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20 JanArticle

Canada–China Engagement in a Shifting Global Order: A Strategic Reset with Broader Implications for Asia—and Beyond

By: Muad Zaki,

Canada’s renewed engagement with China is often described as a tactical response to near-term geopolitical pressures. That interpretation understates what is unfolding.

What is taking shape reflects a deeper recognition: the assumptions that once governed alliance predictability, trade continuity, and economic risk are no longer reliable. Middle powers are adjusting accordingly—not loudly, not ideologically, but decisively.

The recent visit by the Canadian prime minister to Beijing, and the steps toward normalization that followed, signal an understanding that stability can no longer be assumed. In an environment shaped by persistent volatility—much of it originating from policy unpredictability in Washington—strategic resilience is increasingly defined by diversification rather than alignment alone.

Strategic Realism in an Era of U.S.-Driven Volatility

For decades, Canada operated within a U.S.-led economic system assumed to be institutionally stable. That assumption has weakened. The United States government has increasingly relied on unilateral trade actions, transactional diplomacy, and policy reversals driven by domestic political cycles.

These measures have affected allies as readily as adversaries. For export-dependent economies, this volatility translates directly into risk—discouraging investment, complicating planning, and exposing domestic sectors to external political shocks.

Canada’s recalibration should therefore be understood not as a rejection of partnership, but as a rational response to structural uncertainty.

Why Asia, and Why China

Asia remains the principal engine of global growth, and China sits at the center of global production and trade networks. Engagement reflects economic structure rather than political alignment.

Stabilizing relations with China expands Canada’s strategic options, strengthens supply-chain resilience, and reduces exposure to abrupt external shocks. In a deeply interdependent system, optionality has become a core strategic asset.

From Risk Mitigation to Structural Rebalancing

Engagement with China may begin as risk mitigation, but its longer-term implications are potentially far more consequential.

History suggests that shifts in global order rarely begin with declarations. They emerge through accumulated decisions taken by states adjusting to instability. Over time, those adjustments reshape strategic gravity.

If sustained, Canada’s recalibration may come to be viewed as an early indicator of a broader transition—one in which middle powers move away from singular strategic concentration toward more distributed and pragmatic alignment patterns.

Agriculture and Strategic Payoff

For Canadian agriculture, the implications are immediate. China has long been a critical market for Canadian canola, seafood, pulses, and agri-food exports. Disruptions in this relationship previously exposed farmers to sudden market closures and price instability unrelated to fundamentals.

Normalization restores predictability. For producers, that predictability translates into planning certainty, market confidence, and resilience. In commodity markets, certainty is value.

Inflation Risk and Economic Stability

The significance of engagement lies less in past price effects than in future risk avoidance.

Trade instability—particularly when driven by U.S. tariff escalation—has repeatedly introduced inflationary pressure into global markets. By reducing exposure to such shocks, Canada lowers the probability that external political volatility will transmit directly into domestic cost-of-living pressures.

Engagement functions not as stimulus, but as insulation.

Strategic Signaling

Canada’s approach also sends a signal. In a period marked by policy volatility from Washington, calm and deliberate engagement communicates competence and strategic autonomy.

This posture reflects neither naïveté nor confrontation. It reflects a judgment that economic security in the current era requires diversification—even among allies.

A Test Case for Europe

Canada’s recalibration may resonate beyond the Indo-Pacific. For Europe, which faces similar exposure to U.S. trade volatility and strategic uncertainty, the Canada–China trajectory could serve as a reference point.

Historically, the European Union has adjusted incrementally to external shocks—trade disputes, sanctions spillovers, energy dependence—rather than through abrupt realignment. The concept of strategic autonomy emerged from precisely such reassessments.

Canada’s experience may help clarify whether engagement with China can be recalibrated without abandoning alliances or political values. The question is no longer whether diversification is desirable, but whether delaying it remains viable.

A Strategic Imperative for Beijing

For this recalibration to endure, the next move matters. China should treat Canada’s decision not merely as a diplomatic opening, but as a strategic moment requiring speed, visibility, and tangible delivery.

The current Canadian government has taken a political risk by moving toward normalization at a time when neoconservative currents in Washington are likely to respond with pressure and disruption. If early benefits are not felt domestically, momentum can stall.

China therefore has a clear interest in front-loading benefits in ways that ordinary Canadian businesses and citizens can feel quickly.

Accelerated market access for Canadian agri-food exports, fast-tracked approvals for small and medium-sized enterprises, expanded business mobility, and visible near-term purchasing commitments would translate diplomacy into an immediate economic signal. These steps do not require new ideology. They require execution.

Canada has opened the door. The strategic task now is to ensure the corridor is used before it is contested.

Canada’s renewed engagement with China reflects a clear-eyed response to structural change in the international system. It prioritizes economic stability, protects key export sectors, and reduces exposure to external policy volatility—particularly that originating from an increasingly unpredictable United States.

If sustained—and matched by decisive, visible follow-through from Beijing—this approach may come to be understood not merely as prudent diversification, but as one of the earliest long-term adjustments to a shifting global order.

In a world where unpredictability has become structural, adaptability is no longer tactical. It is strategic.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow
WRITTEN BY:
Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
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05 JanArticle

Power Without Restraint: What Asia Must Now Confront

By Muad M Zaki. 

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center 

The assumption that Asian—or even Muslim—countries can continue to depend on an unreliable and unpredictable United States, or a visibly weakened Europe, as pillars of global stability must now be rigorously re-examined.

It is true that many Asians, including Muslims and others, were educated in politics, science, and numerous other disciplines in the West, and there remains genuine gratitude for that intellectual legacy. Yet the West that was once admired has steadily eroded due to its own strategic and ideological failures. The free marketplace of ideas and robust protection of free speech—once the cornerstone of Western political appeal—has largely vanished. Today, students paying premium tuition fees in many Western countries no longer encounter the intellectually open and pluralistic environments that earlier generations experienced. Instead, they face expanding regulatory, ideological, and institutional constraints on independent thought and expression.

For those who continue to argue that Asia somehow “owes” the West, the only obligation that remains is to remind Western policymakers why their systems were once respected—because at present, their governance trajectory is moving decisively in reverse gear.

The recent actions of the US neoconservative establishment in Venezuela—including the extraterritorial seizure of its leader and the hurried fabrication of legal justifications for what are fundamentally unlawful acts—underscore how selectively both international law and domestic US law are now applied. This should serve as a clear warning to every independent government that values the rule of law, or at minimum expects consistency and good faith from Washington.

If even long-standing US allies such as Canada and members of the European Union can no longer rely on American commitments, it is unrealistic for Asian states to assume that trade agreements or security arrangements engineered by the US will remain dependable. The strategic risk is simply too high.

Simultaneously, many Asian countries increasingly look toward China for economic partnership and security balance, albeit with unease stemming from Beijing’s long-standing non-interference doctrine. This presents China with a growing strategic dilemma. First, Beijing has effectively lost Venezuela, one of its most dependable economic partners in Latin America. If this lesson is not internalized swiftly, China risks a similar outcome with its most significant strategic partner in the Middle East: Iran.

Should this occur, it is entirely plausible that the US will escalate pressure on Asian states, coercing alignment regardless of domestic public opinion. Washington’s calculation, however, continues to rely on China maintaining strict adherence to non-interference—thereby allowing the US to incrementally encircle China, following a playbook previously deployed against Russia.

At present, China retains a strategic advantage in Asia. Across the region, there are credible political leaders prepared to accept China as a regional political and security anchor—provided China is willing to assume that role decisively. Yet as long as Beijing’s non-interference posture remains unchanged, Asian governments will continue to view open resistance to US pressure as a political and economic gamble, particularly when Chinese intervention is assumed but not guaranteed.

From Beijing’s perspective, substantial resources have rightly been devoted to people-to-people engagement and shared economic prosperity. However, the pace of this approach has not matched the speed or intensity of contemporary US geopolitical adventurism. While long-term societal engagement is essential, China could benefit from selectively adopting foreign-policy methods historically employed by Britain in Asia—particularly in distinguishing between leaders who view China merely as a financial resource for domestic patronage, and those who genuinely value China as a stabilizing regional partner.

As global geopolitics continue to deteriorate, Asia must adapt with realism rather than nostalgia—until, perhaps, the West eventually recognizes that perpetual confrontation and manufactured instability serve no one’s long-term interests.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
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08 DecAsia Middle East Perspectives

Transitional justice between Peace, Memory and Reconciliation: Lessons from the Past for Syria’s Future

BY: Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

The persistent dilemma confronting post-conflict societies concerns the sequencing of transitional imperatives. When should the attainment of peace be prioritised, and when should demands for justice prevail? The Syrian conflict, like other instances scrutinised within the transitional-justice literature, has wrought not only material destruction but also an erosion of social trust and communal cohesion. Consequently, tensions emerge between imperatives of negotiated stability and claims for accountability for grave international crimes[1].

This article interrogates the enduring tension between peace and justice in post-conflict transitions and applies comparative lessons to Syria’s emerging transitional architecture. Building on insights shared by practitioners and scholars during the PILPG[2] 2025 Peace and Negotiation Summer School course, dedicated to the Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, it draws on cases from Sierra Leone, the Balkans, South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda, demonstrating that durable transitional outcomes require a context-specific mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, domestically anchored design and strategic sequencing.

Conceptual framework: instruments and sequencing

Transitional justice is not merely an alternative to ordinary criminal justice; rather, it encompasses a spectrum of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with varying degrees of international involvement (or none), including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking mechanisms, institutional reform (comprising vetting and removal from office) or combinations thereof, depending on the context.[3] The literature identifies several potential trajectories: privileging peace; prioritising justice; pursuing a “peace with justice” or experiencing a growing judicialization of peace processes – that is, the increasing influence of courts and judicial bodies on political negotiations, with ambivalent consequences for accountability and for the prospects of reaching and sustaining peace.

Sierra Leone and the coexistence of restorative and retributive mechanisms

The protracted civil war in Sierra Leone, partly a spillover from the conflict in Liberia and heavily fueled by the struggle to control diamond resources, illustrates the practical and moral challenges of balancing the imperatives of immediate peace with the demands of criminal accountability. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty clause that facilitated a ceasefire but simultaneously left deep wounds and sparked considerable controversy over questions of justice. In practice, the transitional response was dual and parallel: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a restorative and narrative mandate, tasked with collecting testimonies, documenting violations and fostering processes of reconciliation; and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established to prosecute those bearing “the greatest responsibility” for the gravest crimes (a mechanism that avoided blanket impunity without derailing the fragile peace process.

This experience demonstrates that the coexistence of restorative (TRC) and retributive (Special Court) mechanisms can succeed when their mandates are clearly delineated and communicated, when practical coordination is ensured (procedural sequencing, witness protection, allocation of resources) and when meaningful space is created for both symbolic and material redress for victims. Ambassador Yvette Stevens and other observers have emphasized that this multi-dimensional approach, together with the clarity in the distribution of responsibilities between commission and court, was central to preventing the Lomé amnesty from devolving into a perceived culture of impunity in Sierra Leone.[4]

Memory, symbols and institutional confidence in Montenegro and the Balkans

If the Sierra Leonean experience illustrates the delicate balance between peace, truth and accountability in a context marked by resource-driven conflict, the post-Yugoslav Balkans, and particularly Montenegro, highlight a different but equally crucial dimension of transitional justice: the reconstruction of trust in the aftermath of mass atrocity and the role of institutional, symbolic and economic measures in shaping reconciliation and state-building. The post-1995 Balkans demonstrate that collective traumas (Srebrenica above all) rapidly erode social trust, and that if civic culture and historical memory are not actively nurtured, the reconstruction of confidence becomes a project spanning decades.

The Montenegrin case is particularly instructive, as it combined political, symbolic and economic elements: the decision – controversial yet strategic – to introduce the Deutsche Mark at the end of 1999, and subsequently the euro, was not merely an economic maneuver to stabilize prices and safeguard savings, but also a political act of symbolic autonomy vis-à-vis Belgrade. The subsequent Belgrade Agreement and the constitutional framework established in 2002 created a pragmatic arrangement of “one State, two economic systems”, which allowed for the functional separation of economic and political spheres during the transitional period. Igor Lukšić, a key actor in Montenegro’s transition, has emphasized the importance of early confidence-building measures, predictable institutional rules and political symbols capable of ensuring minority inclusion, thereby pre-empting historical revisionism and competing narratives.[5]

The Montenegrin experience suggests that economic and symbolic measures (currency reform, autonomous fiscal policies) can serve as instruments of political stabilization, provided they are coupled with institutional reforms and underpinned by a minimal consensus on clear and predictable rules.

Alternatives and trade-offs from South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda

Whereas the Sierra Leonean and Montenegrin cases shed light on, respectively, the balance between peace and accountability and the role of economic-symbolic measures in rebuilding trust, a broader comparative perspective highlights further variations. Other transitional contexts (South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda) offer additional insights into how different societies have sought to reconcile truth, accountability and reconciliation through distinct institutional and culture mechanisms.

In South Africa, the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission – led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and his colleagues – adopted the mechanism of conditional amnesty in exchange for full public disclosure. The public revelation of truth was conceived as a form of symbolic healing, essential for the moral legitimacy of the new democracy, even as it left unresolved criticisms regarding the lack of material punishment.

In Colombia, the 2016 peace accord introduces the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), which provides alternative sanctions and reparative measures for those who acknowledge responsibility. This pragmatic model of compromise sought to maximize truth-telling, victim participation and the reintegration of former combatants, while in many cases avoiding traditional custodial sentences.

In Rwanda, the Gacaca courts – deeply rooted in local communal practices – enabled the mass processing of genocide-related cases in a relatively short period of time, fostering community involvement and testimonial exchange. Yet they also attracted criticism for shortcomings in procedural safeguards and for the tensions they generated between local justice and international legal standards.

Comparative synthesis: no one-size-fits-all

Taken together, these cases underscore a crucial lesson: there is no “one-size-fits-all” model of transitional justice. Instruments such as conditional amnesty, alternative sanctions and community-based justice must be tailored to the cultural fabric, institutional capacity and expectations of victims in each specific context. As Ambassador Amina Mohamed has stressed, no matter how urgent a political settlement may be, peace will falter unless it is built on a foundation of inclusivity and accountability.[6] Above all, local legitimacy and victim participation emerge as non-negotiable conditions for the durability and credibility of transitional outcomes.

Syria: context and recent institutional developments

Today, Syria stands at a critical juncture between continuity of established practices and the opportunity to innovate a genuinely domestic transitional justice process. In May 2025, transitional authorities established a National Transitional Justice Commission (NCTJ) – mandated to “uncover the truth about the grave violations caused by the former regime, hold those responsible accountable in coordination with the relevant authorities, compensate the victims, and consolidate the principles of non-repetition and national reconciliation” – and a Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) to address over one hundred thousand missing and detained persons. As stated on Amnesty International’s official website, between 2011 and 2024, it is estimated that over 100,000 individuals were subjected to enforced disappearance in Syria.[7] The overwhelming majority were forcibly disappeared by the Assad government within its extensive network of detention facilities, while additional cases have been linked to armed opposition groups.[8] These data clearly underscore the existence of a profound vacuum that must be addressed within a transitional justice process which, as emphasized by relevant international actors, such as Amnesty International and the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), requires transparency, independence and meaningful victim participation.

Syria: sequencing and policy design

Turning these bodies into credible mechanisms demands careful sequencing and a calibrated mix of measures. The ordering of elections, judicial proceedings, refugee returns, and institutional reforms is not neutral: comparative experiences from Sierra Leone and Colombia illustrate that truth-telling, graduated sanctions and non-custodial measures are effective only when paired with credible demobilization and reintegration strategies. At the same time, some grave crimes will demand formal judicial accountability; restorative or administrative measures cannot substitute for prosecution where atrocity crimes are implicated. As the United Nations has emphasized, any transitional-justice process must be nationally owned and sensitive to local conditions, centred on victims’ needs and inclusive of all relevant stakeholders (notably women, youth and minorities).[9] Thus, international actors should support the domestic design and implementation of context-specific, victim-centred processes that address the root causes and structural drivers of violations and thereby contribute to prevention, sustained peace, development and reconciliation.

Syria: memory, participation and legitimacy

Memory and truth are inseparable from institutional capacity: the Balkans and Rwanda demonstrate that public narratives require documentation, witness protection and educational initiatives to prevent revisionism. As Joud Monla-Hassan stresses, transitional justice must be genuinely “Syrian-led”, informed by survivors, civil society and the diaspora[10]; only through meaningful inclusion can the new commissions build legitimacy and public trust. This point is salient given that the transitional authorities’ own legitimacy may be contested: the commissions must therefore demonstrate independence, transparency and representative composition from the outset if they are to earn popular confidence. 

Timing and constitutional framing

Finally, Dr. Paul R. Williams emphasizes the complexity of rebuilding political, legal and social infrastructures after decades of dictatorship and conflict, noting that a return to the pre-war status quo is neither feasible nor desirable. Williams stresses that processes such as refugee returns, elections, establishment of legal mechanisms and institutional stabilization must be carefully coordinated.[11] The transitional period should be time-bound, governed by an interim constitutional framework and guided by a clear public roadmap. Strategic sequencing of these measures is essential, as holding elections prematurely, without an appropriate political and legal foundation, risks creating power vacuums or undermining democratic legitimacy.[12]

Practical recommendations

Building on comparative lessons and the Syrian context, five practical priorities emerge: 1) codify the mandates and legal safeguards for the NCTJ and NCM to guarantee independence and victim-centredness; 2) adopt a publicly negotiated sequencing roadmap that sequences elections, accountability measures and refugee returns by political feasibility and security considerations; 3) design a calibrated mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, including hybrid or internationalized modalities for the gravest crimes; 4) mainstream psychosocial support, reparations and service delivery to tangibly demonstrate benefits to victims; 5) establish independent monitoring and transparency mechanisms (including public reporting and civic oversight) to sustain public trust.

A further step to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of Syria’s emerging transitional justice institutions would be to establish a formal data-sharing framework between the National Transitional Justice Commission (NTJC), the National Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) and the UN-mandated Independent Institution for Missing Persons (IIMP). Such cooperation, grounded in informed victim consent, strict confidentiality and independent oversight, would serve several purposes. First, it would prevent duplication of investigative efforts and inconsistencies across national and international databases. Second, it would accelerate the identification of the disappeared by enabling secure exchange of genetic, testimonial and documentary evidence. Third, it would strengthen transparency and public trust by linking domestic mechanisms with an internationally recognised body. Finally, a harmonised and victim-centred data system would improve families’ access to truth, reparations and psychosocial support, thereby transforming fragmented documentation into meaningful outcomes for survivors.

Conclusion

Syria’s transitional framework stands at a crossroads: it can either generate institutions lacking legitimacy or evolve into a process capable of healing collective wounds and rebuilding social trust. The outcome will hinge on ensuring inclusion, transparency and coherence between memory, accountability and reform. If grounded in meaningful engagement with victims and designed with strategic realism, Syria’s path could offer an innovative model of transitional justice for the wider region.

[1] The core international crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) are: genocide (article 6), crimes against humanity (article7), war crimes (article 8) and crime of aggression (article 8 bis).

[2] The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) is a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance to parties involved in peace negotiations, drafting post-conflict constitutions, and war crimes prosecution/transitional justice.

[3] United Nations (UN), Guidance note of the secretary-general, “Transitional Justice. A Strategic Tool for People, Prevention and Peace”, 2023, p.2. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/03/202307guidancenotetransitionaljusticeen.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[4] Yvette Stevens, “Transitional justice – Lessons Learned from Sierra Leona” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability)

[5] Igor Lukšić “Case Study: Lessons Learned from Montenegro’s Transition” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[6] Amina Mohamed, “Legal Reforms and Constitution Building” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-governance-and-the-rule-of-law)

[7] Amnesty International, Syria: New Government must ensure Truth, Justice and Reparations for the disappeared, 2025. Available at: https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/syria-new-government-must-ensure-truth-justice-and-reparations-for-the-disappeared/#:~:text=He%20said%20the%20NCM’s%20core,by%20the%20rule%20of%20law.

[8] Ibidem.

[9] United Nations, OCHR: Transitional justice and human rights, 2025. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice

[10] Joud Monla-Hassan, “Domestic and Locally Owned Transitional Justice and State-Building Processes in Syria” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability#:~:text=international%20conferences—on%20the%20future%20of,and%20grounded%20in%20local%20realities) See also Nousha Kabawat, “To Syria’s New Justice Commissions: Victims Need You Now,” 31 July 2025, emphasizing that the new commissions must explicitly recognize violations wherever they occur, advocate for victims without discrimination or political pressure, ensure genuine independence, and reflect Syria’s full diversity in composition and decision-making so that all victims are represented and heard (available at: https://www.ictj.org/latest-news/syria’s-new-justice-commissions-victims-need-you-now#:~:text=independence%20by%20ensuring%20that%20no,see%20themselves%20represented%20and%20heard)

[11] Paul R. Williams, “Introduction to Post-Conflict State Building: Challenges and Opportunities”, presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[12] Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, Marie Forestier, Reimagining Syria: A Roadmap for Peace and Prosperity Beyond Assad, in Middle East Institute, 2025. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/reimagining-syria-roadmap-peace-and-prosperity-beyond-assad#:~:text=supported%20by%20a%20clear%2C%20public,framework%2C%20risks%20undermining%20democratic%20progress

Transitional_Justice_-_SyriaDownload

Auther’s Bio

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso holds a bachelor’s in history, Politics and International Relations and is pursuing a master’s in law in Strasbourg with a focus on minority rights. She has over four years of experience in private tutoring. She helps students understand complex historical, political, and legal topics through clear explanations. Based in Catania, she supports learners at different levels.

She can be reached at : roberta.lazzaro15@gmail.com

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08 DecReport

One-day International Conferenceon Palestine: Exploring Asian Perspectives

Executive Summary                                        

The One-day International Conference on Palestine: Exploring Asian Perspectives, held on 4 November 2024 at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was a collaborative initiative organized by the Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), University of Malaya, and the Hashim Sani Centre for Palestine Studies. The conference aimed to provide a platform for experts, academics, policymakers, and activists to engage in discussions on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, with a specific focus on the role and responses of Malaysia and the broader Asian community.


Report_ 4 Nov 2024 – One-day International Conference on Palestine_ Exploring Asian PerspectivesDownload
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12 SepReport

AMEC Visitations to UI and UMJ  Highlight Cross-Sector Advocacy for Palestine

Jakarta, 8 September 2025 — The Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC) conducted a series of academic and humanitarian engagements in Jakarta, strengthening partnerships with Universitas Indonesia (UI) and Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta (UMJ). Dr. Ferooze Ali, Senior Fellow at AMEC and lecturer at Sultan Zainal Abidin University, Malaysia, who were visiting Indonesia had these visitations focused on interfaith dialogue, youth activism, and humanitarian aid for Palestine.

The first visit took place at Universitas Indonesia (UI), where Dr. Ferooze met with Mr. Broto Wardoyo, Ph.D., Head of the International Relations Department. Their discussion explored how the Palestinian issue is understood among non-Muslim communities in Indonesia, particularly Christians, and emphasized that the conflict should be framed as a human rights crisis, not merely a religious one.

Mr. Wardoyo shared how organizations like the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI) are often included in Muslim-led Palestine solidarity actions by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), sending a clear message of interfaith unity. They also discussed the limited influence of Evangelical Christian groups in Indonesia. 

The conversation further highlighted the growing role of youth in Palestine advocacy. Student organizations, digital activism, and grassroots movements are increasingly framing the issue within a global justice narrative. Dr. Ferooze noted this as a promising trend for sustaining inclusive, values-based support for Palestinian rights.

Later that day, Dr. Ferooze and AMEC Indonesia’s team visited Dr. Asep Setiawan (AMEC’s Regional Coordinator) and Mr. Hamka, M.Si (Senior Lecturer at UMJ) at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP) at Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta (UMJ) for a closed discussion in preparation for his upcoming book on NGOs and Malaysian Foreign Aid to Palestine. The session was co-organized by AMEC and UMJ’s Political Science Program.

In the discussion, Dr. Ferooze stressed the urgency of increasing and improving humanitarian aid to Gaza, particularly in light of ongoing Israeli aggression. He called on NGOs to enhance their professionalism, coordination, and transparency to ensure that aid is both effective and ethically delivered. He noted that aid has spiritual and moral significance in Islam, and its proper management reinforces public trust and accountability.

Mr. Hamka, M.Si shared findings from his year-long research on Muhammadiyah’s humanitarian efforts in Gaza. He highlighted Muhammadiyah’s role in humanitarian diplomacy, in strengthening Indonesia’s global image as a humanitarian actor, and in supporting peace aligned with national foreign policy.

Recent figures show that Malaysian NGOs, through the Humanitarian Trust Fund for Palestine (AAKRP), have distributed over 99 million Ringgit (approx. IDR 383.4 billion) in aid between 2023 and 2025. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah has contributed IDR 40 billion across two periods. Other Indonesian NGOs—such as Dompet Dhuafa, Aqsha Working Group (AWG), Maemuna Center Indonesia, and MER-C—also remain active in Gaza relief efforts.

These visitations reaffirm AMEC’s commitment to fostering academic dialogue, interfaith understanding, and sustained humanitarian support for the people of Palestine. Through partnerships with Indonesian institutions, AMEC continues to amplify advocacy that is grounded in justice, collaboration, and compassion.

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09 Julتقارير

 التفاعلات بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون الخليجي في ظل نظام عالمي متغيّر: جسـرٌ بين المنطقتين – الفرص والتحديات

 التاريخ: الثلاثاء، 8 يوليو 2025
المكان: قاعة المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإسلامية المتقدمة (IAIS)، كوالالمبور
الجهات المنظّمة: مركز آسيا والشرق الأوسط للبحث والحوار (AMEC) بالشراكة مع المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإسلامية المتقدمة (IAIS) ماليزيا

مقدمة

في ظل تسارع التحولات الجيوسياسية والاقتصادية على مستوى العالم، يبرز كل من رابطة دول جنوب شرق آسيا (آسيان) ومجلس التعاون الخليجي (GCC) كقوتين إقليميتين لهما تأثير متزايد على الساحة الدولية. وانطلاقًا من هذه الأهمية، نظّم مركز آسيا والشرق الأوسط للبحث والحوار (AMEC) بالتعاون مع المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإسلامية المتقدمة (IAIS)، حلقة نقاشية مغلقة تحت عنوان:
“التفاعلات بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون الخليجي في ظل نظام عالمي متغيّر: جسـرٌ بين المنطقتين – الفرص والتحديات”، وذلك بتاريخ 8 يوليو 2025.

جاءت هذه الفعالية متزامنة مع رئاسة ماليزيا لعام 2025 لرابطة آسيان، وشكّلت منصة جمعت دبلوماسيين ومفكرين وصانعي سياسات لاستكشاف سُبل التكامل الاقتصادي، والتقارب الثقافي، والتعاون الاستراتيجي بين المنطقتين.

الكلمات الافتتاحية والرئيسية

الدكتور مسلم عمران (مدير AMEC)
 افتتح الدكتور مسلم عمران الجلسة مؤكّدًا التزام المركز بتعزيز الشراكة بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون. وربط النقاش بمخرجات المؤتمر الدولي الذي نظمه AMEC في جاكرتا عام 2024، مؤكدًا أن الحوار المستمر هو حجر الأساس لتعاون فعّال.
سلط الضوء على أهمية أن تتبنى آسيان ومجلس التعاون مسارًا تشاركيًا قائمًا على الاحترام المتبادل، والحياد الاستراتيجي، والقيم المشتركة، مشيرًا إلى محاور رئيسية، أبرزها:

  • التكامل الاقتصادي: ارتفاع التجارة المتوقعة من 130 مليار دولار (2023) إلى 180 مليار دولار بحلول 2032، مع التركيز على الاقتصاد الرقمي، وصناعة الحلال، وتمويل المناخ.
  • الأمن المشترك: الدعوة إلى التعاون في الأمن البحري والسيبراني، ومواجهة التطرف والأزمات المناخية.
  • بناء الثقة الثقافية: عبر التعليم، وبرامج الشباب، والتعاون الأكاديمي، مدعومًا باتفاقيات وقّعها AMEC مع جامعات في كلا المنطقتين.
  • دور ماليزيا القيادي: كرئيس حالي لآسيان، تمتلك ماليزيا فرصة استراتيجية لقيادة جهود الدمج الدبلوماسي والفكري والاقتصادي بين المنطقتين.

“دعونا نواصل هذه المسيرة بصدق ووضوح وهدف مشترك.”

الأستاذ الدكتور معزلي مالك (رئيس مجلس IAIS ماليزيا)
 في كلمته الترحيبية، شدد على ضرورة تجاوز العلاقات الرمزية إلى شراكات عملية، شاملة، وقابلة للتكيّف. واقترح بناء ما سماه “البنية التحتية الفكرية” القائمة على شبكات الثقة وسرديات السياسات المشتركة كأساس للتعاون المستدام.

تان سري سيد حامد البر (المستشار الفخري لـ AMEC)
 أبرز في كلمته الجذور التاريخية للتقارب بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون من خلال التجارة والقيم المشتركة. ودعا إلى إنشاء آليات مؤسسية مثل القمم، ومجموعات العمل، وبرامج تبادل المجتمع المدني. واقترح التركيز على مجالات التمويل الإسلامي، الطاقة المتجددة، والسيادة الرقمية كمساحات للتكامل.

🔹 النائب توان ليو تشين تونغ (نائب وزير MITI)
 أكد على أهمية تحويل التعاون بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون إلى شراكة واقعية. وأشار إلى القطاعات ذات الأولوية مثل سلاسل الإمداد، والتحول في الطاقة، والحوكمة الرقمية، معتبراً أن رئاسة ماليزيا لآسيان تمثل لحظة مناسبة لدفع جهود اتفاقية تجارة حرة شاملة.

العروض التقديمية من الخبراء

السيدة مريم إسماعيل (ISIS ماليزيا)
 سلّطت الضوء على أهمية الإعلام والتعليم ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في تعزيز الدبلوماسية الثقافية وبناء الثقة المتبادلة.

السيدة نبيلة ناتاشا عثمان (AMEC)
 قدّمت نموذج العلاقات بين قطر وسنغافورة كمثال ناجح يمكن استنساخه لتعزيز التكامل الاقتصادي والدبلوماسي بين آسيان ودول الخليج.

السيدة مسني محمد (MIDA)
 استعرضت حجم الاستثمارات الماليزية الذي تجاوز 378.5 مليار رنجيت، مشيرة إلى اهتمام دول الخليج بالطاقة النظيفة والبنية التحتية الرقمية وصناعة الحلال. وشددت على ضرورة وضع الأسس القانونية والتجارية لاتفاقية تجارة حرة بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون.

المداخلات الختامية

الدكتور أحمد البدري عبد الله (نائب الرئيس التنفيذي لـ IAIS)
 وضع التعاون بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون ضمن ما سماه “النظام الآسيوي الناشئ”، ودعا إلى تطوير أطر سياسات متعددة الأطراف، ومبادرات للطاقة النظيفة، ومنصات رقمية مشتركة. واقترح ما يلي:

  • ممر اقتصادي مشترك بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون
  • شبكات تفكير وتعاون مجتمعي مشترك
  • منصات للابتكار وتسهيل التجارة

الأستاذ معاذ صيام (مدير RTD – AMEC)
 اختتم النقاش باستعراض الركائز الأساسية التي برزت خلال الجلسة، وهي:

  • الانسجام القطاعي: التمويل الأخضر، الاقتصاد الرقمي، تجارة الحلال
  • الدبلوماسية الثقافية والتعليمية: الشباب، الإعلام، الجامعات
  • التنسيق الاستراتيجي: الاستجابة للأزمات، الحوكمة، سلاسل التوريد

وأشاد بالفعالية كمحطة انطلاق نحو شراكة أكثر تنظيمًا واستدامة بين المنطقتين، متماشية مع قيادة ماليزيا الدبلوماسية في 2025.

“لتكن هذه البداية لعلاقات أعمق وأكثر تنظيمًا بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون.”

خلاصات رئيسية

  • العلاقات بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون استراتيجية وليست رمزية، تستند إلى تاريخ مشترك ورؤى عالمية متقاربة.
  • هناك فرص اقتصادية واعدة، خاصة في التجارة، وسوق الحلال، والتقنية المالية، والاقتصاد الرقمي.
  • الثقة بين الشعوب عنصر أساسي لبناء شراكة مرنة ومستدامة.
  • ماليزيا مؤهلة لقيادة الجهود نحو أطر تعاون قائمة على قواعد واضحة وشمولية.

التزام AMEC

يواصل مركز AMEC التزامه ببناء الجسور بين آسيا والشرق الأوسط، من خلال البحث، والحوار، وتيسير الشراكات. وسيبقى فاعلًا في دعم شراكة آسيان–مجلس التعاون بطريقة شاملة واستراتيجية ومستدامة.

 

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09 JulReport

ASEAN-GCC Interactions in a Changing Global Order: Bridging Regions – Opportunities and Challenges

Date: 8 July 2025 (Tuesday)
Venue: IAIS Hall, Kuala Lumpur
Organizers: Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC) & International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia
Format: Round Table Discussion (RTD)
Language: English

Introduction

In an era of accelerating geopolitical and economic transformation, ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stand as critical regional blocs with rising global influence. To address shared challenges and explore new synergies, the Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC) and the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia jointly hosted a Round Table Discussion (RTD) on “ASEAN-GCC Interactions in a Changing Global Order: Bridging Regions – Opportunities and Challenges” on 8 July 2025.

Timed with Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship, the event brought together diplomats, thought leaders, and policy practitioners to explore avenues for economic integration, cultural connectivity, and strategic cooperation.

Opening and Keynote Remarks

Dr. Muslim Imran (Director, AMEC)

Dr. Muslim Imran opened the round table by reaffirming AMEC’s commitment to deepening ASEAN-GCC engagement. Building upon the momentum of AMEC’s 2024 international conference in Jakarta, he positioned the event within a broader trajectory of sustained dialogue.

He emphasized that in today’s multipolar and uncertain global context, ASEAN and the GCC must chart a collaborative course grounded in mutual respect, strategic neutrality, and shared values.
Key themes included:

  • Economic Synergies: Trade is projected to grow from US$130B (2023) to US$180B by 2032, especially in digital infrastructure, halal industries, and climate finance.
  • Security Collaboration: Advocated for maritime and cyber cooperation, as well as shared frameworks to address extremism and climate-related crises.
  • Cultural Trust: Called for deeper people-to-people diplomacy through education, youth programs, and academic cooperation—supported by recent AMEC university MoUs.
  • Malaysia’s Leadership: As ASEAN Chair, Malaysia has the opportunity to bridge regions intellectually, diplomatically, and economically.

“Let us continue this journey together—with sincerity, clarity, and purpose.”

Prof. Dr. Maszlee Malik (Chairman, IAIS Malaysia)

In his welcoming remarks, Dr. Maszlee emphasized that ASEAN-GCC ties must evolve beyond symbolism into functional, inclusive, and adaptive partnerships. He proposed building “intellectual infrastructure”—trust networks and shared policy narratives—as the foundation for durable cooperation.

Tan Sri Syed Hamid Albar (Honorary Advisor, AMEC)

Tan Sri Syed Hamid’s keynote highlighted the historical convergence between ASEAN and GCC through trade and shared values. He urged the development of institutional mechanisms (e.g., summits, working groups, civil society exchanges) and identified key areas for cooperation such as Islamic finance, renewable energy, and digital sovereignty.

YB Tuan Liew Chin Tong (Deputy Minister, MITI)

YB Liew Chin Tong reinforced the need for practical, region-to-region cooperation. He cited ASEAN-GCC trade volumes and prioritized sectors like supply chains, energy transition, and digital governance, affirming that Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship presents a timely opportunity to push toward a formal FTA framework.

Expert Presentations

  • Ms. Maryam Ismail (ISIS Malaysia)
    On cross-cultural connectivity, she spotlighted social media, education, and media as critical avenues for diplomacy and mutual trust.
  • Ms. Nabila Natasha Osman (AMEC)
    Presented Qatar-Singapore relations as a replicable model for ASEAN-GCC economic, innovation, and diplomatic integration.
  • Ms. Masni Muhammad (MIDA)
    Highlighted Malaysia’s RM378.5B investment record, and GCC interest in green energy, digital infrastructure, and halal industries—urging groundwork for an ASEAN-GCC FTA.

Reflections and Closing Remarks

Dr. Ahmad Badri Abdullah (Deputy CEO, IAIS)

Dr. Badri positioned ASEAN-GCC cooperation within a larger “Asian order”, calling for multilateral policy frameworks, clean energy consortiums, and shared digital platforms. He proposed:

  • ASEAN-GCC Economic Corridor
  • Think tank and civil society networks
  • Joint innovation and trade facilitation platforms

Mr. Muath Seyam (Director, RTD – AMEC)

Mr. Muath Seyam closed the session by summarizing the core pillars that emerged:

  1. Sectoral Synergy (green finance, digital, halal trade)
  2. Cultural & Educational Diplomacy (youth, media, academia)
  3. Strategic Coordination (crisis response, governance, supply chains)

He praised the event as a launchpad for structured, enduring engagement, aligning with Malaysia’s diplomatic leadership in 2025.

“Let this be the beginning of deeper and more structured engagements between our regions.”

Key Takeaways

  • ASEAN-GCC relations are strategic, not symbolic, built on shared history and aligned global visions.
    Economic potential is vast—trade, halal markets, fintech, and digital economies are growth sectors.
  • Deep people-to-people trust is essential for resilient cooperation.
  • Malaysia, as ASEAN Chair, is well positioned to lead efforts in rule-based, inclusive frameworks.

AMEC’s Commitment

AMEC remains dedicated to building bridges between Asia and the Middle East. Through research, dialogue, and partnership facilitation, it will continue to promote inclusive and strategic ASEAN-GCC engagement.

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08 Julpress statement

Bridging Regions: ASEAN-GCC Round Table Highlights Strategic Cooperation in a Changing Global Order


 8 July 2025 | Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

The Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), in collaboration with the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia, convened a high-level Round Table Discussion (RTD) on “ASEAN-GCC Interactions in a Changing Global Order: Bridging Regions – Opportunities and Challenges” on Tuesday, 8 July 2025 at the IAIS Hall, Kuala Lumpur.

Amidst rapid global transformation, the event provided a timely platform for strategic dialogue between two influential regional blocs: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As Malaysia assumes the ASEAN Chairmanship for 2025, the discussion underscored the country’s longstanding commitment to regional diplomacy and multilateral cooperation.

The round table gathered leading scholars, policymakers, and diplomatic voices from across ASEAN and the Gulf region. Opening remarks were delivered by Dr. Muslim Imran, Director of AMEC, and Dr. Maszlee Malik, Chairperson of IAIS Malaysia. The keynote address, titled “The ASEAN-GCC Nexus”, was delivered by Tan Sri Dr. Syed Hamid Albar, Honorary Advisor of AMEC. YB Tuan Liew Chin Tong, Deputy Minister of International Trade and Industry, officiated the session with remarks emphasizing the importance of deepening interregional economic ties.

The RTD featured five expert presentations exploring the multifaceted nature of ASEAN-GCC cooperation:

  • Ms. Maryam Ismail (ISIS Malaysia) offered insights into cross-cultural understanding and human connectivity.
    Ms. Nabila Natasha Osman (AMEC Fellow) presented a case study on Singapore-Qatar relations.
  • Mr. Samer Allawi (Al Jazeera International) discussed media, narratives, and regional perception.
    Ms. Masni Muhammad (Malaysian Investment Development Authority, MIDA) addressed investment trends and development opportunities in ASEAN-GCC interactions.

With a shared emphasis on economic cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and strategic coordination, the RTD aimed to:

  • Identify sectoral synergies in trade, energy, digital transformation, and the halal economy;
  • Promote educational, cultural, and religious exchange to foster mutual trust and social cohesion;
  • Explore joint strategies for navigating multipolar geopolitical realities.

Closing remarks were given by Dr. Ahmad Badri bin Abdullah, Deputy CEO of IAIS Malaysia, followed by a summary and acknowledgements by Muath Seyam, Director of the RTD from AMEC.

As global power centers continue to shift, ASEAN and the GCC are well-positioned to lead inclusive and balanced regional partnerships. The discussion affirmed a growing consensus: interregional engagement is no longer optional—it is essential.

Press Release_ ASEAN-GCC RTDDownload
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26 JunArticle

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: IS THE WEST’S CREDIBILITY AT STAKE?

In recent years, the notion of judicial independence – long perceived as a settled pillar of liberal democracy – has come under increasing strain. From political interference in Hungary and Poland to growing concerns in the United States, the very idea that justice can operate free from political pressure is being tested. This article explores how judicial independence underpins not only domestic rule of law, but also international credibility, economic trust, and diplomatic legitimacy. Is the West still fit to champion these values globally? To fully grasp what is at stake today, it is essential to revisit the historical foundations and the pivotal role judicial independence has played in shaping Western democracies.

I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE : PILLAR OF THE RULE OF LAW AND RELEVANT STANDARDS

Judicial independence stands as one of the most powerful embodiments of the foundational ideal of Western liberal democracies: the rule of law. Far from being a mere institutional arrangement, it is a centuries-old pillar rooted in the democratic architecture of the separation of powers – an idea most famously articulated by Montesquieu. Within this framework, the judiciary emerges not just as a branch of government, but as an autonomous authority, shielded from the influence of both the legislature and the executive. Crucially, this independence is not only external: the principle of internal independence ensures that no hierarchical interference distorts the impartial exercise of judicial power from within.(1)

Why is it important to discuss judicial independence today ?  As  Giacomo OBERTO, judge at the Court of Turin, points out, « every legal system recognizes, at least in principle, the independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches ; however, in practice, this independence cannot yet be considered a fully and durably achieved reality everywhere in the world and, upon closer inspection, not even within our own continent ».(2) Indeed, our era seems marked by a theory-practice gap that sometime diverges significantly from what might be described as a true international – or perhaps transnational(3) – legal framework protecting judicial independence.

This specific body of law, expressing the formal commitment of States to uphold and protect individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, is reflected in numerous regional instruments – for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (Article 6), and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges, adopted by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 10 July 1998 – as well as in universal ones, such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted in 1985, along with the Procedures for their Effective Implementation (1989), and the Universal Charter of the Judge. The latter, originally approved in 1999 by the Central Council of the International Association of Judges (IAJ), was most recently updated in 2017 in Santiago de Chile.

The recent failure to uphold the principles of judicial independence and impartiality recognized in these texts (and beyond)(4) in certain contexts has increased awareness of what might be described as a genuine crisis of judicial independence within the rule of law, both in Europe and the United States. Yet, the current landscape reveals a much more fragile reality: in several European countries, judicial autonomy is increasingly under threat, raising serious concerns about the erosion of the rule of law.

II. INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY THREATS : JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN DEFENSE AND CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL AUTONOMY

The essential nature of the judicial independence has been reaffirmed in several judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, such as in the cases of Yalçinkaya v. Turkey (2023), in which the Court notes « the perceived erosion of the independence of the Turkish judiciary and the concerns over undue interference by the executive »(5), and Baka v. Hungary (2016)(6). Repeatedly, the ECtHR emphasizes « the cardinal importance of maintaining the independence of national courts in order to ensure effective judicial protection » (Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 2020).(7) In the same judgment, the Court affirms that the three elements of independence, impartiality, and a tribunal « established by law » are interrelated through « the institutional requirements of Article 6 § 1, in that they are guided by the aim of upholding the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers » (Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021).(8)

Remaining within the European sphere, Gaetano DE AMICIS(9) reports that the Court of Justice of the European Union has progressively affirmed judicial independence as an essential component of the rule of law, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU(10). In landmark rulings, such as Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16)(11), it underlined that Member States are required to guarantee such independence as an indispensable condition for the proper functioning of the Union’s legal order.

Beyond the EU borders, on the American continent, the Trump-era United States has not been exempting from violations of the independence principle. Recently, District Judge Jeannette Vargas granted a motion by over a dozen Democratic state attorneys general to order a preliminary

injunction halting the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE)(12) access to the payment

system. Due to intense media pressure immediately exerted following the author’s decision, this case raises concerns regarding judicial independence and the security of judges.

These developments are far from isolated legal issues. They have far-reaching implications for democratic stability, the protection of fundamental rights, and the credibility of Western institutions as a whole.

III. JUDGES UNDER PRESSURE : CURRENT QUESTIONS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

From the entirety of these cases arise three essential questions that Fredrik Sundberg(13) raised during the conference on “The importance of Judicial Independence in Europe in the light of two case studies : Yalçinkaya v. Türkiye and Baka v. Hungary”, held on 17 February 2025 in Strasbourg. In that context, he asked himself : a) can national judges defend themselves against such attacks and pressures ? ; b) can the European Union or the Council of Europe effectively intervene to protect judicial independence ? ; c) is judicial independence truly essential, or can a democracy survive without it ?

As he himself invites us to observe, these three questions bring us back to the necessity of considering judicial independence not from an isolated perspective, but rather from its interaction with other components – such as politics – which remind us why it is important : it is the task of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, to act as a safeguard against abuses of power and to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, even (or especially) when majority governments neglect them.

In this perspective, it is also essential to invoke the principle of subsidiarity(14) on which the very existence of the European Court of Human Rights is founded and which may recall the principle of complementarity(15) that characterizes the functioning of the International Criminal Court. Thus, the dynamic that emerges from the interaction between national bodies and international bodies guarantees an additional justice option for the victims of state dysfunctions. And the essential nature of this observation has been demonstrated precisely by the interventions of the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court, whose (binding) judgments are designed to regulate the overreach of state actors.

In this same spirit, an open letter was recently published by a group of academics, legal professionals, and members of the national, European, and international criminal justice communities. Presented during the third colloquium in Paris in honor of Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty, under the theme Raisonner la raison d’État: Où en est l’Europe?, this initiative responds to the open letter signed on 22 May 2025 by nine heads of government from EU and Council of Europe member states—an alarming statement that, according to its critics, reveals an intention to challenge the authority of the European Court of Human Rights and, more broadly, to undermine human rights protections. The counter-letter expresses deep concern over these developments and calls on national, European, and international actors to reaffirm their commitment to safeguarding the independence of the judiciary and preserving the authority of the Strasbourg Court.

However, this dynamic does not end with judicial bodies and institutions alone. For example, within the European Union, an important role of monitoring and ensuring respect for the rule of law by Member States is played by the Commission. In the framework of infringement procedures, in fact, the European Commission can initiate legal actions against Member States that violate EU law, including in matters related to the rule of law – for example, judicial independence. The case of Poland is one such example : following the concerns raised in 2017, the Commission initiated a formal procedure for the risk of a serious breach of the rule of law. Only after the adoption of an action plan by the Polish authorities and the observation that this risk had subsided did it withdraw the reasoned proposal, while still maintaining the monitoring mechanism through the Rule of Law

Report.(16) This shows how European institutions can exercise effective political and institutional

pressure in defense of the Union’s fundamental values.

 In light of this crisis, coordinated responses are urgently needed: the European Union, national institutions, and civil society all have a critical role to play in safeguarding judicial independence as a cornerstone of democracy.

IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AD AN INSTRUMENT OF TRUST, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In a globalized world, the guarantee of a judiciary free from interference is an essential condition not only for the protection of fundamental rights, but also for the stability of international relations. The connection is clear : a well-functioning judicial system inevitably attracts individuals and external partners who will have trust in it. The Court of Justice of the European Union itself tends to emphasize the close link between the principle of mutual trust and respect for the fundamental values of Article 2 TEU, describing it as a key for establishing and maintaining the mutual trust that underlies the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.

Indeed, it is above all true that an authoritative and impartial judicial system contributes to creating an environment of legal certainty and predictability, an essential requirement to attract foreign investment and stimulate international economic cooperation. This assertion is shared by the European Commission which, in the paragraph Perceptions of judicial independence of the already mentioned Report, observes that « well-functioning and fully independent justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for investments protection, and therefore contribute to growth and competitiveness ».(17)

In accordance with this logic, the 2021 Versi Maplecroft Human Rights Outlook report states that « for companies in ‘high’ risk jurisdictions, this [the growing political interference in the legal systems] could mean a lack of recourse in contract renegotiations, or unfair legal sanctions imposed

by governments to punish perceived slights or to achieve geopolitical aims ».(18) Furthermore,

beyond the economic and financial sphere alone, it « undermines the protection of human rights by enabling states to pursue political opponent, activists and journalists with legal penalties, while removing access to remedy for victims of violations ».(19)

Ultimately, what is at stake goes far beyond national judicial reforms: it is the integrity of the democratic project in the West that is being put to the test.

V. THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE OF TRUST

Thus, judicial independence bolsters a State’s credibility in multilateral settings, constituting an indicator of compliance with the rule of law and human rights. As the Italian Andrea ORLANDO recalls, in Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : independence, efficiency and responsibilities ”, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe point out that the independence of judges « is not a privilege for judges, but a guarantee of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing every person to have confidence in the justice system ».(20)

The question then becomes whether, in today’s world, this trust is being strengthened or weakened. Indeed, the crisis of independence in influential powers such as the United States of America – especially under the Trump administration – and Europe calls into question the stability of judicial system that has traditionally represented a model of democratic guarantee, and affects the international perception of the reliability of U.S. institutions. Judicial instability in key geopolitical contexts generates ripple effects, influencing diplomatic balances and global economic relations.

As judicial independence erodes in the very nations that once exported rule-of-law standards, a critical question emerges: can the West still lead by example? If trust in the judiciary falters domestically, its influence abroad is bound to wane. What is at stake is not only the impartiality of courts, but the moral authority of democratic systems on the global stage. Finally, it could be argued that the Western model of judicial independence is not the only possible one, nor necessarily the best in absolute terms. Could other, more ‘politicized’ or integrated judicial systems function effectively without compromising justice or the protection of rights?

1 Rule of Law Checklist (CDL-AD(2016)007), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (11-12 March 2016) , par. 74 : « […] Independence means that the judiciary is free from external pressure, and is not subject to political influence or manipulation, in particular by the executive branch. This requirement is an integral part of the fundamental democratic principle of the separation of powers. Judges should not be subject to political influence or manipulation ».

2 Translated by the author from : Giacomo OBERTO, Un Nuovo Statuto per un Nuovo Giudice. Available in PDF format since 2017 at the following link: https://www.iaj-uim.org/iuw/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ Oberto_Un_nuovo_statuto_per_un_nuovo_giudice_2017.pdf (p. 6)

3 Ibid., p.8.

4 Ibid., p. 8-10. OBERTO also mentions the following international and regional instruments concerning judicial independence (note : this list dates back to 2017 and may not reflect the most recent developments) : the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) ; the Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on the “Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges”, adopted in 1994 and late updated by Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : Independence, Efficiency and Responsibilities” ; the Victoria Falls Proclamation 1994 “For and Independent Judiciary through Judicial Education”, issued by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association ; the Resolution on the Role of the Judiciary in a State governed by the Rule of Law, adopted in Warsaw on 4 April 1995 by the Ministers participating in the Round Table of Ministers of Justice from Central and Eastern European countries ; the European Parliament Resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the European Union in 1998 and 1999 (11350/1999 – C5-02265/1999 – 1999/2001 (INI)), adopted on 16 March 2000 ; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in Nice on 7 December 2000 (Article 47) ; various Opinions of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), including the one on “Standards concerning the independence of the Judiciary and the Irrevocabilità of Judges”, and the “Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles)”, a compilation of such opinions published in 2010 ; the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) ; ECOSOC Resolution 2006/23; the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, in particular Opinion No. 494/2008 on the independence of the judiciary ; the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, adopted in 2010 ; various Opinions of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) ; the Status of Magistrates’ in the Commonwealth, adopted in 2013 by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association.

5 ECtHR, GC, Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, 2016, §363.

6 ECtHR, GC, Baka c. Hungary, 2016.

7 ECtHR, GC, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 1 december 2020, § 139.

8 ECtHR, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 260.

9 Gaetano DE AMICIS, “Stato di diritto, garanzie europee di indipendenza della magistratura e cooperazione giudiziaria penale : quadri di un’esposizione in fieri”, Sistema Penale, 2021. PDF available at the following link: https://www.sistemapenale.it/pdf_contenuti/1639342956_deamicis-2021a-stato-di-diritto-garanzie- indipendenza-magistratura-cooperazione-giudiziaria-unione-europea.pdf

10 Article 2 TEU : « The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail ».

11 CJEU, GC, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 2018.

12 Formally the “ US DOGE Service Temporary Organization ”, it is an organization established at the initiative of the second Trump administration and led by Elon Musk.

13 Former Chief of the department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.

14 This subsidiarity is implicitly expressed in Articles 1 ( « The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention »), 13 ( « Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority […] ») and 35 (1) ( « The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted […] ») of the ECHR. With the entry into force of Protocol No. 15, it is also explicitly reaffirmed in the Preamble ( « […] Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto […] »).

15 Rome Statute, Article 17.

16 2024 Rule of Law Report, p. 7. PDF available at the following link : https://commission.europa.eu/

d o c u m e n t / d o w n l o a d / 2 7 d b 4 1 4 3 – 5 8 b 4 – 4 b 6 1 – a 0 2 1 – a 2 1 5 9 4 0 e 1 9 d 0 _ e n ?  filename=1_1_58120_communication_rol_en.pdf

18 S. NAZALYA, O. MARIN, S. HAYNES, W. NICHOLS, J. LOCKHART-SMITH, E. GAVIN, F. WOLF, C.

MAY, Human Rights Outlook, Verisk Maplecroft, 2021. PDF available at the following link : https:// h u m a n t r a f f i c k i n g s e a r c h . o r g / w p – c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 2 1 / 1 0 / Verisk_Maplecroft_Human_Rights_Outlook_2021.pdf

19 Ibid.

20 Andrea ORLANDO, “Judges in Poland and in the Republic of Moldova must remain independent”, (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights), doc. 15204, 2021. Available at the following link : https:// pace.coe.int/en/files/28907/html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

WRITTEN BY:

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

 

  • Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
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30 MayArticle

Understanding the Syrian Conflict: Internal Resilience and External Influences

The Syrian crisis, lasted from 2011 to 2024, shows how complicated the interactions between internal social processes and external geopolitical factors are in the Middle East. A critical, research-based analysis shows that both internal factors like regime consolidation, sectarian divisions, and the legacy of colonial state-building played a big role in the conflict’s path, as did external actors in shaping its course and outcomes.
Using theoretical frameworks like Neoclassical Realism (NCR) helps us comprehend how domestic political systems deal with and respond to systemic foreign forces in a more complex way. In Syria’s case, continued assistance from regional and global allies, especially Iran and Russia, gave the regime military, economic, and diplomatic support that helped it stay in power and strengthen its position. Iran’s intervention in Syria went beyond ideological affinity and was strategically embedded in a wider goal of maintaining and expanding its “axis of resistance” across the Levant. This was evident in Iran’s coordination of Shi’a militias, including fighters from Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, and Afghan Fatemiyoun units, mobilized under the command of the IRGC to secure key areas such as the Damascus–Aleppo corridor and the Sayyida Zaynab shrine. Tehran’s strategy included establishing permanent military infrastructure in Syria, such as the Imam Ali base near the Iraqi border in 2019, reflecting broader security and logistical interests. These efforts aligned with NCR’s emphasis on how systemic ambitions are translated into concrete actions through domestic capabilities and regional alliances. This outside help helped keep the country together, especially because the dictatorship controlled cities and networks of loyalists.
On the other hand, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and others tried to weaken Assad’s grip on power. But these interventions often had different goals, which made the region more divided and the conflict last longer. Some of these initiatives didn’t take into account how strong existing connections and internal processes were for keeping the regime in power, which made Assad’s position stronger.
Turkey’s involvement was shaped not only by its domestic security concerns about Kurdish autonomy but also by its broader aim to influence the post-conflict order. In addition to “Operation Euphrates Shield” in 2016, Ankara launched “Operation Olive Branch” in 2018 and “Operation Peace Spring” in 2019, targeting Kurdish-held areas in Afrin and northeast Syria, respectively. These operations were not solely counterterrorism efforts but served Ankara’s goal to establish a buffer zone and demographic reconfiguration in areas like Afrin, where local displacement and repopulation strategies followed5. Furthermore, Turkey’s establishment of observation posts under the Astana agreement and its military presence in Idlib province showed an attempt to carve out a strategic sphere of influence, consistent with NCR’s notion of power projection filtered through domestic concerns and regional rivalries.
Furthermore, the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Syria illustrates how their divergent strategies were tied to systemic competition with Iran and regional leadership ambitions. Qatar’s early support for Islamist factions, such as those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, led to its backing of groups like Liwa al-Tawhid and Ahrar al-Sham, which operated predominantly in northern Syria from 2012 to 2014. In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s support coalesced around more secular or Salafist-leaning factions, culminating in the creation of the Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam) in the Damascus suburbs in 2013. Despite their financial and logistical investments, both states struggled to maintain cohesive opposition fronts. Their rivalry was evident during the Geneva II peace talks in 2014, where opposition delegations backed by each state clashed on strategic priorities and political concessions. This fragmentation diluted the effectiveness of external support and highlights the way domestic ambitions and rival threat perceptions—central to NCR—shaped their Syrian policies.
The Syrian regime’s survival did not depend only on help from other countries. The administration used careful plans to keep control of the land, keep the loyalty of the elite, and break up the resistance. But Syria also had significant internal problems, such the fracturing of the opposition, changing demography, and the displacement of millions of people. These things changed the social fabric and made it hard to rule and make peace in the long run.
A post-colonial view also helps us understand how the rest of the world has dealt with the Syrian situation. External powers’ narratives and actions typically ignored the political dynamics of the indigenous people and instead focused on their own strategic objectives. This shows how colonial borders and state institutions still affect the problems and weaknesses in modern Syria.
These case studies make clear that while external actors sometimes aligned with local needs—such as defeating ISIS or providing humanitarian aid—their primary motivations were geostrategic. Whether it was Russia seeking influence and military presence, Iran attempting to sustain a regional alliance network, or Turkey aiming to suppress Kurdish autonomy, their interventions reflect the NCR model of systemic pressures filtered through national interests and domestic agendas. In this sense, external involvement was not an altruistic effort to stabilise Syria, but a continuation of regional and global competition by other means, shaping not only the survival and defeat of Assad but the wider trajectory of Syrian statehood.

WRITTEN BY:

Beatrice Liverzani

 

  • Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
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