Rule of Law Checklist (CDL-AD(2016)007), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (11-12 March 2016) , par. 74 : « […] Independence means that the judiciary is free from external pressure, and is not subject to political influence or manipulation, in particular by the executive branch. This requirement is an integral part of the fundamental democratic principle of the separation of powers. Judges should not be subject to political influence or manipulation ».

2 Translated by the author from : Giacomo OBERTO, Un Nuovo Statuto per un Nuovo Giudice. Available in PDF format since 2017 at the following link: https://www.iaj-uim.org/iuw/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ Oberto_Un_nuovo_statuto_per_un_nuovo_giudice_2017.pdf (p. 6)

3 Ibid., p.8.

4 Ibid., p. 8-10. OBERTO also mentions the following international and regional instruments concerning judicial independence (note : this list dates back to 2017 and may not reflect the most recent developments) : the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) ; the Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on the “Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges”, adopted in 1994 and late updated by Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : Independence, Efficiency and Responsibilities” ; the Victoria Falls Proclamation 1994 “For and Independent Judiciary through Judicial Education”, issued by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association ; the Resolution on the Role of the Judiciary in a State governed by the Rule of Law, adopted in Warsaw on 4 April 1995 by the Ministers participating in the Round Table of Ministers of Justice from Central and Eastern European countries ; the European Parliament Resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the European Union in 1998 and 1999 (11350/1999 – C5-02265/1999 – 1999/2001 (INI)), adopted on 16 March 2000 ; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in Nice on 7 December 2000 (Article 47) ; various Opinions of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), including the one on “Standards concerning the independence of the Judiciary and the Irrevocabilità of Judges”, and the “Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles)”, a compilation of such opinions published in 2010 ; the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) ; ECOSOC Resolution 2006/23; the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, in particular Opinion No. 494/2008 on the independence of the judiciary ; the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, adopted in 2010 ; various Opinions of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) ; the Status of Magistrates’ in the Commonwealth, adopted in 2013 by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association.

5 ECtHR, GC, Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, 2016, §363.

6 ECtHR, GC, Baka c. Hungary, 2016.

7 ECtHR, GC, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 1 december 2020, § 139.

8 ECtHR, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 260.

9 Gaetano DE AMICIS, “Stato di diritto, garanzie europee di indipendenza della magistratura e cooperazione giudiziaria penale : quadri di un’esposizione in fieri”, Sistema Penale, 2021. PDF available at the following link: https://www.sistemapenale.it/pdf_contenuti/1639342956_deamicis-2021a-stato-di-diritto-garanzie- indipendenza-magistratura-cooperazione-giudiziaria-unione-europea.pdf

10 Article 2 TEU : « The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail ».

11 CJEU, GC, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 2018.

12 Formally the “ US DOGE Service Temporary Organization ”, it is an organization established at the initiative of the second Trump administration and led by Elon Musk.

13 Former Chief of the department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.

14 This subsidiarity is implicitly expressed in Articles 1 ( « The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention »), 13 ( « Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority […] ») and 35 (1) ( « The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted […] ») of the ECHR. With the entry into force of Protocol No. 15, it is also explicitly reaffirmed in the Preamble ( « […] Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto […] »).

15 Rome Statute, Article 17.

16 2024 Rule of Law Report, p. 7. PDF available at the following link : https://commission.europa.eu/

d o c u m e n t / d o w n l o a d / 2 7 d b 4 1 4 3 – 5 8 b 4 – 4 b 6 1 – a 0 2 1 – a 2 1 5 9 4 0 e 1 9 d 0 _ e n ? filename=1_1_58120_communication_rol_en.pdf

18 S. NAZALYA, O. MARIN, S. HAYNES, W. NICHOLS, J. LOCKHART-SMITH, E. GAVIN, F. WOLF, C.

MAY, Human Rights Outlook, Verisk Maplecroft, 2021. PDF available at the following link : https:// h u m a n t r a f f i c k i n g s e a r c h . o r g / w p – c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 2 1 / 1 0 / Verisk_Maplecroft_Human_Rights_Outlook_2021.pdf

19 Ibid.

20 Andrea ORLANDO, “Judges in Poland and in the Republic of Moldova must remain independent”, (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights), doc. 15204, 2021. Available at the following link : https:// pace.coe.int/en/files/28907/html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

WRITTEN BY:

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

30 MayArticle

Understanding the Syrian Conflict: Internal Resilience and External Influences

The Syrian crisis, lasted from 2011 to 2024, shows how complicated the interactions between internal social processes and external geopolitical factors are in the Middle East. A critical, research-based analysis shows that both internal factors like regime consolidation, sectarian divisions, and the legacy of colonial state-building played a big role in the conflict’s path, as did external actors in shaping its course and outcomes.
Using theoretical frameworks like Neoclassical Realism (NCR) helps us comprehend how domestic political systems deal with and respond to systemic foreign forces in a more complex way. In Syria’s case, continued assistance from regional and global allies, especially Iran and Russia, gave the regime military, economic, and diplomatic support that helped it stay in power and strengthen its position. Iran’s intervention in Syria went beyond ideological affinity and was strategically embedded in a wider goal of maintaining and expanding its “axis of resistance” across the Levant. This was evident in Iran’s coordination of Shi’a militias, including fighters from Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, and Afghan Fatemiyoun units, mobilized under the command of the IRGC to secure key areas such as the Damascus–Aleppo corridor and the Sayyida Zaynab shrine. Tehran’s strategy included establishing permanent military infrastructure in Syria, such as the Imam Ali base near the Iraqi border in 2019, reflecting broader security and logistical interests. These efforts aligned with NCR’s emphasis on how systemic ambitions are translated into concrete actions through domestic capabilities and regional alliances. This outside help helped keep the country together, especially because the dictatorship controlled cities and networks of loyalists.
On the other hand, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and others tried to weaken Assad’s grip on power. But these interventions often had different goals, which made the region more divided and the conflict last longer. Some of these initiatives didn’t take into account how strong existing connections and internal processes were for keeping the regime in power, which made Assad’s position stronger.
Turkey’s involvement was shaped not only by its domestic security concerns about Kurdish autonomy but also by its broader aim to influence the post-conflict order. In addition to “Operation Euphrates Shield” in 2016, Ankara launched “Operation Olive Branch” in 2018 and “Operation Peace Spring” in 2019, targeting Kurdish-held areas in Afrin and northeast Syria, respectively. These operations were not solely counterterrorism efforts but served Ankara’s goal to establish a buffer zone and demographic reconfiguration in areas like Afrin, where local displacement and repopulation strategies followed5. Furthermore, Turkey’s establishment of observation posts under the Astana agreement and its military presence in Idlib province showed an attempt to carve out a strategic sphere of influence, consistent with NCR’s notion of power projection filtered through domestic concerns and regional rivalries.
Furthermore, the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Syria illustrates how their divergent strategies were tied to systemic competition with Iran and regional leadership ambitions. Qatar’s early support for Islamist factions, such as those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, led to its backing of groups like Liwa al-Tawhid and Ahrar al-Sham, which operated predominantly in northern Syria from 2012 to 2014. In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s support coalesced around more secular or Salafist-leaning factions, culminating in the creation of the Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam) in the Damascus suburbs in 2013. Despite their financial and logistical investments, both states struggled to maintain cohesive opposition fronts. Their rivalry was evident during the Geneva II peace talks in 2014, where opposition delegations backed by each state clashed on strategic priorities and political concessions. This fragmentation diluted the effectiveness of external support and highlights the way domestic ambitions and rival threat perceptions—central to NCR—shaped their Syrian policies.
The Syrian regime’s survival did not depend only on help from other countries. The administration used careful plans to keep control of the land, keep the loyalty of the elite, and break up the resistance. But Syria also had significant internal problems, such the fracturing of the opposition, changing demography, and the displacement of millions of people. These things changed the social fabric and made it hard to rule and make peace in the long run.
A post-colonial view also helps us understand how the rest of the world has dealt with the Syrian situation. External powers’ narratives and actions typically ignored the political dynamics of the indigenous people and instead focused on their own strategic objectives. This shows how colonial borders and state institutions still affect the problems and weaknesses in modern Syria.
These case studies make clear that while external actors sometimes aligned with local needs—such as defeating ISIS or providing humanitarian aid—their primary motivations were geostrategic. Whether it was Russia seeking influence and military presence, Iran attempting to sustain a regional alliance network, or Turkey aiming to suppress Kurdish autonomy, their interventions reflect the NCR model of systemic pressures filtered through national interests and domestic agendas. In this sense, external involvement was not an altruistic effort to stabilise Syria, but a continuation of regional and global competition by other means, shaping not only the survival and defeat of Assad but the wider trajectory of Syrian statehood.

WRITTEN BY:

Beatrice Liverzani

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

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Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC