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10 FebArticle

Starlink and the Risks of Digital Power Politics in the Middle East

By Muad M Zaki. 

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center 

 

For more than a decade, U.S. strategy has searched for ways to influence political outcomes abroad without repeating the political and human costs of direct military intervention. Wars are expensive, electorally damaging, and increasingly unpopular across Western societies. In this environment, technology has been elevated as a substitute for force, capable of applying pressure, shaping narratives, and sustaining political movements without crossing the threshold of armed conflict.

The confrontation surrounding Starlink and Iran exposes the limits—and dangers—of that assumption. What began as a non-kinetic experiment in influence has not only failed to deliver decisive outcomes but, has also accelerated military escalation while raising fundamental questions about sovereignty, international law, and the reliability of shared communications infrastructure for allies as well as adversaries.

At its core, this is not a story about satellites or bandwidth. It is about whether privately owned technology can be selectively deployed to advance state objectives without undermining the legal order it claims to support.

The Strategic Appeal of Starlink

From a U.S. strategic perspective, Starlink appeared to offer something unprecedented: a transnational communications layer that does not rely on domestic infrastructure and is therefore difficult for states to control. Satellite terminals operate independently of national networks, creating the perception that connectivity could be sustained even when governments attempted to shut information flows down.

Strategically, this offered three advantages. First, circumvention without invasion. Political pressure could be applied without troops or airstrikes, avoiding escalation and the costs of kinetic force. Second, persistence. Because the infrastructure was external, it was assumed to be resilient to state countermeasures. Third, political insulation. As a privately owned commercial service, Starlink could be presented as neutral technology even when its effects aligned closely with U.S. foreign-policy objectives.

In practice, Starlink functioned as a pressure-sustaining infrastructure, capable of maintaining internal connectivity during periods of unrest while preserving external narrative access. This role reflected operational decisions about where, when, and for whom access would be enabled.

Domestic Constraints and Strategic Incentives

These assumptions cannot be separated from political realities in Washington. For President Donald Trump, the costs of direct confrontation with Iran are not abstract. Military escalation in the Middle East carries clear electoral risks, particularly ahead of midterm elections, when public tolerance for new conflicts is limited.

This has produced a visible split within the U.S. policy establishment. On one side are interventionist factions pressing for decisive action against Iran, even at the risk of regional war. On the other are “America First” voices that view foreign conflict as a political liability and urge concentration on domestic priorities. In this context, technology-driven pressure appeared to offer a compromise: influence outcomes without triggering a war that could destabilize domestic politics.

The Miscalculation

What was underestimated was not Iran’s technical capacity alone, but the breadth of its statecraft, particularly its anticipation that non-kinetic pressure would be paired with covert, intelligence-driven efforts to destabilize its internal security environment.

Rather than attempting to destroy satellites or escalate militarily, Iran focused on denying usability within its territory. States do not need to control infrastructure globally; they need only control the legal, physical, and electromagnetic environment in which it operates domestically.

Iran combined electromagnetic interference, criminal enforcement against unlicensed communications equipment, and physical deterrence through confiscation and penalties. These measures raised the personal cost of reliance on the system and sharply reduced its strategic utility. Importantly, they fall squarely within established principles of international law governing spectrum regulation and telecommunications.

The Neutrality Claim and the Gaza Test

The episode also exposes a deeper inconsistency in claims that Starlink operates as a neutral or humanitarian platform.

If satellite connectivity were genuinely deployed to protect civilians, journalists, and medical workers during crises, Gaza would represent the clearest possible case for its use. For more than two full years, Gaza has endured sustained large-scale civilian destruction, the collapse of medical infrastructure, mass displacement, and prolonged information blackouts, conditions widely recognized as genocide under international law by United Nations investigative mechanisms and reflected in proceedings before international courts under the 1948 Genocide Convention.

Yet during this two-year period, Starlink did not provide unrestricted, civilian-focused access to doctors, hospitals, journalists, or humanitarian organizations operating under siege. This absence is not a technical oversight or logistical delay. After two years, it can only be understood as a deliberate political choice.

Selective deployment across crises transforms a technology from a neutral humanitarian tool into a discretionary instrument aligned with geopolitical priorities.

Alignment With U.S. Policy and the Risks Ahead

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Starlink has been used selectively in ways that support U.S. foreign-policy objectives, including in contexts where those objectives conflict with international legal obligations. Under international law, particularly the Genocide Convention, states and relevant actors have a duty to prevent genocide where possible. Withholding a capability that could materially assist civilians during a legally recognized genocide, while deploying that same capability elsewhere to sustain political pressure, carries legal and normative significance.

History suggests that escalation rarely begins with overt military strikes. It is more often preceded by covert action, intelligence operations, and proxy dynamics designed to weaken a target state from within. The Syrian war offers a sobering precedent: networks activated for short-term leverage quickly escaped control, producing regional instability that far outlasted their original objectives.

A similar risk now looms in the context of Iran. Such tactics may appear to offer deniability and leverage, but experience suggests they carry profound risks.

Europe and Global Consequences

The most significant danger revealed by the Starlink–Iran episode is not escalation with Iran alone, but the normalization of digital infrastructure as an instrument of geopolitical coercion. When private technology platforms can be selectively enabled or withheld in line with strategic priorities, they cease to function as neutral commercial services and instead become extensions of state power.

For Europe, the implications are acute. European states are deeply exposed to energy volatility, inflationary shocks, misinformation and political fragmentation driven by external crises. Yet they are also increasingly dependent on U.S.-based private infrastructure that operates under American jurisdiction. The Starlink precedent raises an unavoidable question: if such technologies can be used selectively against adversaries today, what guarantees exist that they will not be leveraged tomorrow in moments of transatlantic disagreement?

This is not a hypothetical concern. The selective deployment of Starlink—active in some politically aligned contexts, absent during two years of legally recognized genocide in Gaza—demonstrates that access is shaped by power, not principle. Once that reality is acknowledged, trust in shared infrastructure inevitably erodes.

The danger ahead is not simply escalation with Iran. It is the normalization of a system in which communications infrastructure becomes another instrument of coercion—quiet, deniable, and increasingly difficult to trust—undermining the sovereignty of independent states and destabilizing the international order.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
Read More
20 JanArticle

Canada–China Engagement in a Shifting Global Order: A Strategic Reset with Broader Implications for Asia—and Beyond

By: Muad Zaki,

Canada’s renewed engagement with China is often described as a tactical response to near-term geopolitical pressures. That interpretation understates what is unfolding.

What is taking shape reflects a deeper recognition: the assumptions that once governed alliance predictability, trade continuity, and economic risk are no longer reliable. Middle powers are adjusting accordingly—not loudly, not ideologically, but decisively.

The recent visit by the Canadian prime minister to Beijing, and the steps toward normalization that followed, signal an understanding that stability can no longer be assumed. In an environment shaped by persistent volatility—much of it originating from policy unpredictability in Washington—strategic resilience is increasingly defined by diversification rather than alignment alone.

Strategic Realism in an Era of U.S.-Driven Volatility

For decades, Canada operated within a U.S.-led economic system assumed to be institutionally stable. That assumption has weakened. The United States government has increasingly relied on unilateral trade actions, transactional diplomacy, and policy reversals driven by domestic political cycles.

These measures have affected allies as readily as adversaries. For export-dependent economies, this volatility translates directly into risk—discouraging investment, complicating planning, and exposing domestic sectors to external political shocks.

Canada’s recalibration should therefore be understood not as a rejection of partnership, but as a rational response to structural uncertainty.

Why Asia, and Why China

Asia remains the principal engine of global growth, and China sits at the center of global production and trade networks. Engagement reflects economic structure rather than political alignment.

Stabilizing relations with China expands Canada’s strategic options, strengthens supply-chain resilience, and reduces exposure to abrupt external shocks. In a deeply interdependent system, optionality has become a core strategic asset.

From Risk Mitigation to Structural Rebalancing

Engagement with China may begin as risk mitigation, but its longer-term implications are potentially far more consequential.

History suggests that shifts in global order rarely begin with declarations. They emerge through accumulated decisions taken by states adjusting to instability. Over time, those adjustments reshape strategic gravity.

If sustained, Canada’s recalibration may come to be viewed as an early indicator of a broader transition—one in which middle powers move away from singular strategic concentration toward more distributed and pragmatic alignment patterns.

Agriculture and Strategic Payoff

For Canadian agriculture, the implications are immediate. China has long been a critical market for Canadian canola, seafood, pulses, and agri-food exports. Disruptions in this relationship previously exposed farmers to sudden market closures and price instability unrelated to fundamentals.

Normalization restores predictability. For producers, that predictability translates into planning certainty, market confidence, and resilience. In commodity markets, certainty is value.

Inflation Risk and Economic Stability

The significance of engagement lies less in past price effects than in future risk avoidance.

Trade instability—particularly when driven by U.S. tariff escalation—has repeatedly introduced inflationary pressure into global markets. By reducing exposure to such shocks, Canada lowers the probability that external political volatility will transmit directly into domestic cost-of-living pressures.

Engagement functions not as stimulus, but as insulation.

Strategic Signaling

Canada’s approach also sends a signal. In a period marked by policy volatility from Washington, calm and deliberate engagement communicates competence and strategic autonomy.

This posture reflects neither naïveté nor confrontation. It reflects a judgment that economic security in the current era requires diversification—even among allies.

A Test Case for Europe

Canada’s recalibration may resonate beyond the Indo-Pacific. For Europe, which faces similar exposure to U.S. trade volatility and strategic uncertainty, the Canada–China trajectory could serve as a reference point.

Historically, the European Union has adjusted incrementally to external shocks—trade disputes, sanctions spillovers, energy dependence—rather than through abrupt realignment. The concept of strategic autonomy emerged from precisely such reassessments.

Canada’s experience may help clarify whether engagement with China can be recalibrated without abandoning alliances or political values. The question is no longer whether diversification is desirable, but whether delaying it remains viable.

A Strategic Imperative for Beijing

For this recalibration to endure, the next move matters. China should treat Canada’s decision not merely as a diplomatic opening, but as a strategic moment requiring speed, visibility, and tangible delivery.

The current Canadian government has taken a political risk by moving toward normalization at a time when neoconservative currents in Washington are likely to respond with pressure and disruption. If early benefits are not felt domestically, momentum can stall.

China therefore has a clear interest in front-loading benefits in ways that ordinary Canadian businesses and citizens can feel quickly.

Accelerated market access for Canadian agri-food exports, fast-tracked approvals for small and medium-sized enterprises, expanded business mobility, and visible near-term purchasing commitments would translate diplomacy into an immediate economic signal. These steps do not require new ideology. They require execution.

Canada has opened the door. The strategic task now is to ensure the corridor is used before it is contested.

Canada’s renewed engagement with China reflects a clear-eyed response to structural change in the international system. It prioritizes economic stability, protects key export sectors, and reduces exposure to external policy volatility—particularly that originating from an increasingly unpredictable United States.

If sustained—and matched by decisive, visible follow-through from Beijing—this approach may come to be understood not merely as prudent diversification, but as one of the earliest long-term adjustments to a shifting global order.

In a world where unpredictability has become structural, adaptability is no longer tactical. It is strategic.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow
WRITTEN BY:
Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
Read More
05 JanArticle

Power Without Restraint: What Asia Must Now Confront

By Muad M Zaki. 

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center 

The assumption that Asian—or even Muslim—countries can continue to depend on an unreliable and unpredictable United States, or a visibly weakened Europe, as pillars of global stability must now be rigorously re-examined.

It is true that many Asians, including Muslims and others, were educated in politics, science, and numerous other disciplines in the West, and there remains genuine gratitude for that intellectual legacy. Yet the West that was once admired has steadily eroded due to its own strategic and ideological failures. The free marketplace of ideas and robust protection of free speech—once the cornerstone of Western political appeal—has largely vanished. Today, students paying premium tuition fees in many Western countries no longer encounter the intellectually open and pluralistic environments that earlier generations experienced. Instead, they face expanding regulatory, ideological, and institutional constraints on independent thought and expression.

For those who continue to argue that Asia somehow “owes” the West, the only obligation that remains is to remind Western policymakers why their systems were once respected—because at present, their governance trajectory is moving decisively in reverse gear.

The recent actions of the US neoconservative establishment in Venezuela—including the extraterritorial seizure of its leader and the hurried fabrication of legal justifications for what are fundamentally unlawful acts—underscore how selectively both international law and domestic US law are now applied. This should serve as a clear warning to every independent government that values the rule of law, or at minimum expects consistency and good faith from Washington.

If even long-standing US allies such as Canada and members of the European Union can no longer rely on American commitments, it is unrealistic for Asian states to assume that trade agreements or security arrangements engineered by the US will remain dependable. The strategic risk is simply too high.

Simultaneously, many Asian countries increasingly look toward China for economic partnership and security balance, albeit with unease stemming from Beijing’s long-standing non-interference doctrine. This presents China with a growing strategic dilemma. First, Beijing has effectively lost Venezuela, one of its most dependable economic partners in Latin America. If this lesson is not internalized swiftly, China risks a similar outcome with its most significant strategic partner in the Middle East: Iran.

Should this occur, it is entirely plausible that the US will escalate pressure on Asian states, coercing alignment regardless of domestic public opinion. Washington’s calculation, however, continues to rely on China maintaining strict adherence to non-interference—thereby allowing the US to incrementally encircle China, following a playbook previously deployed against Russia.

At present, China retains a strategic advantage in Asia. Across the region, there are credible political leaders prepared to accept China as a regional political and security anchor—provided China is willing to assume that role decisively. Yet as long as Beijing’s non-interference posture remains unchanged, Asian governments will continue to view open resistance to US pressure as a political and economic gamble, particularly when Chinese intervention is assumed but not guaranteed.

From Beijing’s perspective, substantial resources have rightly been devoted to people-to-people engagement and shared economic prosperity. However, the pace of this approach has not matched the speed or intensity of contemporary US geopolitical adventurism. While long-term societal engagement is essential, China could benefit from selectively adopting foreign-policy methods historically employed by Britain in Asia—particularly in distinguishing between leaders who view China merely as a financial resource for domestic patronage, and those who genuinely value China as a stabilizing regional partner.

As global geopolitics continue to deteriorate, Asia must adapt with realism rather than nostalgia—until, perhaps, the West eventually recognizes that perpetual confrontation and manufactured instability serve no one’s long-term interests.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
Read More
26 JunArticle

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: IS THE WEST’S CREDIBILITY AT STAKE?

In recent years, the notion of judicial independence – long perceived as a settled pillar of liberal democracy – has come under increasing strain. From political interference in Hungary and Poland to growing concerns in the United States, the very idea that justice can operate free from political pressure is being tested. This article explores how judicial independence underpins not only domestic rule of law, but also international credibility, economic trust, and diplomatic legitimacy. Is the West still fit to champion these values globally? To fully grasp what is at stake today, it is essential to revisit the historical foundations and the pivotal role judicial independence has played in shaping Western democracies.

I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE : PILLAR OF THE RULE OF LAW AND RELEVANT STANDARDS

Judicial independence stands as one of the most powerful embodiments of the foundational ideal of Western liberal democracies: the rule of law. Far from being a mere institutional arrangement, it is a centuries-old pillar rooted in the democratic architecture of the separation of powers – an idea most famously articulated by Montesquieu. Within this framework, the judiciary emerges not just as a branch of government, but as an autonomous authority, shielded from the influence of both the legislature and the executive. Crucially, this independence is not only external: the principle of internal independence ensures that no hierarchical interference distorts the impartial exercise of judicial power from within.(1)

Why is it important to discuss judicial independence today ?  As  Giacomo OBERTO, judge at the Court of Turin, points out, « every legal system recognizes, at least in principle, the independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches ; however, in practice, this independence cannot yet be considered a fully and durably achieved reality everywhere in the world and, upon closer inspection, not even within our own continent ».(2) Indeed, our era seems marked by a theory-practice gap that sometime diverges significantly from what might be described as a true international – or perhaps transnational(3) – legal framework protecting judicial independence.

This specific body of law, expressing the formal commitment of States to uphold and protect individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, is reflected in numerous regional instruments – for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (Article 6), and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges, adopted by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 10 July 1998 – as well as in universal ones, such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted in 1985, along with the Procedures for their Effective Implementation (1989), and the Universal Charter of the Judge. The latter, originally approved in 1999 by the Central Council of the International Association of Judges (IAJ), was most recently updated in 2017 in Santiago de Chile.

The recent failure to uphold the principles of judicial independence and impartiality recognized in these texts (and beyond)(4) in certain contexts has increased awareness of what might be described as a genuine crisis of judicial independence within the rule of law, both in Europe and the United States. Yet, the current landscape reveals a much more fragile reality: in several European countries, judicial autonomy is increasingly under threat, raising serious concerns about the erosion of the rule of law.

II. INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY THREATS : JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN DEFENSE AND CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL AUTONOMY

The essential nature of the judicial independence has been reaffirmed in several judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, such as in the cases of Yalçinkaya v. Turkey (2023), in which the Court notes « the perceived erosion of the independence of the Turkish judiciary and the concerns over undue interference by the executive »(5), and Baka v. Hungary (2016)(6). Repeatedly, the ECtHR emphasizes « the cardinal importance of maintaining the independence of national courts in order to ensure effective judicial protection » (Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 2020).(7) In the same judgment, the Court affirms that the three elements of independence, impartiality, and a tribunal « established by law » are interrelated through « the institutional requirements of Article 6 § 1, in that they are guided by the aim of upholding the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers » (Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021).(8)

Remaining within the European sphere, Gaetano DE AMICIS(9) reports that the Court of Justice of the European Union has progressively affirmed judicial independence as an essential component of the rule of law, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU(10). In landmark rulings, such as Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16)(11), it underlined that Member States are required to guarantee such independence as an indispensable condition for the proper functioning of the Union’s legal order.

Beyond the EU borders, on the American continent, the Trump-era United States has not been exempting from violations of the independence principle. Recently, District Judge Jeannette Vargas granted a motion by over a dozen Democratic state attorneys general to order a preliminary

injunction halting the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE)(12) access to the payment

system. Due to intense media pressure immediately exerted following the author’s decision, this case raises concerns regarding judicial independence and the security of judges.

These developments are far from isolated legal issues. They have far-reaching implications for democratic stability, the protection of fundamental rights, and the credibility of Western institutions as a whole.

III. JUDGES UNDER PRESSURE : CURRENT QUESTIONS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

From the entirety of these cases arise three essential questions that Fredrik Sundberg(13) raised during the conference on “The importance of Judicial Independence in Europe in the light of two case studies : Yalçinkaya v. Türkiye and Baka v. Hungary”, held on 17 February 2025 in Strasbourg. In that context, he asked himself : a) can national judges defend themselves against such attacks and pressures ? ; b) can the European Union or the Council of Europe effectively intervene to protect judicial independence ? ; c) is judicial independence truly essential, or can a democracy survive without it ?

As he himself invites us to observe, these three questions bring us back to the necessity of considering judicial independence not from an isolated perspective, but rather from its interaction with other components – such as politics – which remind us why it is important : it is the task of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, to act as a safeguard against abuses of power and to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, even (or especially) when majority governments neglect them.

In this perspective, it is also essential to invoke the principle of subsidiarity(14) on which the very existence of the European Court of Human Rights is founded and which may recall the principle of complementarity(15) that characterizes the functioning of the International Criminal Court. Thus, the dynamic that emerges from the interaction between national bodies and international bodies guarantees an additional justice option for the victims of state dysfunctions. And the essential nature of this observation has been demonstrated precisely by the interventions of the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court, whose (binding) judgments are designed to regulate the overreach of state actors.

In this same spirit, an open letter was recently published by a group of academics, legal professionals, and members of the national, European, and international criminal justice communities. Presented during the third colloquium in Paris in honor of Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty, under the theme Raisonner la raison d’État: Où en est l’Europe?, this initiative responds to the open letter signed on 22 May 2025 by nine heads of government from EU and Council of Europe member states—an alarming statement that, according to its critics, reveals an intention to challenge the authority of the European Court of Human Rights and, more broadly, to undermine human rights protections. The counter-letter expresses deep concern over these developments and calls on national, European, and international actors to reaffirm their commitment to safeguarding the independence of the judiciary and preserving the authority of the Strasbourg Court.

However, this dynamic does not end with judicial bodies and institutions alone. For example, within the European Union, an important role of monitoring and ensuring respect for the rule of law by Member States is played by the Commission. In the framework of infringement procedures, in fact, the European Commission can initiate legal actions against Member States that violate EU law, including in matters related to the rule of law – for example, judicial independence. The case of Poland is one such example : following the concerns raised in 2017, the Commission initiated a formal procedure for the risk of a serious breach of the rule of law. Only after the adoption of an action plan by the Polish authorities and the observation that this risk had subsided did it withdraw the reasoned proposal, while still maintaining the monitoring mechanism through the Rule of Law

Report.(16) This shows how European institutions can exercise effective political and institutional

pressure in defense of the Union’s fundamental values.

 In light of this crisis, coordinated responses are urgently needed: the European Union, national institutions, and civil society all have a critical role to play in safeguarding judicial independence as a cornerstone of democracy.

IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AD AN INSTRUMENT OF TRUST, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In a globalized world, the guarantee of a judiciary free from interference is an essential condition not only for the protection of fundamental rights, but also for the stability of international relations. The connection is clear : a well-functioning judicial system inevitably attracts individuals and external partners who will have trust in it. The Court of Justice of the European Union itself tends to emphasize the close link between the principle of mutual trust and respect for the fundamental values of Article 2 TEU, describing it as a key for establishing and maintaining the mutual trust that underlies the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.

Indeed, it is above all true that an authoritative and impartial judicial system contributes to creating an environment of legal certainty and predictability, an essential requirement to attract foreign investment and stimulate international economic cooperation. This assertion is shared by the European Commission which, in the paragraph Perceptions of judicial independence of the already mentioned Report, observes that « well-functioning and fully independent justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for investments protection, and therefore contribute to growth and competitiveness ».(17)

In accordance with this logic, the 2021 Versi Maplecroft Human Rights Outlook report states that « for companies in ‘high’ risk jurisdictions, this [the growing political interference in the legal systems] could mean a lack of recourse in contract renegotiations, or unfair legal sanctions imposed

by governments to punish perceived slights or to achieve geopolitical aims ».(18) Furthermore,

beyond the economic and financial sphere alone, it « undermines the protection of human rights by enabling states to pursue political opponent, activists and journalists with legal penalties, while removing access to remedy for victims of violations ».(19)

Ultimately, what is at stake goes far beyond national judicial reforms: it is the integrity of the democratic project in the West that is being put to the test.

V. THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE OF TRUST

Thus, judicial independence bolsters a State’s credibility in multilateral settings, constituting an indicator of compliance with the rule of law and human rights. As the Italian Andrea ORLANDO recalls, in Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : independence, efficiency and responsibilities ”, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe point out that the independence of judges « is not a privilege for judges, but a guarantee of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing every person to have confidence in the justice system ».(20)

The question then becomes whether, in today’s world, this trust is being strengthened or weakened. Indeed, the crisis of independence in influential powers such as the United States of America – especially under the Trump administration – and Europe calls into question the stability of judicial system that has traditionally represented a model of democratic guarantee, and affects the international perception of the reliability of U.S. institutions. Judicial instability in key geopolitical contexts generates ripple effects, influencing diplomatic balances and global economic relations.

As judicial independence erodes in the very nations that once exported rule-of-law standards, a critical question emerges: can the West still lead by example? If trust in the judiciary falters domestically, its influence abroad is bound to wane. What is at stake is not only the impartiality of courts, but the moral authority of democratic systems on the global stage. Finally, it could be argued that the Western model of judicial independence is not the only possible one, nor necessarily the best in absolute terms. Could other, more ‘politicized’ or integrated judicial systems function effectively without compromising justice or the protection of rights?

1 Rule of Law Checklist (CDL-AD(2016)007), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (11-12 March 2016) , par. 74 : « […] Independence means that the judiciary is free from external pressure, and is not subject to political influence or manipulation, in particular by the executive branch. This requirement is an integral part of the fundamental democratic principle of the separation of powers. Judges should not be subject to political influence or manipulation ».

2 Translated by the author from : Giacomo OBERTO, Un Nuovo Statuto per un Nuovo Giudice. Available in PDF format since 2017 at the following link: https://www.iaj-uim.org/iuw/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ Oberto_Un_nuovo_statuto_per_un_nuovo_giudice_2017.pdf (p. 6)

3 Ibid., p.8.

4 Ibid., p. 8-10. OBERTO also mentions the following international and regional instruments concerning judicial independence (note : this list dates back to 2017 and may not reflect the most recent developments) : the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) ; the Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on the “Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges”, adopted in 1994 and late updated by Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : Independence, Efficiency and Responsibilities” ; the Victoria Falls Proclamation 1994 “For and Independent Judiciary through Judicial Education”, issued by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association ; the Resolution on the Role of the Judiciary in a State governed by the Rule of Law, adopted in Warsaw on 4 April 1995 by the Ministers participating in the Round Table of Ministers of Justice from Central and Eastern European countries ; the European Parliament Resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the European Union in 1998 and 1999 (11350/1999 – C5-02265/1999 – 1999/2001 (INI)), adopted on 16 March 2000 ; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in Nice on 7 December 2000 (Article 47) ; various Opinions of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), including the one on “Standards concerning the independence of the Judiciary and the Irrevocabilità of Judges”, and the “Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles)”, a compilation of such opinions published in 2010 ; the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) ; ECOSOC Resolution 2006/23; the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, in particular Opinion No. 494/2008 on the independence of the judiciary ; the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, adopted in 2010 ; various Opinions of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) ; the Status of Magistrates’ in the Commonwealth, adopted in 2013 by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association.

5 ECtHR, GC, Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, 2016, §363.

6 ECtHR, GC, Baka c. Hungary, 2016.

7 ECtHR, GC, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 1 december 2020, § 139.

8 ECtHR, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 260.

9 Gaetano DE AMICIS, “Stato di diritto, garanzie europee di indipendenza della magistratura e cooperazione giudiziaria penale : quadri di un’esposizione in fieri”, Sistema Penale, 2021. PDF available at the following link: https://www.sistemapenale.it/pdf_contenuti/1639342956_deamicis-2021a-stato-di-diritto-garanzie- indipendenza-magistratura-cooperazione-giudiziaria-unione-europea.pdf

10 Article 2 TEU : « The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail ».

11 CJEU, GC, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 2018.

12 Formally the “ US DOGE Service Temporary Organization ”, it is an organization established at the initiative of the second Trump administration and led by Elon Musk.

13 Former Chief of the department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.

14 This subsidiarity is implicitly expressed in Articles 1 ( « The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention »), 13 ( « Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority […] ») and 35 (1) ( « The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted […] ») of the ECHR. With the entry into force of Protocol No. 15, it is also explicitly reaffirmed in the Preamble ( « […] Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto […] »).

15 Rome Statute, Article 17.

16 2024 Rule of Law Report, p. 7. PDF available at the following link : https://commission.europa.eu/

d o c u m e n t / d o w n l o a d / 2 7 d b 4 1 4 3 – 5 8 b 4 – 4 b 6 1 – a 0 2 1 – a 2 1 5 9 4 0 e 1 9 d 0 _ e n ?  filename=1_1_58120_communication_rol_en.pdf

18 S. NAZALYA, O. MARIN, S. HAYNES, W. NICHOLS, J. LOCKHART-SMITH, E. GAVIN, F. WOLF, C.

MAY, Human Rights Outlook, Verisk Maplecroft, 2021. PDF available at the following link : https:// h u m a n t r a f f i c k i n g s e a r c h . o r g / w p – c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 2 1 / 1 0 / Verisk_Maplecroft_Human_Rights_Outlook_2021.pdf

19 Ibid.

20 Andrea ORLANDO, “Judges in Poland and in the Republic of Moldova must remain independent”, (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights), doc. 15204, 2021. Available at the following link : https:// pace.coe.int/en/files/28907/html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

WRITTEN BY:

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

 

  • Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
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30 MayArticle

Understanding the Syrian Conflict: Internal Resilience and External Influences

The Syrian crisis, lasted from 2011 to 2024, shows how complicated the interactions between internal social processes and external geopolitical factors are in the Middle East. A critical, research-based analysis shows that both internal factors like regime consolidation, sectarian divisions, and the legacy of colonial state-building played a big role in the conflict’s path, as did external actors in shaping its course and outcomes.
Using theoretical frameworks like Neoclassical Realism (NCR) helps us comprehend how domestic political systems deal with and respond to systemic foreign forces in a more complex way. In Syria’s case, continued assistance from regional and global allies, especially Iran and Russia, gave the regime military, economic, and diplomatic support that helped it stay in power and strengthen its position. Iran’s intervention in Syria went beyond ideological affinity and was strategically embedded in a wider goal of maintaining and expanding its “axis of resistance” across the Levant. This was evident in Iran’s coordination of Shi’a militias, including fighters from Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, and Afghan Fatemiyoun units, mobilized under the command of the IRGC to secure key areas such as the Damascus–Aleppo corridor and the Sayyida Zaynab shrine. Tehran’s strategy included establishing permanent military infrastructure in Syria, such as the Imam Ali base near the Iraqi border in 2019, reflecting broader security and logistical interests. These efforts aligned with NCR’s emphasis on how systemic ambitions are translated into concrete actions through domestic capabilities and regional alliances. This outside help helped keep the country together, especially because the dictatorship controlled cities and networks of loyalists.
On the other hand, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and others tried to weaken Assad’s grip on power. But these interventions often had different goals, which made the region more divided and the conflict last longer. Some of these initiatives didn’t take into account how strong existing connections and internal processes were for keeping the regime in power, which made Assad’s position stronger.
Turkey’s involvement was shaped not only by its domestic security concerns about Kurdish autonomy but also by its broader aim to influence the post-conflict order. In addition to “Operation Euphrates Shield” in 2016, Ankara launched “Operation Olive Branch” in 2018 and “Operation Peace Spring” in 2019, targeting Kurdish-held areas in Afrin and northeast Syria, respectively. These operations were not solely counterterrorism efforts but served Ankara’s goal to establish a buffer zone and demographic reconfiguration in areas like Afrin, where local displacement and repopulation strategies followed5. Furthermore, Turkey’s establishment of observation posts under the Astana agreement and its military presence in Idlib province showed an attempt to carve out a strategic sphere of influence, consistent with NCR’s notion of power projection filtered through domestic concerns and regional rivalries.
Furthermore, the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Syria illustrates how their divergent strategies were tied to systemic competition with Iran and regional leadership ambitions. Qatar’s early support for Islamist factions, such as those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, led to its backing of groups like Liwa al-Tawhid and Ahrar al-Sham, which operated predominantly in northern Syria from 2012 to 2014. In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s support coalesced around more secular or Salafist-leaning factions, culminating in the creation of the Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam) in the Damascus suburbs in 2013. Despite their financial and logistical investments, both states struggled to maintain cohesive opposition fronts. Their rivalry was evident during the Geneva II peace talks in 2014, where opposition delegations backed by each state clashed on strategic priorities and political concessions. This fragmentation diluted the effectiveness of external support and highlights the way domestic ambitions and rival threat perceptions—central to NCR—shaped their Syrian policies.
The Syrian regime’s survival did not depend only on help from other countries. The administration used careful plans to keep control of the land, keep the loyalty of the elite, and break up the resistance. But Syria also had significant internal problems, such the fracturing of the opposition, changing demography, and the displacement of millions of people. These things changed the social fabric and made it hard to rule and make peace in the long run.
A post-colonial view also helps us understand how the rest of the world has dealt with the Syrian situation. External powers’ narratives and actions typically ignored the political dynamics of the indigenous people and instead focused on their own strategic objectives. This shows how colonial borders and state institutions still affect the problems and weaknesses in modern Syria.
These case studies make clear that while external actors sometimes aligned with local needs—such as defeating ISIS or providing humanitarian aid—their primary motivations were geostrategic. Whether it was Russia seeking influence and military presence, Iran attempting to sustain a regional alliance network, or Turkey aiming to suppress Kurdish autonomy, their interventions reflect the NCR model of systemic pressures filtered through national interests and domestic agendas. In this sense, external involvement was not an altruistic effort to stabilise Syria, but a continuation of regional and global competition by other means, shaping not only the survival and defeat of Assad but the wider trajectory of Syrian statehood.

WRITTEN BY:

Beatrice Liverzani

 

  • Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
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26 MarArticle

From Plan to Action: Localising Circular Economy from the Youth Perspective

Presented at the International Conference on ASEAN-GCC Relations, Jakarta, Indonesia | 17 December 2024

Introduction

The transition to a circular economy (CE) is crucial for addressing environmental challenges and ensuring sustainable economic growth. The traditional linear economic model of “take, make, dispose” has led to significant resource depletion and waste generation. This article explores the need for transitioning to a circular economy, the existing ASEAN framework, policy initiatives in Malaysia, and the role of youth in driving this transformation.

The Urgency of Circular Economy Transition

Malaysia produces approximately 39,000 tonnes of waste daily, with municipal solid waste largely composed of food waste (44%), plastic (13%), and paper (12%). Despite efforts to improve recycling rates, which reached 35.38% in 2023 against a target of 40% by 2025, challenges persist. The “Business as Usual” approach exacerbates the Triple Planetary Crises of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss, highlighting the urgent need for a shift to a CE model.

ASEAN’s Circular Economy Framework

The ASEAN Circular Economy Framework identifies several gaps that need to be addressed:

  • Policy Alignment: Greater integration of CE principles within national and regional policies in trade, technology, and finance sectors is necessary.
  • Standardised Metrics: The lack of monitoring mechanisms hinders progress assessment.
  • Public-Private Partnerships: Increased investment in circular innovations is essential for bridging the gap between theory and practical implementation.
  • Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR): Holding manufacturers accountable for the entire product lifecycle, including waste management, is critical.

Circular Economy Policies in Malaysia

Malaysia has implemented several policies aimed at fostering a circular economy:

  1. National Industrial Policy (MITI): Incorporates CE as a driver for net-zero commitments.
  2. Energy Transition Roadmap (NRES): Focuses on bioenergy and waste-to-energy solutions.
  3. Plastic Circular Economy Framework (KPKT): Promotes plastic circularity across the value chain.
  4. Solid Waste Management Strategic Framework: Aims to transform waste management into a CE model.
  5. Manufacturing CE Framework (MITI): Supports Net Zero 2050 goals and aligns with NIMP2030.

Regional Initiatives

  • Indonesia CE Roadmap (2025-2045): Focuses on resource efficiency, sustainable production, and implementing the 9R principles (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, Repair, Refurbish, Remanufacture, Repurpose, Recover, and Redesign).
  • Thailand CE Ecosystem Framework: Promotes a shift from consumption to resource management.
  • Ipoh City Council’s Doughnut Economy Model: Balances economic modernization with cultural heritage preservation, addressing urban poverty and food security.

Role of Youth in Circular Economy

Youth play a pivotal role in advocating for and implementing CE practices:

  • Equitable Platforms: Ensuring youth voices are included in decision-making processes.
  • Social and Environmental Advocacy: Raising awareness and mobilizing action.
  • Intergenerational Knowledge Exchange: Learning from older generations to implement effective CE strategies.

Challenges and Solutions

  • Fragmented CE Implementation: Need for harmonized standards and a regional framework.
  • Limited MSME Support: Nearly 48% of MSMEs lack policy and financial backing.
  • Structural Inequalities: Need to balance modern CE solutions with traditional practices.

Key solutions include:

  1. Expanding Regional Integration: Strengthening the ASEAN Circular Economy Business Alliance (ACEBA).
  2. Developing Innovative Financing: Implementing venture debt, blended finance, and carbon credit monetization.
  3. Enhancing Stakeholder Collaboration: Promoting partnerships between academia, businesses, and policymakers.
  4. Bridging Traditional and Modern Practices: Strengthening university-community collaboration.

KWAP’s Commitment to Sustainability

As a major institutional investor, KWAP integrates sustainability principles into its operations:

  • DEI Policies: Ensuring diversity, equity, and inclusion.
  • Human Capital Development: Investing in leadership and employee engagement.
  • Community Empowerment: Supporting NGOs and government initiatives.
  • Net Zero Goals: Committing to a net zero portfolio by 2050.
  • Circular Economy Young Leaders for Change (CYCLE): Empowering young leaders to drive sustainability initiatives.

Conclusion

A successful transition to a circular economy in ASEAN and the GCC requires comprehensive policies, active youth participation, and collaboration across sectors. With the right strategies in place, the region can move towards a more sustainable and resilient future.

Disclaimer: This article is based on a presentation by Mohammad Zulhafiy Zol Bahari from Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) [KWAP] during the International Conference on ASEAN-GCC Relations in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 17 December 2024.

WRITTEN BY:

Mohammad Zulhafiy Zol Bahari, 
Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) [KWAP]
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24 MarArticle

The US Operation Against Houthis: Implications, Limitations and Strategic Objectives

On Saturday, March 15th, the United States (US) Navy and Air Force initiated a joint military operation targeting the Houthi group in Sanaa, Yemen. The assault, which focused on the group’s stronghold in the Jeraf district of Sanaa, resulted in the deaths of nine senior Houthi members, whose identities remain undisclosed, as well as several civilian casualties. This operation is believed to be part of a broader campaign aimed at undermining the Houthis’ human and military capital. The strikes carry both domestic and regional implications, directly impacting the Houthis in Yemen while also serving as a strategic message to Iran, the group’s primary regional ally.

Strategic Objectives: Coercion or Decisive Action?

The US strikes against the Houthis can be interpreted as serving one of two potential strategic objectives. The first is coercion, aimed at restoring a deterrence equation by compelling the Houthis to cease their operations against Red Sea shipping. The second is a more decisive effort to dismantle the group’s offensive capabilities entirely.
In the context of coercion, the US strikes send a strong message to the Houthis, drawing parallels to previous experiences with Hezbollah and the Assad regime, where Iranian-backed groups faced significant setbacks, in conjunction with Iran’s relative passivity, which may drive the Houthis to de-escalate.
However, the Houthis’ recent attacks in the Red Sea, which they claim are a response to the Israeli military operations in Gaza, have become a central element of their strategic positioning, especially against their Yemeni counterparts. This complicates the likelihood of their immediate submission to US pressure.
Given these dynamics, it is unlikely that the Houthis will hastily capitulate. Instead, they are expected to leverage domestic and international sentiments, amplified by potential civilian casualties, as an instrument to resist US actions, utilizing the operations as evidence of their credibility and pushing for a US de-escalation. In such scenario, the intensity and accuracy of US operations, avoiding civilian casualties, is crucial for achieving deterrence.

On the other hand, achieving a decisive outcome against the Houthis presents significant challenges for the United States. The group’s operational flexibility and ability to utilize existing infrastructure limit the effectiveness of air and sea-based operations. While such strikes may degrade some of the Houthis’ assets, they are unlikely to deliver a decisive blow without complementary ground operations. This would require the involvement of a reliable Yemeni proxy, though such a partnership is fraught with several challenges and limitations.
Furthermore, a qualitative targeted approach aimed at decapitating the Houthi leadership, similar to Hezbollah, would necessitate in-depth intelligence, which the US Central Command (CENTCOM) may lack due to its limited focus on the Houthis over the past decade. Without precise intelligence, efforts to dismantle the group’s leadership structure are likely to face significant obstacles.

Prospects:
In light of these challenges, the US is more likely to focus on restoring deterrence rather than pursuing a comprehensive dismantling of the Houthi movement. This would involve limiting the group’s offensive capabilities, particularly along the Yemeni western coast, while pushing the insurgents toward the central and northern regions of the country, probably with limited assistance from a Yemeni military partner. Additionally, the US is expected to strengthen its military presence in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic chokepoint where the US geopolitical interest extends even beyond curbing the Houthis

 

Khaldoon Ahmed Hasson Abdulla

Senior fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Khaldoon A.H. Abdulla
Senior Research Fellow at Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

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10 MarArticle

Trade War: The Political Strategy Behind this Madness

The US trade war with the world—particularly China, Europe, Mexico, and Canada—has evolved into a weaponized economic policy under Trump, creating market instability and strategic uncertainty on a global scale. His cycle of tariff imposition, temporary halts, and renewed threats keeps both domestic and international markets in a state of flux, forcing businesses and governments to hedge against unpredictable US trade policies.

Trump’s “tariff diplomacy” follows a pattern:

  • Announces or implements tariffs (e.g., on steel, aluminum, or tech products).
  • Pauses or temporarily removes them (often as leverage in negotiations).
  • Threatens new or higher tariffs if the opposing party does not comply with US demands.
  • Repeats the cycle, ensuring continuous uncertainty.

This approach creates an unstable business environment where both American and international companies struggle to plan for the future, impacting global supply chains, investment strategies, and economic growth.

China: The US-China trade war has seen increased tariffs on Chinese exports (up to 25% on certain goods), forcing China to retaliate with countermeasures (higher tariffs on US agricultural products, tech restrictions). This disrupts global supply chains and accelerates China’s rise towards self-sufficiency in key industries.

Europe: The EU is caught in a balancing act—it needs the US for security but resents Trump’s trade aggression. His threats to impose tariffs on European car exports keep European policymakers on edge, pushing the EU towards a more independent trade and defense policy. In the short outlook the EU has practically no chance to win a trade war against the US.

Mexico & Canada: The USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), which replaced NAFTA, was supposed to stabilize North American trade. However, Trump’s sporadic reimposition of tariffs (e.g., on steel/aluminum) undermines the agreement and raises costs for industries that rely on cross-border supply chains. In addition, this confirms further insecurity for future trade agreements made with the United States.

The constant tariff uncertainty has several destabilizing effects:

Reduced Foreign Investment: Investors hesitate to commit capital in industries affected by US tariffs, leading to slower economic growth. International investors are reluctant to accept being strong armed by the US, when other economies are open to mutually beneficial environments.

Volatile Markets: Stock markets react negatively to trade war escalations, triggering sell-offs and currency fluctuations. Not even Trump’s closest associates seem to be able to predict what will happen the days ahead, creating an overall negative economic outlook.

Supply Chain Disruptions: Companies must constantly shift suppliers to avoid tariffs, increasing production costs.

Encouraging De-dollarization: Countries like China and Russia push for trade in local currencies, reducing US dollar dominance. Other nations are doing the same secretly while keeping good relations with the US, showing the lack of confidence of the US as a positive partner to world trade.

So what’s the political strategy behind this madness?

Trump’s tariff threats signal strength to his voter base—framing himself as the leader who “protects American jobs.” This has definitely kept his domestic popularity rating at an all-time high compared with former President Biden.

The “pause-resume” tactic keeps foreign leaders off-balance, preventing them from crafting a consistent counter-strategy. He is weaponizing uncertainty as a negotiation tool, creating a world economy that is reactive rather than proactive.

While Trump’s tactics yield short-term wins and maybe even the possibility of re-election at home, they risk permanently damaging the US’s economic credibility. Global players are actively seeking alternatives to US trade dominance, leading to fragmented trade blocs and a less predictable global economy.

In essence, Trump’s tariff game isn’t just about trade—it’s about power projection, using economic pressure to maintain US leverage in an increasingly multipolar world. But the instability it causes might just push the world to permanently reduce its dependence on the US.

 

 

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

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25 JanArticle

Powering Partnerships: Qatar’s Trade Dynamics with ASEAN

By: Nabila Osman

This article examines Qatar’s trade with ASEAN countries through the lens of 2022 trade data, highlighting a strong economic relationship shaped by energy exports and trade imbalances. This asymmetry underscores potential areas for diversification and deeper bilateral relationships, while also exploring the key dynamics, regional trends, and implications for both Qatar and ASEAN.

1- Qatar’s Trade Surplus and Export Dominance:


Qatar enjoys a substantial trade surplus with all ASEAN countries, primarily driven by exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), crude oil, and petrochemicals. In recent years, Qatar’s trade relations with ASEAN members have grown significantly, with the bloc collectively accounting for around 50% of Qatar’s trade market in 2017. The export of Qatari gas to the region has also contributed to Qatar’s economic resilience during the 2017 blockade by ensuring stable revenue streams and maintaining vital trade connections.

These energy exports cater to the industrial needs of economies like Thailand ($3.92 billion), Singapore ($3.83 billion), and Indonesia ($856 million). Smaller nations such as Laos ($633 million), Brunei ($546 million), and Myanmar ($670.35 million) also demonstratesignificant reliance on Qatari energy, though reciprocal trade remains minimal. This reliance underscores both the dependence of these countries on Qatari resources and the untapped potential for diversifying trade relationships.

Although ASEAN countries possess strong manufacturing and agro-industrial capabilities, their market penetration in Qatar remains limited. This may be due to mismatched demand or restricted trade agreements that hinder further market expansion for both regions. Malaysia has suggested establishing a free trade agreement (FTA) between ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the first ASEAN-GCC Summit held in October 2023, but this proposal remains in the preliminary stages. Similarly, though the first round of FTA negotiations between the GCC and Indonesia commenced in September 2024, its realization could potentially take a few years. Notably, Singapore is excluded from this challenge, as it already has an FTA with the GCC, including Qatar, since 2013.

2- Regional Economic Relationships:


Singapore stands out as a pivotal trade hub in Qatar-ASEAN relations. Facilitating $3.83 billion in Qatari exports and $658 million in imports to Qatar, Singapore leverages its strategic location, robust financial infrastructure, and neutral foreign policy to act as a bridge between the Gulf and Southeast Asia. This role reflects Qatar’s broader strategy of diversifying its economic and political ties beyond the GCC.
Other ASEAN nations also contribute significantly to Qatar’s imports. For instance, Thailand ($379 million), Malaysia ($354 million), and Indonesia ($315 million) supply a mix of high value goods that reflect their manufacturing and agro-industrial strengths. Thailand exports machinery and transport equipment to Qatar, while Indonesia supplies mineral fuels and oils.
Emerging economies like Vietnam ($175 million in exports to Qatar) and the Philippines ($83.4 million in exports to Qatar) present opportunities for growth as they continue to industrialize and diversify. These nations are poised to enhance their economic engagements with Qatar as they expand their manufacturing and export capacities.
Meanwhile, less developed nations such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar maintain minimal trade flows with Qatar. These limited engagements highlight untapped potential for deeper economic integration between Qatar and ASEAN’s smaller economies.

3- Implications for Qatar and ASEAN:


The trade dynamics between Qatar and ASEAN highlight both opportunities and challenges for the two regions, underscoring the need for strategic adjustments to enhance mutual benefits. For Qatar, its reliance on hydrocarbon exports poses significant risks as the global energy transition gains momentum. While ASEAN has emerged as a key market for Qatar, the country’s limited diversification beyond energy products leaves its economy vulnerable to future shifts in global energy demand. Expanding its export portfolio to include value-added products could reduce this risk and create a more sustainable trade framework. Additionally, ASEAN’s advanced manufacturing capabilities offer Qatar an opportunity to diversify its imports. Enhancing these import ties could bolster Qatar’s supply chain resilience and reduce dependency on traditional trading partners.
ASEAN’s energy security is a multifaceted issue, with member countries sourcing LNG from various global suppliers. While nations like Thailand have diversified their LNG imports, including recent agreements with Oman LNG, others such as Vietnam are expanding their LNG infrastructure to reduce coal dependence. Smaller economies like Laos have minimal or no LNG import activity, reflecting their limited demand or alternative energy strategies, while Brunei is a notable LNG exporter with no need for imports. To enhance energy security, ASEAN countries are focusing on diversifying energy sources and suppliers, thereby mitigating risks associated with over-reliance on a single source and reducing exposure to potential supply disruptions.
ASEAN countries also have untapped potential to expand their export footprint in Qatar, targeting sectors like halal food, which caters to the dietary preferences of Qatar’s Muslim-majority population; textiles, leveraging ASEAN’s established manufacturing base, especially in countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Myanmar, which are known for their competitive garment and textile industries; and electronics, reflecting the region’s growing expertise in high-tech industries. While trade between Qatar and ASEAN demonstrates strong growth potential, the significant imbalance in export-import dynamics reveals a need for proactive strategies on both sides. Qatar has already made notable investments in ASEAN’s infrastructure, renewable energy, and technology sectors, reflecting its commitment to fostering strong economic ties. Building on these existing efforts and further diversifying into emerging industries within ASEAN could ensure reciprocal benefits and solidify long-term partnerships. For ASEAN, fostering stronger trade agreements and targeting high-value export opportunities in Qatar would enhance regional integration and economic security.

4- Additional Observation:


An interesting dynamic is that Qatar’s top two trade partners in ASEAN, Thailand and Singapore, are non-Muslim majority countries. This indicates that Qatar’s trade in the region is driven by economic pragmatism rather than cultural or religious alignment. Singapore’s strategic role as a financial and logistics hub and Thailand’s industrial capacity underscore their significance as trade partners. This fact reflects Qatar’s ability to prioritize mutual economic benefits over cultural considerations, enhancing its reach and influence in diverse markets.

5- Conclusion:


Qatar’s trade dynamics with ASEAN go beyond economics, reflecting a strategic blend of energy diplomacy and Qatar’s use of energy exports to expand its geopolitical reach. Singapore’s role as a major trade hub underscores its significance as a key economic partner for Qatar. Smaller trade partnerships with countries like Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia reflect Qatar’s efforts to diversify its diplomatic relationships and reduce over-reliance on Gulf neighbors. Moving forward, strengthening trade agreements and diversifying exports and imports could solidify Qatar’s economic influence while creating sustainable benefits for both regions.

By: Nabila Osman

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Sources:

Atlantic Council. (2017, July 7). ASEAN and the Qatar crisis. Atlantic Council.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/asean-and-the-qatar-crisis/

Gulf Cooperation Council. (2024, September 13). The first round of free trade agreement
negotiations between the GCC and the Republic of Indonesia. Gulf Cooperation Council.
https://gaft.gov.sa/en/media-center/news/Pages/The-First-Round-of-Free-Trade-Agreeme
nt-Negotiations-Between-the-GCC-and-the-Republic-of-Indonesia.aspx

Gulf Times. (2018, November 15). Asia a key trading partner for Qatar: FM. Gulf Times.
https://www.gulf-times.com/story/568009/Asia-a-key-trading-partner-for-Qatar-FM

Reuters. (2024, August 23). Vietnam’s second LNG terminal seeks cargo to begin commissioning
tests. Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnams-second-lng-terminal-seeks-cargo-be
gin-commissioning-tests-2024-08-23/

Reuters. (2023, October 20). Malaysia PM proposes free trade pact between ASEAN, Gulf
Council. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-pm-proposes-free-trade-pact-betwe
en-asean-gulf-council-2023-10-20/

Reuters. (2024, September 16). Thailand’s PTT signs 5-year LNG deal with Oman LNG.
Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/thailands-ptt-signs-5-year-lng-deal-with-oman-ln
g-2024-09-16/

The Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). Bilateral trade profiles with Qatar. Retrieved
January 8, 2025, from

https://oec.world

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10 JanArticle

Foreign Policy Analysis – Trump: A Game of Russian Roulette with the World

Will Trump Drown America with the World or Make It Great Again? 

This is an enduring question about Trump’s presidency, debated long before he even won the election. Most people already understood that Trump was on the brink of a historic victory against the relentless push from corporate globalist forces. Yet, the tight-knit circles controlling the Biden administration obstinately refused to heed external counsel or consider alternative perspectives. 

Over a week ahead of Trump’s inauguration, he and his team began dropping hints about the planned dismantling of the existing global governance structures that sought to keep him from power. The blunt and unapologetic threats directed at sovereign nations are the sort of rhetoric one might expect from countries like India and Pakistan, where political decorum often takes a backseat to raw, unfiltered power struggles. 

The overt hostility displayed towards Canada and other traditionally friendly nations has shaken the bedrock of Western political stability—a foundation that once distinguished the West from more chaotic political arenas. It echoes the crumbling illusion of Israel’s once-invincible military dominance, which, when truly tested, has repeatedly faltered. It seems increasingly clear that 2025 will be one of the most turbulent years in recent memory for Western nations. 

Timing and Narrative Control: The Musk Factor 

It is important to ask why Trump and his team are making these pronouncements at these specific moments. Elon Musk’s recent attacks on the British government were not random—they were strategically timed. Just as Trump’s MAGA base erupted in fury over his suggestion of bringing in large numbers of Indian workers to the U.S.—a stark reversal of his earlier vow to dismantle foreign work visa schemes—Musk conveniently launched his tirade. His enormous following on X (formerly Twitter) makes it the perfect tool to steer narratives and subdue dissent within Trump’s base. 

When discourse around grooming gangs in Britain escalated and was painted broadly as an “Asian problem,” Musk swiftly reshaped the narrative by retweeting posts suggesting it was a Pakistani issue, not an Indian one. This was not a coincidence. Yet, India remains one of the world’s leading countries for reported sexual assaults—an uncomfortable fact seemingly ignored by Trump and his team for reasons of political convenience. 

During his first term, Trump met India’s far-right Prime Minister Narendra Modi on three occasions: once in Washington D.C., another time at the grandiose “Howdy Modi” rally in Texas attended by 50,000 Indian-Americans, and finally during his state visit to India in February 2020. Back then, Trump likely viewed India primarily as a lucrative market for American goods. However, in his second term, India’s influence appears set to grow within Trump’s inner circle, with key Indian-American figures holding influential positions or even being married into his core team. 

This is a significant development. Apart from the long-standing Israeli dual national influence in U.S. politics, India now seems poised to become the second most influential foreign power in shaping American domestic and foreign policy over the next four years. Trump appears likely to prioritise India even above Europe and Canada—a notable irony considering the severe diplomatic fallout between Canada and India in June 2023, when Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a prominent Sikh separatist leader and Canadian citizen, was assassinated outside a gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia. Canadian intelligence directly accused the Indian government of orchestrating the assassination. 

Canada, India, and the Fragile Western Alliance 

India’s growing proximity to Trump is being conspicuously overlooked by many analysts, despite its obvious significance as a key piece on Trump’s geopolitical chessboard. However, Trump seems blind to the repercussions of alienating Canada, Panama, and Europe simultaneously. Such confrontations will likely push these nations to band together in opposition to the United States, causing instability not just abroad but within American borders. 

Russia, meanwhile, will likely observe the unfolding chaos with detached amusement, popcorn in hand. The friction that Russia once faced with NATO seems now to be brought to NATO’s doorstep by Trump and his team—an ironic twist orchestrated, in part, by the world’s richest man. 

NATO: A House in Disarray 

Following Trump’s first term, some European nations, notably France, floated the idea of forming a European army to ensure collective security independent of American whims. However, Biden’s presidency largely shelved these ambitions, redirecting focus towards NATO’s war efforts in Ukraine. 

With Trump back in power, NATO may face paralysis, or worse, disintegration. Individual member states might break ranks, showing loyalty to Trump in exchange for economic benefits rather than prioritising collective security. This would spell disaster for NATO, which could soon become a hollow shell of its former self. 

Trump’s Economic Gambit: A Risky Transaction 

Trump has always portrayed himself first and foremost as a businessman, and his foreign policy reflects this transactional mindset. While his approach may generate short-term economic gains, it risks leaving the U.S. isolated on the global stage and could severely disrupt international supply chains. 

If Trump aggressively targets Canada, the UK, or European nations with economic warfare, the resulting fractures will deter foreign investors. Already wary of America’s unpredictable political climate, they may pivot towards other, more stable economies. 

Simultaneously, Trump’s expected crackdown on illegal immigration and potential skirmishes with Panama and Mexico could wreak havoc on cross-border cooperation, exacerbating economic tensions. 

The Ripple Effect: Global Stability in Question 

The question now arises: as the Western hemisphere grows increasingly unstable, what ripple effects will emerge in the next one to four years? How will foreign investors interpret Trump’s relentless attacks on America’s traditional allies? If Trump alienates multiple key partners simultaneously, they are likely to unite against America for at least the duration of his presidency. Such a scenario would create severe investor instability not only in the U.S. but across the Western world. 

Will European countries begin to see China as a more dependable trading partner? Could Trump’s brash style inadvertently gift China strategic advantages while undermining India, which seems to have gone all-in on Team Trump? Asia seems poised to become a more stable region, but this will depend heavily on how individual nations play their cards. 

Meanwhile, Trump will attempt to manage crises on multiple fronts: illegal immigration in the U.S., potential military tensions with Panama and Mexico, and economic wars with Canada, the UK, and Europe. At the same time, he will likely seek to secure support from select Asian countries to counterbalance China in the twilight years of his presidency. 

Trump: A Game of Russian Roulette 

Trump’s presidency increasingly resembles a high-stakes game of Russian Roulette. And this is without even touching on the complexities of the Middle East. His grandiose claim of resolving a conflict that even Israel has been unable to win after a year of brutal warfare is unlikely to lead to meaningful negotiations. Instead, it seems more plausible that Trump will continue to blow hot air in the media while privately making contradictory promises and threats to both sides, playing the role of the ultimate salesman. 

His primary goal will be to secure a symbolic victory—something he can showcase to his voter base as proof that he’s not only an entertainer but also a peacemaker capable of solving conflicts that have endured for decades. 

As world leaders clamber for Trump’s attention, eager for a metaphorical (and literal) selfie with the man of the hour, they must tread carefully. Beyond the photo-op lies a precarious balance, where one wrong step could lead to either unparalleled economic prosperity or a catastrophic geopolitical downfall. 

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

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