Author: Mustafa Abdul Ghafoor

Malaysia, despite its non-signatory status to the 1951 Refugee Convention, is host to over 190,000 refugees, including more than 2,800 Afghans. This study investigates how undergraduate students at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) perceive Afghan refugees, employing Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT) as a conceptual lens. Through in-depth qualitative interviews with ten students, the research reveals mixed attitudes shaped by competing moral and socio-political narratives. Islamic values cultivate empathy and a sense of humanitarian obligation. Conversely, anxieties surrounding economic competition, national security, and social cohesion create scepticism. These findings highlight the complexity of host-society perceptions within a legally ambiguous refugee system. The paper argues for a more inclusive and context-sensitive policy approach, driven by public education, legal reform, and multi-stakeholder engagement to address prevailing concerns while fostering meaningful integration. 

Keywords: Afghan refugees, Intergroup Threat Theory, Malaysian youth, public perception, refugee policy, social media, Islamic values

Introduction 

Malaysia’s role as a host country for refugees presents a unique situation. It provides de facto refuge to over 190,000 displaced persons while remaining outside the legal framework of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. This legal non-recognition renders refugees vulnerable to exploitation, detention, and systemic exclusion from basic services (Smith, 2012; UNHCR, 2022). Among these populations, Afghan refugees numbering just over 2,800 occupy a particularly marginal position, often overshadowed by more visible groups such as the Rohingya.

Existing scholarship on refugee protection in Malaysia has primarily focused on legal frameworks, humanitarian discourses, or the role of civil society actors. However, limited attention has been paid to how ordinary Malaysians, particularly university-educated youth, perceive refugees and how these perceptions may inform or constrain future policy responses. This oversight is significant because young people constitute a politically emergent group whose views will shape the normative climate for refugee integration in decades to come.

This study investigates how undergraduate students at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), a university known for its Islamic educational ethos, perceive Afghan refugees. Drawing on the extended Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT), the research examines how perceptions of realistic threats like economic strain and security intersect with religious norms and humanitarian values, alongside symbolic threats based on religious and cultural identity. The central research question guiding this study is: How do Malaysian university students at IIUM perceive Afghan refugees, and what religious, economic, and sociopolitical factors shape these perceptions?

Despite the challenges Afghan refugees face in Malaysia, public perception constitutes an additional layer of adversity. A global study by Ipsos (2019) on attitudes toward refugees found that only 24% of Malaysians believe asylum seekers are genuinely fleeing persecution, while 61% suspect they are exploiting the system for economic gain. Although 57% support the right to seek asylum from war and persecution, Malaysians are split, with 43% in favor and 43% against, when it comes to actually accepting refugees. Concerns about integration persist, with only 38% believing refugees can successfully adapt and 44% expressing doubt.

These attitudes are echoed in a national survey by Vase.ai (2020), conducted in partnership with Undi18 and civil society groups. The survey found that 70% of Malaysians supported the deportation of refugees during the COVID-19 lockdown. This was a time marked by xenophobic rhetoric and intensified crackdowns on undocumented migrants, including Afghans. Existing literature has primarily examined refugee law, civil society roles, and humanitarianism, yet few studies have investigated how Malaysian citizens, particularly youth, perceive refugees. This study addresses that gap by focusing on university students, a politically relevant group whose attitudes may shape future refugee policies in Malaysia. In particular, it examines students at IIUM, where exposure to foundational Islamic values such as compassion, justice, and aid to the oppressed may influence their perceptions of refugees.

Intergroup Threat Theory

ITT suggests that prejudice arises when an in-group perceives an out-group as threatening resources, identity, or security (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Realistic threats involve competition for tangible resources like jobs and housing, while symbolic threats concern cultural or value differences. The extended ITT incorporates perceived benefits, such as cultural diversity or humanitarian fulfilment, which can mitigate prejudice (Tartakovsky & Walsh, 2016). Studies using ITT show that economic concerns often outweigh humanitarian sentiments in host communities. 

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research design to explore how Malaysian university students perceive Afghan refugees. Qualitative methods are particularly suited to capturing the subjective meanings, moral reasoning, and emotional responses that underpin public attitudes toward marginalised communities.

Sample Selection

The research involved in-depth, semi-structured interviews with ten undergraduate students from the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Participants were purposely selected based on three criteria: (1) current enrollment at IIUM, (2) self-identification as Malaysian citizens, and (3) willingness to engage in discussions on refugee-related issues. The sample was constructed to reflect diversity in gender, academic disciplines, and socio-political orientations, allowing for a broad range of perspectives within a manageable cohort for deep thematic analysis.

Data Collection

Interviews were conducted either in person or through secure virtual platforms, based on participant preferences. Each session lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes and followed a semi-structured format. The questions focused on key themes such as awareness of refugee issues, interpretations of Islamic values, perceived economic and social impacts, and notions of national belonging. Interviews were conducted in English or Malay, according to participant comfort. All interviews were audio-recorded with informed consent and transcribed verbatim.

Data Analysis

Thematic analysis was applied to interpret the data. Coding proceeded through three stages: open coding to identify initial patterns, axial coding to establish connections between categories, and selective coding to refine core themes. The analysis was guided by Intergroup Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), allowing the data to be interpreted through the lens of realistic threats and symbolic threats. To enhance analytical rigour, peer debriefing and reflective memoing were used throughout the coding process. Ethical approval was secured through institutional procedures. All participants were assured of anonymity, confidentiality, and the voluntary nature of their participation. Pseudonyms are used throughout the analysis to protect participants’ identities.

Four major but interrelated themes emerged, illustrating the tensions and dualities in students’ perceptions of Afghan refugees:

1. Threat Perception Outweighs Benefits

All participants perceived Afghan refugees as both a threat and a benefit, but threat perceptions were stronger. Economic concerns, such as draining social funds and disrupting housing markets, were prominent, followed by physical and social cohesion threats. Benefits, such as humanitarian fulfilment, were acknowledged but secondary. One participant noted, “Helping refugees is good, but we can’t ignore the strain on our resources.”

2. Economic And Social Concerns

Economic anxiety was the dominant theme. Participants voiced concerns that Afghan refugees might compete for low-cost housing and public welfare resources. However, most agreed that refugees usually work informal, low-income jobs avoided by locals. They did not view them as major contributors to unemployment or wage suppression. A few referenced national security issues, particularly the fear of radicalisation, which are often fueled by media narratives. Petty crimes and disease concerns were mentioned but seen as less pressing. Cultural or symbolic threats were not strongly emphasised; most students believed Malaysian cultural dominance would naturally shape refugee behaviour.

These findings are consistent with prior research in the Malaysian context, where empathy for refugees is often outweighed by concerns over economic burden. Ipsos (2019) found that 61% of Malaysians view refugees as economic opportunists. Fears around radicalisation and security have also been shaped by politicised media portrayals, as noted by Sukhani (2020). Meanwhile, students’ confidence in cultural resilience echoes findings by Jedinger and Eisentraut (2020), who found that perceptions of symbolic threat tend to be lower in non-Western or culturally dominant host contexts.

3. Humanitarian and Cultural Benefits

Students strongly valued humanitarian responsibility, often referencing Islamic teachings like zakat and helping the oppressed. Many felt a moral duty to support refugees, seeing their presence as a reminder of Malaysia’s blessings and stability. Cultural diversity was also appreciated, although economic contributions from refugees were viewed as limited.  This mirrors broader observations that Islamic values can foster empathy in Muslim-majority societies. However, students also admitted that this empathy has limits, especially when national resources feel strained. This supports Tartakovsky and Walsh’s (2016) view that while humanitarian values can ease prejudice, they may not always override perceived economic threats. 

4. Religion and Role of Information Sources

In Muslim-majority contexts, Islamic values like charity and brotherhood can foster empathy towards refugees. However, nationalistic concerns may limit this empathy. Social media platforms, such as Twitter (now X), are primary information sources for youth but often spread misinformation and xenophobic narratives (Sukhani, 2020). In Malaysia, negative online sentiments surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with refugees blamed for economic and health issues.

My research findings align with these concerns. Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube were the primary sources of information on Afghan refugees for most participants. While students cited credible outlets like MalaysiaKini and the UNHCR, negative narratives often found in comment sections or viral posts shaped their attitudes. This reflects a broader consensus that while social media enables access to humanitarian content, it also facilitates the spread of xenophobic narratives and misinformation, particularly during times of national stress. These dynamics raise ethical challenges in refugee advocacy within digital spaces, where emotionally charged or inaccurate content can reinforce stereotypes and influence public opinion. 

There was also a clear gap between awareness and understanding. Many students were unaware of the presence and actual experiences of Afghan refugees in Malaysia. This suggests that surface-level exposure via social media often fails to translate into deeper knowledge or empathy. 

Policy Implications

The findings of this study reveal a complex relationship between humanitarian compassion and socio-economic anxiety in student perceptions of Afghan refugees. While there is recognition of Islamic values encouraging empathy, concerns about national stability and resource scarcity shape mixed attitudes. These insights have significant implications for refugee policy discourse in Malaysia, particularly given the country’s ambiguous legal and political positioning.  Refugees are classified as “illegal immigrants” under the Immigration Act 1959/63. This legal void constrains their access to employment, education, and health services, reinforcing their socio-economic vulnerability. While legal reform, such as formal recognition of refugee status or access to work permits, has been proposed by scholars and advocacy groups (UNHCR, 2022), such measures face substantial political and legal hurdles. These include securitised narratives, public resistance, concerns over national sovereignty, and a lack of political will, all of which limit the feasibility of implementing comprehensive reforms in the short term. 

Therefore, policy recommendations must be framed within Malaysia’s political realities and institutional constraints. In the short to medium term, a multi-stakeholder, incremental approach is more feasible. Civil society organisations and NGOs, including Islamic humanitarian groups, have played a crucial role in providing informal education, healthcare, and community support (SUHAKAM, 2021). Universities, particularly those with Islamic missions like IIUM, are uniquely positioned to cultivate inclusive narratives and promote intergroup understanding. Initiatives such as refugee scholarships, awareness campaigns, and civic education modules can help dismantle prejudice and foster long-term cultural inclusion. Greater coordination among these actors, with support from relevant government agencies, could enhance the reach and sustainability of such initiatives. 

UNHCR and development partners can also facilitate pilot programs, such as community-based work schemes or education partnerships. These improve refugee self-reliance without requiring full legal recognition. These pragmatic, low-risk models have proven effective in comparable non-signatory contexts, such as Indonesia and Thailand (Missbach, 2015; Kneebone, 2016). 

At the normative level, Islamic values of justice (ʿadl), compassion (raḥma), and hospitality (karāma) offer a culturally grounded ethical framework for refugee inclusion. Leveraging these values can help align public discourse with humanitarian commitments while maintaining religious and cultural legitimacy.

In sum, while systemic reform remains elusive in the short term, a feasible path forward lies in empowering non-state actors, promoting localised inclusion programs, and anchoring refugee protection within Islamic ethical paradigms. These strategies, supported by sustained engagement from NGOs, universities, UNHCR, and community leaders, can gradually reshape public attitudes and lay the groundwork for more sustainable policy change. 

The findings suggest several policy recommendations to foster inclusive refugee policies in Malaysia:

1. Reframe Refugee Integration: Policymakers should highlight refugees’ potential contributions to cultural diversity and economic growth, framing integration as a national asset rather than a burden.
2. Counter Misinformation: Public education campaigns, leveraging legitimate media and social media platforms, can address misinformation and promote positive refugee narratives.
3. Enhance Community Engagement: Programs facilitating interaction between refugees and Malaysians, such as cultural exchanges or volunteer initiatives, can reduce prejudice and build empathy.
4. Legal Reforms: Granting refugees basic rights, such as work permits and access to education, could alleviate public concerns about informal labour competition and improve integration, though this will require strategic advocacy and coalition-building to overcome political barriers.
5. Engage Youth: Involving university students in policy dialogues can harness their influence to shape inclusive refugee discourse, leveraging their Islamic values and educational exposure.

Conclusion

This study explored how Malaysian university students at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) perceive Afghan refugees. It draws on the Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT) to examine the relationship between humanitarian values and perceived threats. The findings reveal a mixed perception. Islamic principles of compassion and solidarity shape empathetic attitudes, but concerns over economic competition, resource scarcity, and national stability create reservations about refugee integration. The voices of educated youth, particularly in institutions like IIUM, offer a valuable lens through which to understand how religious values, national identity, and socio-economic considerations shape refugee discourse in Muslim-majority, non-signatory states.

By centering student perceptions, this research contributes to the growing body of scholarship on refugee reception in Southeast Asia. It offers a culturally grounded analysis of intergroup relations in Malaysia, an area that remains underexplored compared to Western contexts. The study provides both empirical data and normative insights that can inform future academic inquiry, particularly in the fields of youth political engagement, Islamic ethics, and refugee policy in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, it emphasizes the importance of inclusive educational initiatives and culturally sensitive policy approaches that can address public concerns while affirming the dignity and rights of refugees.

References

Ipsos. (2019). World Refugee Day 2019: A Malaysian perspective. https://www.ipsos.com/en-my/world-refugee-day-2019-malaysian-perspective

Jedinger, A., & Eisentraut, M. (2020). Exploring the differential effects of perceived threat on attitudes toward ethnic minority groups in Germany. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, Article 2895. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02895

Kneebone, S. (2016). Comparative regional protection frameworks for refugees: Norms and norm entrepreneurs. The International Journal of Human Rights, 20(2), 153–172. https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2016.1141499

Missbach, A. (2015). Troubled transit: Asylum seekers stuck in Indonesia. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Smith, A. (2012). In search of survival and sanctuary in the city: Refugees from Myanmar/Burma in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. International Rescue Committee.

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination (pp. 23–45). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

SUHAKAM. (2021). Annual report on the human rights situation in Malaysia. Human Rights Commission of Malaysia.

Sukhani, P. (2020). The shifting politics of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-shifting-politics-of-rohingya-refugees-in-malaysia/

Tartakovsky, E., & Walsh, S. D. (2016). Testing a new theoretical model for attitudes toward immigrants: The case of social workers’ attitudes toward asylum seekers in Israel. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 47(1), 72–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022115613860

UNHCR. (2022). Malaysia: Operational update. https://www.unhcr.org/my/

Vase.ai. (2020). Malaysia’s temperature check: Policies for a better Malaysia, as voted by Malaysians. https://vase.ai/resources/malaysia-temperature-23check

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

By:

Mustafa Abdul Ghafoor 

By Muad Zaki,

Director of Economic & Trade Policy at Asia Middle East Center (AMEC)

Malaysia’s data-centre boom may test not only its grid, but its politics.

The cloud has a habit of sounding lighter than it is.

Artificial intelligence is spoken of as if it floats somewhere above the economy. Cloud computing suggests something distant and weightless. Digital transformation is sold as clean, modern and almost frictionless. Yet the machinery behind this future is anything but weightless. It requires land, electricity, water, concrete, cooling systems, substations, diesel generators, security fences and roads strong enough for construction traffic.

The digital economy, in other words, has a very physical body.

Malaysia is now discovering this. Its data-centre boom has been welcomed as proof that the country is becoming a serious player in the regional technology race. Investment agencies speak of foreign direct investment, artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure and long-term spillovers. State governments see industrial momentum. Technology companies see a useful location close to Singapore, with cheaper land and room to grow.

There is truth in all this. A country that wants to compete in the age of artificial intelligence needs the infrastructure on which artificial intelligence runs. Servers must sit somewhere. Cables must land somewhere. Power must come from somewhere.

The question is not whether data centres are useful. They are. The question is whether Malaysia is pricing their politics correctly.

Data centres have an awkward feature. Their benefits are often national, abstract and delayed. Their costs are local, visible and immediate. The gains appear in investment statistics, technology strategies and corporate announcements. The irritations appear as dust on laundry, lorries on roads, anxiety over water and questions about electricity demand.

That gap is where politics begins.

In many countries, data centres arrived first as symbols of progress. They were promoted as the infrastructure of the future: job-creating, investment-attracting and innovation-friendly. Only later did the argument change. Communities began asking not whether the facilities were modern, but whether they were worth the resources they consumed. The cloud, once a metaphor for convenience, became a neighbour.

Malaysia would be wise to notice the pattern before it becomes local habit.

The country’s enthusiasm is understandable. Data centres fit the language of the moment. They are tied to artificial intelligence, digital services, fintech, cybersecurity and cloud computing. They allow leaders to speak about the future without seeming speculative. Unlike start-ups, they involve steel, land and large capital commitments. They are easy to photograph and easier to announce.

But headline investment is a poor substitute for public value.

A factory employing thousands of people has obvious politics. A port, a logistics hub or a tourism project creates visible chains of local activity. Workers are hired. Shops benefit. Transport firms gain business. Families can see where the money goes.

A data centre is harder to sell after the ribbon is cut. During construction it may create work. Once operating, however, many facilities are relatively quiet employers for their size and cost. The capital intensity is impressive. The labour intensity is not.

This does not make them bad investments. It makes them politically delicate ones.

Voters rarely think in terms of capital expenditure. They think in terms of household consequences. A billion-ringgit project that produces few visible local jobs but consumes water and electricity is not easily defended at a community meeting. Economists may speak of spillovers. Consultants may speak of ecosystems. Voters ask whether their children were hired.

This is the first danger for Malaysian politicians: mistaking an investment story for a constituency story.

The second is mistaking technological enthusiasm for public consent.

Most Malaysians use and welcome technology. They want better internet, smoother digital services, efficient banking, online commerce and modern government. But using technology is not the same as hosting its industrial infrastructure. People may like artificial intelligence in their phones and still dislike the idea of nearby facilities drawing heavily on water, land and power.

That is not backwardness. It is rational politics.

The public rarely objects to progress in the abstract. It objects when progress appears to send the benefits elsewhere and the burdens next door.

Johor offers an early warning. Its rise as a data-centre hub has brought attention and investment. It has also brought complaints about dust, pollution and water concerns. These are not yet a national backlash. But they are the kind of small signals that often precede larger political arguments. In other countries, the debate also began locally: a road here, a substation there, a water worry, a tax incentive, a noise complaint. Then the questions accumulated.

The most combustible issue may be water.

Electricity demand can be hidden inside technical language: grids, capacity, tariffs, generation mix. Water is harder to abstract. It enters kitchens, bathrooms, farms, schools and restaurants. If households come to believe that data centres are receiving secure access while ordinary users face pressure, the facts will have to fight the feeling. In politics, feeling often arrives first.

That is why the standard defence of data centres, though partly correct, is insufficient.

Industry advocates argue that data centres should not be judged merely by direct jobs. They point instead to long-term ecosystem benefits: artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud services, cybersecurity, supplier networks, skilled work and the attraction of future industries. This may be true. But politics runs on a different clock. An ecosystem may take ten years to mature. An election may be lost in five.

This timing problem matters. The costs of a project are often experienced early: construction, land-use change, utility anxiety, public incentives. The benefits may be diffuse and delayed. A technology cluster, if it emerges, may enrich firms and skilled workers far from the affected community. That does not mean the investment lacks value. It means the value may not be felt where the political cost is paid.

America and Ireland have already shown how quickly the mood can turn. Places that once competed for data centres now debate their power demand, land use, water consumption and tax treatment. The facilities did not suddenly become less digital. Residents simply began measuring them differently. What had been sold as national competitiveness was judged as local inconvenience.

Malaysia’s leaders should not read these examples as arguments for retreat. They should read them as warnings against laziness.

The lazy approach is to count investment announcements and call that strategy. The better approach is to ask what remains after the announcement: how many permanent local jobs, how much tax after incentives, how much water, how much electricity, how much local procurement, how much training, how much infrastructure cost, and how much public trust.

A project that cannot answer these questions may still be profitable. It may even be useful. But it is not yet politically safe.

This is the uncomfortable truth of the data-centre race. The countries that win may not be those that approve the most projects fastest. They may be those that learn to discriminate. Some data centres will be worth welcoming. Others may consume too much scarce resource for too little local return. A serious industrial policy must know the difference.

Malaysia has time to get this right. Its advantage is that others have made mistakes first. The choice is not between embracing the future and rejecting it. It is between governing the future and merely advertising it.

For politicians, the lesson is sharper still. Voters do not reward megawatts, server racks or investment memoranda. They reward visible improvements in ordinary life. If data centres bring skills, jobs, infrastructure and shared prosperity, they will become part of Malaysia’s success story. If they bring anxiety over bills, water and land while the benefits remain invisible, they will become someone’s campaign problem.

The cloud may be digital. The backlash will not be.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

By:

Director of Economic & Trade Policy

at Asia Middle East Center (AMEC)

Threats to global energy systems are on the rise. Geopolitical changes, attacks on energy infrastructure, and supply chain disruptions are currently threatening energy supplies worldwide. (IEA, n.d). With the latest events in the Middle East, the issue is highly relevant as the turbulent geopolitical situation affects oil supplies and risks energy prices to skyrocket (Russel, 2026).

Relying on fossil fuels leaves countries extremely sensitive to external factors such as supply disruptions and price volatility. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shed light on the geopolitical aspects of energy supplies and accelerated the green transition in Europe. Sweden is a small country with a unique position. To meet its climate goals, Sweden has ensured that 98 percent of its electricity comes from low-carbon sources (The Swedish Government, 2023). Low-carbon energy refers to energy sources that produce low levels of greenhouse gas. Renewable energy comes from self-replenishing sources such as wind power and hydro power. The transformation is not only important for handling climate change but also a way of increasing resilience in a turbulent world.

This article examines how the Swedish energy system has contributed to its strategic resilience, the general geopolitical implications of a green transition, and what policymakers can learn from the Swedish case. 

Sweden’s energy system and strategic resilience

Sweden has a political and public consensus to achieve the net-zero goal by 2045 (IEA, 2024). Sweden’s green energy system provides a strong foundation for strategic resilience in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment. Sweden relies largely on domestically produced, low-carbon electricity, with hydropower, nuclear energy, and wind power, making it the EU leader in low-carbon electricity (Ember, 2026). This reduces dependence on imported fossil fuels and limits exposure to global supply disruptions and price volatility.

Sweden’s diversified energy structure also enhances energy reliability. Relying on multiple energy sources helps balance fluctuations in supply and demand, reducing the risk of large-scale disruptions. Different energy sources have different functions in a diversified system. Hydro power plays a key role by enabling storage and adjustment depending on demand, making it important for balancing the grid. Nuclear power helps provide a stable energy supply that is not easily affected by external factors. Wind power complements these energy sources by further contributing to the energy system at a low marginal cost. (IEA, n.d) Together, this diversified mix enhances energy security in the context of growing geopolitical tensions and increasing pressure on global energy markets. 

Opportunities of green transition

Last week, Brent crude oil prices rose 28 percent amid current events in the Middle East. Iranian attacks on oil facilities in the Gulf region and disrupted shipping routes have put energy security in many parts of the world at risk (CSIS, 2026). Countries able to produce reliable, non-fossil fuels on a large scale and reduce dependency on oil and gas exports are likely to gain a strategic advantage in the international system. 

The first pillar of energy security is availability. Green energy, mainly locally produced, reduces dependence on imported oil and gas, increasing the availability even in turbulent times. The transition of the energy sector can not be understood solely as a matter of climate change. It is also a matter of stability, security, and resilience.

The second pillar of energy security is reliability. Energy supplies are supposed to work without risk of disruptions such as war, sabotage, or natural disasters. One way to ensure this is by diversifying the energy sector. Sweden has a very diversified energy sector, with energy from wind to nuclear power. Also, an assured balanced energy supply, meaning that input equals output (Swedish Energy Agency, 2025). If one energy source is disrupted, the country can rely on another. The case of Sweden’s diversified energy sector can show how a multifaceted energy production can create greater resilience to external events and threats. 

The third pillar is affordability. Too high prices will affect households, the transport sector, industries, and economic growth. For this reason, an important part of energy security is keeping the prices down. Countries heavily dependent on oil and gas become, as mentioned earlier, extremely sensitive to price volatility. This issue is something we can see now when oil prices have increased due to the war in Iran, as well as when Russia fully invaded Ukraine in 2022. Renewable energy sources are produced locally and are, for this reason, less sensitive to the global market, resulting in more stable and predictable prices. 

Taken together, Sweden’s energy transition highlights how the shift toward renewable energy can simultaneously enhance availability, reliability, and affordability: three core pillars of energy security.

Sweden in the European Energy Security Context

As previously noted, energy security has gained relevance after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The European energy system was forced to adapt to a new geopolitical environment. Energy security became a topic at the forefront of policy discussion across the European Union. Shortly after the full invasion in 2022, the EU launched REPowerEU with the plan to phase out Russian fossil fuels. The project aims to save energy, produce clean energy and diversify the energy sector (European Commission, 2022). In this context, Sweden’s diversified and, to a large extent, clean energy system stands out as a model of resilience. 

Furthermore, regional energy cooperation provides an additional layer of stability that could be applied to the broader European context. Regional cooperation can further strengthen the resilience. It balances the supply and reduces the risk of domestic shortages. NordPool is a regional energy cooperation that started between Sweden and Norway and is now working as a cornerstone in the European energy market. They are promoting competition, price transparency, efficient electricity markets and the integration of renewables into the market (NordPool, n.d) 

Remaining challenges

Sweden serves as an archetype of a green transition and illustrates how it can benefit energy security. However, there are still challenges we need to take into consideration.

As industries and the transport sector shift toward electrification, energy demand increases rapidly. The supply must grow to potentially meet a doubling of electricity demand in the coming decades (IEA, 2024). Energy transition takes time, and there is a risk of falling behind demand.

Furthermore, Sweden is part of the EU, making it integrated in the European energy market. Energy prices will be affected by this, even though Sweden has a strong domestic supply of energy. For resilience to become stronger, other countries must take action towards an energy transition. 

Lastly, the green transition is dependent on policymakers. In a period of economic uncertainty and geopolitical threats, climate change seems to be less prioritized. Sweden will fail to meet its own and the EU’s climate goals by 2030 (SVT, 2025). Taking into consideration what has been discussed in this article, this will affect not only the climate but also energy security.  

Policy recommendations 

1. Maintain long-term political commitment to the green transition

Leaders should ensure sustained political support for the green energy transition, even in times of economic or geopolitical uncertainty. This is not only necessary for managing climate change but also for creating resilience and security. Short-term policy shifts toward fossil-based solutions risk undermining both climate goals and energy security.

2. Invest in grid infrastructure and system capacity

To fully benefit from renewable energy systems, countries must invest in electricity grid expansion, storage solutions, and system flexibility. Electrification will lead to a rise in energy demand. The right infrastructure is therefore crucial for energy security. 

3. Diversify energy systems to enhance resilience 

Policymakers should invest in diversifying the energy sector. A combination of different energy sources will increase reliability and reduce vulnerability to disruptions. Countries overly dependent on a single energy source are more sensitive to external risks and market volatility. 

Conclusion

Sweden’s renewable energy transition shows that energy security and climate policy are closely interconnected. By reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels and building a diversified, low-carbon energy system, Sweden has strengthened its resilience to geopolitical and market disruptions. However, this experience also highlights that such benefits depend on sustained political commitment and continued investment. For policymakers: the green transition is not only a necessity in times of climate change, but a strategic advantage for energy security.

References: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2026). What does the Iran war mean for global energy markets? Retrieved March 16, 2026 from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-iran-war-mean-global-energy-markets 

Ember. (2026). Sweden: Electricity data. Retrieved March 19, 2026 from: https://ember-energy.org/countries-and-regions/sweden/  

European Commission. (2022). REPowerEU. European Commission. Retrived April 17, 2026 from: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en 

Government Offices of Sweden. (n.d.). Electricity production in Sweden. Retrieved March 16, 2026 from: https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/sveriges-elforsorjning/elproduktion-i-sverige/ 

International Energy Agency. (n.d). Energy security – Reliable, affordable access to all fuels and energy sources. Retrieved March 16, 2026 from: https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security 

International Energy Agency. (2024). Sweden 2024: Executive summary. Retrieved March 19, 2026 from: https://www.iea.org/reports/sweden-2024/executive-summary 

Nord Pool. (n.d.). About us. Nord Pool. Retrived April 17 from:  https://www.nordpoolgroup.com/en/About-us/ 

SVT Nyheter. (2025). Sverige missar sina egna och EU:s klimatmål – framtida generationer får betala. Retrieved March 19, 2026 from: https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/sverige-missar-sina-egna-och-eus-klimatmal-framtida-generationer-far-betala 

Swedish Energy Agency. (n.d.). An energy system in balance. Retrieved March 16, 2026 from: https://www.energimyndigheten.se/en/facts-and-figures/swedens-energy-system–an-overview/how-the-energy-system-works/an-energy-system-in-balance/ 

Russel, C. (2026). Iran war hits refined fuels harder than crude and importers need to act. Reuters. Retrieved March 16, 2026 from:

https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/iran-war-hits-refined-fuels-harder-than-crude-importers-need-act-2026-03-16

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Written by:

Signe Ramberg,

AMEC member in Sweden

Prepared by:
Muhammad Daffa Aulia Ridwan

The Iran War of 2026 was to be used to put order back. Rather, it revealed the lack of control that is left. What started as a joint U.S. and Israel attack on Iran on 28 February 2026 became an action to end a long-held concern about The advances of Tehran towards its nuclear capabilities and influence in the region. However, instead of asserting dominance, the war has shown a different truth that U.S. influence in the Middle East is not absolute, and its conventional instruments are yielding less and less returns. Over the decades, Washington has been following a time-tested agenda in the region: ensuring influence, accessing strategic routes, and protecting allies. These priorities remain the same. The issue was that the environment in which they work has changed. The Middle East is now more fragmented, more independent, and more influenced by various actors in the world. Not only has America become dependent on negotiating the influence, rather than enforcing it despite its military power, but it is now also functioning within a system that mandates it. That’s how it should be within the past history with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

This contradiction is present in this tension that underlies the current U.S. policy. On the one hand, it can be clearly seen in the will to diminish long-term commitments, a kind of hydro-retaliatory shrink, which can be said to be a strategic pullback. Conversely, instances of crisis also provoke aggressive responses. It is exactly the same pattern we are witnessing in the war of 2026: a state tries to de-escalate, but is again and again lured into the battle when its credibility or its interests are questioned.

But the consequences of such a strategy are more and more counterproductive. This is demonstrated with the war itself. The first attacks were aimed at the Iranian leadership, military infrastructure and nuclear-related assets, as an attempt to weaken Iranian capabilities. But Iran did not react with the normal escalation. Rather, it depended on asymmetric warfare, missile attacks and drone attacks on various fronts; missiles were used to attack not only Israel but also the U.S. bases and other allied countries in the Gulf. More to the point, Iran proved its strategic advantage in the place where it is most needed: global energy. Interfering with the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran reminded the world that its ability to influence events is not eradicated by any military pressure. On the one hand, it strengthens Iran as one of the main actors in the system of the region and all over the world.

The war soon escalated into a wider conflict. Proxy networks were initiated, such as the Hezbollah and tacitly Eastern block (Russia, China, etc.), and Israel’s interest in contesting major power in the Middle East (weakening Iran) with their own means, they started a parallel war in the region. It is not the conventional war between states anymore because it is a networked war where influence is exerted in many ways by a number of actors. The sheer might of the military in such a situation is not a guarantee of a decisive victory.

And that is the main wrong estimation. U.S. strategy continues to be based on the premise that an excellent force has the ability to deliver strategic results. However, the Middle East today does not operate in such a manner. Power flow is decentralized, coalitions are prone to change, and smaller players have been able to create substantial costs for bigger rivals. Iran was also capable of surviving a cumulative pressure, which is not a one-off event, but an indication of how contemporary war operates in the area.

The larger geopolitical implications merely drive this point home. The Middle East is in a new period of instability brought about by the war. Energy channels have been shaken, world markets disrupted, and tensions heightened in regions. However, especially, the reaction of the states of the Middle East has been tentative instead of concerted. Even critics of Iran have not completely concurred with U.S. activities, as they are afraid of escalation and revenge. Meanwhile, other external forces like China and Russia have opposed U.S.-led efforts, which is an indication that the conflict cannot be confined to the region anymore. It belongs to a bigger geopolitical game, in which U.S. influence is no longer presumed. Even the U.S.’s own allies, such as European countries, have raised concerns about the war and have taken an ambiguous stance not to support it.

This begs an uncomfortable question: by what exactly have they been done?. The result indicates otherwise, in case the intention was to weaken Iran. The last thing that would have been desired is to stabilize the region, but that is the opposite of what has happened. And, had the goal been to strengthen American leadership, the war has rather shown its weaknesses. All this does not imply that the United States is no longer super-powerful. It is still the strongest military player in the region, has far-reaching alliances and a global presence. Yet no longer is power enough. The efficiency of such power, its capacity to achieve the desirable results, becomes more and more limited. The Iran War 2026 is not purely regional. It is reflecting a signal strategically. It demonstrates that in a complicated, multipolar setting, coercive strategies usually result in escalation, rather than resolution. It shows that alliances, however, continue to be significant, but they do not compensate enough for the changes in regional dynamics. And it highlights that these enemies, such as Iran, have changed so as to be much more difficult to contain using traditional methods.

And, assuming that there is a moral to be learned, it is an easy, yet disagreeable one: that the control is not so sure any more. To be effective, the U.S. policy can no longer afford to be reactive in its military efforts, but instead it should be more coherent, long-term, one that incorporates diplomacy, recognizes regional autonomy, and adapts to the realities of a multipolar world. Without such a change, nothing more is to be expected of future interventions; the same cycle is bound to be repeated: bold initiation, inconclusive culminations, a cycle of instability ever-deepening.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Prepared by:
Muhammad Daffa Aulia Ridwan

“In Sudan, more than 40,000 lives have been lost, 13 million people displaced, and 30 million

are now in need of humanitarian assistance.”¹

“In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II

— claiming over six million lives — continues to rage. Driven by the struggle for vast mineral wealth, it has brought unimaginable suffering,

especially to women and children.”

— Panzi Hospital, 2025²

Executive Summary:

The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan cannot be attributed solely to ethnic or religious divisions. A comprehensive understanding requires consideration of multiple interrelated factors; chief among them, the exploitation of natural resources in these resource-rich states. This dynamic of domination and extraction predates colonization and continues to shape the political and economic landscapes of both countries today. In the current global context, the energy transition and the growing demand for critical minerals, driven largely by industrialized nations, have intensified competition over access to these resources. Minerals essential for green technologies and artificial intelligence have become strategic assets, further entrenching instability and fueling violence. A lasting resolution to these conflicts requires a fundamental re-evaluation of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. Without addressing the structural inequalities and exploitative practices underlying resource extraction, sustainable peace and development in the DRC and Sudan will remain unattainable.

Introduction:

The Berlin Conference of 1885 led to the division of Africa by European powers, with the aim of partitioning the continent for economic purposes, such as access to cheap labor and mineral resources, often acquired by force³. Among these territories were the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which at the time were composed of tribes and not yet organized according to the Westphalian system we know today⁴. The DRC gained independence from Belgium in 1960, while Sudan achieved independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom in 1956. These states, initially serving the needs of European powers, were thus granted independence, but some territories continue to face deadly conflicts. While independence may appear to have been achieved in the eyes of the United Nations, it is necessary to analyze it critically, as it results from complex historical processes shaped by the economic and political interests of former colonial powers.⁵

Sudan’s independence was not straightforward. Administered jointly by Egypt and the United Kingdom from 1899 to 1956, the country saw its lands and primary resources exploited by these powers, each pursuing its own interests.⁶ Even after 1922, Egypt claimed sovereignty, while the United Kingdom sought to maintain control. These rivalries contributed to the country’s ethnic and religious fragmentation, ultimately leading to the division of Sudan into North and South Sudan. The Egyptian nationalist movement demanded full independence for the Nile Valley, while the British sought to separate Sudan from Egypt to develop agriculture, particularly in the Gezira region north of Khartoum.⁷ This policy aimed to exploit the Nile’s waters for cotton cultivation, without Egypt being able to limit British access to these resources. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 officially granted independence to all externally dominated countries, consolidating Britain’s position over Sudan. However, this formal independence did not allow effective territorial control, as Sudanese authorities remained strongly influenced by former powers.

The case of the DRC shows similar patterns. As a former Belgian colony, the country was subjected to massive exploitation of its mineral resources by King Leopold II, to the detriment of the local population, leading to severe human rights violations, including slavery and mass violence. As Adam Hochschild emphasizes in King Leopold’s Ghost, this exploitation resulted in a veritable genocide.⁸ Darfur, rich in primary resources, constitutes another example where resources were at the center of crimes against humanity.⁹ These examples demonstrate that natural resources play a decisive role in humanitarian crises and armed conflicts.

Modern civil wars are defined as “an armed conflict between the government of a sovereign state and one or more organized groups capable of substantial resistance”¹⁰. Several factors have contributed to the increase in civil wars in the 20th and 21st centuries: decolonization, which left states with contested authorities; the end of the Cold War, which resulted in a decline in superpower financial support; and the reduction of peacekeeping operations coupled with the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Today, the main hotspots of civil wars include Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Chad, the DRC, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, and Ukraine.

Two main factors explain the outbreak of these conflicts: ethnicity and economy¹¹. Ethnicity is not a natural cause of conflict but a social and political construct. Anthony Smith defines an ethnic group as a collective sharing a common name, beliefs, and ancestry, shared cultural elements, collective historical memories, and attachment to a territory. Ethnicity is often instrumentalized to divide and mobilize populations for strategic purposes. The economic factor manifests as the “resource curse”: resource-rich states develop rentier economies at the expense of public institutions, limiting state control over their territory and favoring the emergence of rebellions. These mechanisms are particularly evident in peripheral, hard-to-access regions, such as certain areas of Sudan and the DRC, where post-colonial resource management has contributed to the persistence of civil conflicts¹².

Limiting the analysis to an ethnic dimension would be reductive: ethnicity is often used as a tool by elites to control populations and exploit resources at low cost. It is therefore important to ask: have these states truly benefited from their independence? Who truly profits from primary resources? What tactics are employed in these mining-related conflicts? The answers to these questions show that current civil conflicts are not generated by ethnic factors but by economic ones, with ethnicity serving as a political lever to divide and exploit resources cheaply¹³.

I.  Mineral Exploitation Made Possible by a Favorable Military and Political Context

A. The Role of Central Politics in the Countries in Question

1) A Political and Economic Transition (20th Century) – Benefiting Former Colonies

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, which granted independence to formerly colonized peoples, should not be interpreted as a guarantee of true political and economic autonomy¹⁴. The new states inherited profound political instability, exacerbated by the imposition of the Westphalian state system, which brought historically distinct tribes together on a single territory, sometimes with no social or cultural ties.¹⁵ This instability was reinforced by the installation of leaders and governors serving the interests of former colonial powers, ensuring the continuity of economic exploitation post-independence.¹⁶

This political and ethnic construction, inherited from colonization, often led to the exclusion of certain populations. In the United States, for example, a central role was played in the secession of South Sudan through joint support for the Sudanese government and the South Sudanese rebel movement (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement), culminating in the 2005 peace treaty.¹⁷ The official justification relied on a racial and ethnic discourse, attributing conflicts to a legacy of slavery. However, the understanding of Arab-Saharan slavery cannot be reduced to the European slavery lens, as Adam Hochschild emphasizes in King Leopold’s Ghost.¹⁸ Reducing the conflict to a racial opposition, as is often done, obscures the historical and economic complexity of the Sudanese crises.

The division of Sudan into North and South allowed former powers to strategically control the Nile and primary resources, to the detriment of local populations. Amir Idris, in Historicizing Race, Ethnicity, and the Crisis of Citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan, considers that the conflict results from a citizenship crisis: “Postcolonial states adopted definitions of indigeneity, inherited from the colonial era, to frame their own definitions of citizenship.” ¹⁹This approach excludes certain populations and fuels the foundations of civil wars. Citizenship comprises three dimensions: legal, political, and as membership in a political community. Idris emphasizes the third dimension, which is essential for understanding systemic exclusion and identity conflicts.²⁰

These identity and racial constructions were reinforced by colonial propaganda and the prejudices of Western missionaries and administrators, as illustrated by Reverend J. Lowrie Anderson, who considered Arabs practical and Blacks less stable and easier to influence.²¹ These views legitimized the division of Sudan and facilitated control over the populations and resources of the South. Similarly, the DRC, a former Belgian colony, saw its resources exploited by administrators trained to serve colonial interests, as Adam Hochschild shows for Leopold II’s Congo.²²

Territorial division also altered traditional land management systems. According to Jean- Philippe Colin and Charlin Rangé (Les dimensions intrafamiliales du rapport à la terre), land relations were historically structured around the family nucleus and neighborhood relations²³. The colonial state, by imposing centralized administration, disrupted this millennia-old system, transforming relationships with land and resources.

After independence, local politicians often pursued policies serving Western interests. Alden Young, in Transforming Sudan – Decolonization, Economic Development and State Formation, shows that the generation of independents (1954–1958), educated at Western universities such as Oxford, managed major economic projects like the Gezira Scheme, centralizing over 50% of state revenue and ensuring economic control aligned with interests inherited from colonialism²⁴. Even Sudanese economists, such as Sa’ad al-Din Fawzi, had to frame their analyses around unstable political and institutional constraints, with Northern elites favoring a vision of national development focused on economic growth rather than regional redistribution²⁵.

Finally, instability and limited development conditions are exacerbated by the influence of international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. While their goal is to assist financially struggling states, their policies impose market opening and economic liberalization, often to the detriment of local populations, particularly economic minorities²⁶.

2)  Central Powers Under the Grip of Corruption – To the Detriment of the Local Population

In Sudan, following the 2021 coup d’état, a military council led by two generals took control of the country. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the armed forces, de facto assumed the presidency, while General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo leads the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF, created in 2013,²⁷ originated from the Janjaweed militia that had fought rebels in Darfur and was accused of ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab population in the region (BBC). Dagalo strengthened this military force and involved it in international conflicts, notably in Yemen and Libya, while also developing local economic interests, such as controlling certain gold mines in Sudan.

The current conflict does not affect the entire Sudanese territory uniformly. Fighting is concentrated in strategic areas where the two leaders exercise control based on natural resources, notably gold and oil. Northern Sudan, for instance, contains agricultural zones along the Nile, while oil is mainly found in the South, and the strategic Red Sea port remains a key stake. This unstable situation turns the Sudanese state into an economic prey, where local militias profit from resources at the expense of the civilian population.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exhibits similar dynamics. Since 2016, Amnesty International has denounced corruption within central authorities and local military forces. ²⁸In the DRC, the Code of Conduct on artisanal mining defines in Article 21 artisanal mining as “any activity by which a Congolese national extracts and concentrates mineral substances using artisanal tools, methods, and processes, within an artisanal mining area limited in surface and depth, up to a maximum of thirty meters.” ²⁹The code specifies that only adults holding a valid permit may carry out this activity, under penalty of sanctions by the government.

However, these legal provisions are insufficient: they do not take into account the health and safety of miners, remain silent on cobalt handling, and impose no standards for mine construction or organization. Additionally, the government does not create enough Artisanal Mining Zones (ZEA), which forces miners to work in unauthorized areas or illegally enter industrial sites to access cobalt and other minerals. These regulations reveal a complete disconnect between the government and local realities.³⁰

A direct consequence of these gaps is child labor, a violation of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the DRC is a party.³¹ Arthur’s testimony, collected by Amnesty International, illustrates this point: “I worked in the mines because my parents couldn’t afford to pay for food and clothes for me. Papa is unemployed, and mama sells charcoal.”³² This exploitation occurs in a context of widespread structural corruption: local authorities profit from resource extraction, tolerating and effectively organizing illegal activities in the ZEA. Volunteers from Amnesty International and Afrewatch have observed mines controlled by police officers, who regulate access and supervise operations, thereby ensuring the continuity of an exploitation system supported by central authorities.³³

Whether in Sudan or the DRC, central powers serve only their immediate interests, to the detriment of local populations. The abundance of natural resources in these states, combined with elite corruption and a lack of institutional oversight, fuels conflicts specifically centered on competition for these resources, exacerbating political and social instability.

B.   Specific Typologies of Conflicts Related to Primary Resources

Currently, both the DRC and Sudan are experiencing bloody conflicts, largely linked to their abundant mineral resources. In this regard, Welsch notes that recent armed conflicts are often connected to the exploitation of natural resources. A study conducted between 1989 and 2002 across 54 countries showed that an abundance of mineral resources significantly increases the likelihood of internal armed conflict, whereas the productivity of “normal” production and the quality of governance reduce this likelihood. Relevant productivity variables include agricultural capital and human capital, rather than manufactured capital. In other words, “it is not the abundance of natural resources in general that fosters conflict, but the abundance of non-renewable resources” ³⁴. The availability of renewable agricultural resources, such as pastures, croplands, or forests, tends instead to reduce the incidence of armed conflict by increasing labor productivity.

These theoretical observations apply to the Sudanese and Congolese cases. In Sudan, during British colonization, the main issue was the exploitation of farmland near the Nile. After decolonization, new strategic resources were discovered, notably oil, and conflicts enabled the illegal exploitation of gold. The DRC, on the other hand, has been described by Sam Kean as “the richest country in the world and simultaneously the poorest.” It possesses all the primary resources needed for modern industries, artificial intelligence, and the energy transition. Yet, despite this wealth, it remains plagued by violent conflicts.³⁵ Focusing solely on ethnic or religious causes would be a simplistic reading: these violences are primarily the consequence of economic and historical factors.

Philippe Le Billon, in his theory of “political ecology,” distinguishes between conflicts related to resource scarcity, mainly renewable, and those linked to the abundance of non-renewable resources. In scarcity cases, actors fight to ensure survival. In abundance cases, conflicts are driven by greed, as resources provide armed groups with the “loot” necessary to acquire military equipment. These conflicts often become economic: the trade of natural resources structures the economy of armed groups and transforms a political agenda into a private agenda.

Sudan illustrates this transition. During British colonization, it fell under resource scarcity, with access to farmland near the Nile being the main concern. In the 1970s, and especially from 2010 onwards, gold became a new strategic resource, with the introduction of affordable metal detectors and the expansion of artisanal mining activities across the country, notably in the Eastern Desert, the Nile Valley, the Red Sea region, and Darfur, with the discovery of the Jebel Amir deposit in 2012. This abundance led to new political destabilizations and transformed the nature of conflicts, shifting them from territorial or agricultural issues to economic stakes linked to gold.

Zimmerman summarizes this dynamic by stating that “resources are not, they become.” The example of diamonds perfectly illustrates this idea: an industrial material with limited uses, its economic and symbolic value was socially constructed, turning it into a prized resource, a symbol of purity and eternal love. Today, diamonds have become the “best friend” of belligerents, fueling conflicts and the ruin of countries such as Angola, the DRC, or Sierra Leone. As Le Billon emphasizes, mining and conflicts in several African countries are not mere accidents: they are part of the historical continuity of colonization, where the primary beneficiaries are Northern countries, which organize an international trade in these resources while pursuing trade and foreign policies distinct from their domestic policies.³⁷

Thus, conflicts in these states cannot be separated from their history. According to Le Billon, these conflicts are not only motivated by scarcity or greed but are the historical product of social construction and a political economy of resources.³⁸ Geographic position, the creation of markets, and value chains—based on the social construction of desirable resources—determine the nature of these conflicts. These economic interests sometimes lead armed actors to succumb to greed and trigger coups or civil violence, as illustrated by the current Sudanese conflict or the 1997 coup in Congo-Brazzaville by Denis Sassou Nguesso against elected President Pascal Lissouba, closely linked to the control of oil rents.

C.    A Military Context Favoring the Lack of Empathy from External Actors

The causes of the Sudanese and Congolese conflicts are deeply historical, and one of the main reasons lies in the exploitation of natural resources. Philippe Le Billon emphasizes that the economic agenda related to these resources strongly influences the course of conflicts, particularly through their “criminalization” when financial motivations outweigh political ones.³⁹ This analysis applies equally to Sudan and the DRC, where belligerents and certain state authorities see their survival and power closely linked to mining, often at the expense of the local population.

The economic aspect incentivizes soldiers, local commanders, and political backers to maintain a profitable conflict. This logic generates a form of anarchy in which violent competition is exacerbated by the economic and political opportunities provided by the conflict: opportunities that are impossible to obtain in times of peace or even after a victory.⁴⁰ Peace becomes even more distant with the intervention of external powers seeking their own share of resources. Le Billon notes that “access to resources acts as a divisive factor among international actors.” This division intensifies when bilateral actors accommodate local anti-reform interests to secure commercial benefits, particularly for their companies.⁴¹

Thus, states become protectors of private interests, further complicating the conflict. In contemporary armed conflicts, flows of private capital play a more decisive role than foreign aid: they prioritize the commercial interests of transnational corporations over local populations.⁴² Notable examples include the French companies ELF and TOTAL, or the Canadian company Talisman, whose activities have been linked to conflicts and human rights violations.⁴³

This impunity in exploitation is facilitated by the permissive or cynical attitude of external actors, including certain advocacy NGOs. The absence of effective counterbalances and public exposure of abuses perpetuates a nearly uninterrupted cycle of violence⁴⁴. It is therefore essential that local and international NGOs fully play their role, demanding transparency and accountability from international companies, particularly when the resources they exploit are directly linked to conflicts.

II. The Green Transition in Northern Countries as a Source of Tension in Southern Countries

Global warming and the revolution driven by artificial intelligence have led to significant technological innovation in Northern countries. These transformations have triggered a green transition, encouraging these countries to produce and consume goods necessary for this energy transition, such as electric vehicles.

However, this transition often comes at the expense of Southern countries, where essential materials for this energy revolution are located, such as lithium and cobalt. Aware of the impacts of mining in contexts of corruption and weak regulation, several legislations have been implemented to limit resource-related conflicts. Among them, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010, United States) aims to prevent the financing of “conflict minerals” from the DRC by holding companies accountable for the supply chains of their suppliers⁴⁵.

Yet, this law has significant limitations. It only concerns the so-called 3TG minerals: tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold; thereby excluding other materials essential for the green transition, such as lithium or certain diamonds. Sudan, for example, is not covered by these provisions. To address these gaps and improve their image with consumers, companies have gradually incorporated “responsible sourcing” into their corporate social and environmental responsibility policies, based on the principle of due diligence. According to the OECD, “due diligence is the process that companies must carry out to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for the actual or potential negative impacts of their operations, supply chains, and other business relationships.”⁴⁶ This principle aims to hold companies accountable for how resources are extracted.

In practice, however, these measures are far from effective. The Congolese conflict, for instance, is exacerbated by the green transition toward a decarbonized economy led by Northern countries. The development of electric vehicles has increased the exploitation of non-conflict minerals, particularly cobalt, 60–70% of which comes from the DRC.⁴⁷ Despite the EU adopting a similar text to Section 1502 in 2014, the situation on the ground remains catastrophic, with resources continuing to be exported to wealthy countries while conflicts and human rights violations persist. Raphaël Deberdt and Philippe Le Billon identify five major limitations to the implementation of responsible sourcing. First, the scope of artisanal mining: this activity supports the livelihoods of over 40 million people worldwide. In eastern and southeastern DRC, the International Peace Information Service visited nearly 3,000 extraction sites in 2020 and found that tracing minerals through complex chains involving hundreds to thousands of suppliers is extremely difficult⁴⁸. Second, the geographical scope: Section 1502 only concerns nine countries bordering the DRC, immediately excluding other states affected by mining conflicts, such as Sudan.⁴⁹

Other identified limitations include market access, hindered by high taxes and corruption; the integration of certification mechanisms; and the ability of companies to implement technological solutions to ensure traceability and compliance. These obstacles illustrate that the green transition in Northern countries can exacerbate tensions in Southern countries, fueling resource-related conflicts and increasing economic and social imbalances.

Conclusion

Congolese and Sudanese conflicts cannot be reduced to religious or ethnic disputes. They are primarily the result of mining exploitation, directly inherited from colonization. Today, these countries face severe human rights violations, exacerbated by our massive consumption of resources. It is essential to rethink our relationship with others and adopt a comprehensive, in- depth analysis to understand the real causes of these conflicts.

The exploitation of land and resources in Southern countries led to colonization and the establishment of economic and political systems that sustainably disadvantage local populations. The absence of sustainable development policies, in which all parties could benefit fairly, fuels conflicts and weakens the affected states. This issue will become even more pressing in the future, especially in the face of global warming, where essential resources such as water will become increasingly scarce and sources of additional tension.

Books and Reports

1. International Monetary Fund. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa – Holding Steady. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2025.
2. Young, Alden. Transforming Sudan: Decolonization, Economic Development, and State Formation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
3. Hanotaux, Gabriel. Le Soudan perdu et reconquis: Histoire de la nation égyptienne. Paris: Académie française.
4. David, Charles Philippe, and Olivier Schmitt. La guerre et la paix. 4th ed. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2020.
5. République Démocratique du Congo. Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire commises entre mars 1993 et juin 2003 sur le territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo. August 2010.
6. Amnesty International. “This Is What We Die For”: Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt. London: Amnesty International, 2016.
7. Agence européenne pour l’orientation et l’information économiques. Lettre économique de l’AEOI: Soudan.September 2024.

Book Chapters

• Fazi, Thomas. “From Central Bank Independence to Government Dependence: Monetary Colonialism in the Eurozone.” In Economic and Monetary Sovereignty in 21st Century Africa, edited by Maha Ben Gadha, Fadhel Kaboub, Kai Koddenbrock, Ines Mahmoud, and Ndongo Samba Sylla. London: Pluto Press,

2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv244ssnb.11.

• Cross, Harry. “Banking, Business, and Sovereignty in Sudan (1956–2019).”

In Economic and Monetary Sovereignty in 21st Century Africa, edited by Maha Ben Gadha, Fadhel Kaboub, Kai Koddenbrock, Ines Mahmoud, and Ndongo Samba Sylla. London: Pluto Press, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv244ssnb.6.

1. De Beule, Filip, and Daniël Van den Bulcke. “China’s Opening Up, from Shenzhen to Sudan.” In The New Presence of China in Africa, edited by Meine Pieter van Dijk. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n2kj.4.
2. Ongolo, Symphorien, and Max Krott, eds. Power Dynamics in African Forests: The Politics of Global Sustainability.

Journal Articles

1. Mahé, Anne-Laure. “Soudan: Après la chute d’Omar el-Béchir, les défis de la transition.” Politique étrangère, no. 2019/4 (Winter 2019): 99–112. Paris: Éditions Institut français des relations internationales. https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.194.0101.
2. Mamdani, Mahmood. “Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 43, no. 4 (October 2001): 651–664. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2696665.
3. Idris, Amir. “Rethinking Identity, Citizenship, and Violence in Sudan.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2012): 324–

326. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41475022.

1. Idris, Amir. “Historicizing Race, Ethnicity, and the Crisis of Citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan.” Middle East Journal 73, no. 4 (Winter 2019): 591–

606. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26933113.

1. Sharkey, Heather J. “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race.” African Affairs 107, no. 426 (January 2008): 21–

43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27666997.

1. Vasiliev, A. M., D. A. Degterev, and T. M. Shaw. “Decolonization, Postcolonialism, Multiple Modernities, and Persistent East–West Divide in African Studies.”
2. Stoop, Nik, Marijke Verpoorten, and Peter van der Windt. “More Legislation, More Violence? The Impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC.” PLOS ONE.
3. Silná, Zuzana, and Zuzana Kittová. “International Trade in Conflict Minerals: Solutions for the EU Regulatory Framework.” Stavebnícky

Časopis (2014). https://doi.org/10.2478/stcb-2014-0059.

• Greenfield, Aaron, and T. E. Graedel. “The Omnivorous Diet of Modern Technology.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling.
• Deberdt, Raphaël, and Philippe Le Billon. “Conflict Minerals and Battery Materials Supply Chains: A Mapping Review of Responsible Sourcing Initiatives.” The

Extractive Industries and Society 8 (2021):

100935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.100935.

• Welsch, Heinz. “Resource Abundance and Internal Armed Conflict: Types of Natural Resources and the Incidence of ‘New Wars.’” Ecological Economics 67 (2008): 503–

513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.11.021.

• Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography20 (2001): 561–584. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-

6298(01)00015-4.

• De Gayffier-Bonneville, Anne-Claire. “La rivalité anglo-égyptienne au Soudan: Les enjeux de la décolonisation.” Relations internationales 2008/1, no. 133 (2008): 71–89. Éditions Presses Universitaires de France. https://doi.org/10.3917/ri.133.0071.
• Hanai, Kazuyo. “Conflict Minerals Regulation and Mechanism Changes in the DR Congo.” Resources Policy 74 (2021):

102394. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142072100059X.

• Elagiba, Nadir Ahmed, Muhammad Khalifa, Abbas E. Rahma, Zryab Babker, and Suad Ibrahim Gamaledin. “Performance of Major Mechanized Rainfed Agricultural Production in Sudan: Sorghum Vulnerability and Resilience to Climate since 1970.” Agricultural and Forest Meteorology. Elsevier.
• Dalla Via, Nicola, and Paolo Perego. “Determinants of Conflict Minerals Disclosure Under the Dodd–Frank Act.” RSM Erasmus University, Rotterdam; Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy.

News Articles

• England, Andrew. “Glimpse of Better Life Recedes as Investment in Sudan Slips Away: Despite Its Oil and Mineral Wealth, Conflict and Poor Leadership Have Held Back Africa’s Largest Nation.” Financial Times, September 7, 2004.
• Le Monde. “La communauté internationale se doit d’agir pour mettre fin aux souffrances du peuple congolais.” June 6, 2025.

By Abel Josafat Manullang
The international system we live in now has witnessed numerous tumultuous chapters in the past year alone. From the development in the Middle East to the ongoing war in Eastern Europe, one giant was present through it all: the United States.

Recently, the US has embarked on some voyages that caused ripples across the globe. The unilateral tariffs and the following transactional diplomacy that followed are the harbingers of what is to come from the US under its new administration.

However, these unilateral moves do not exclusively revolve around trade activities. The recent capture of Venezuela president in its own national territory and the recent blockade on Cuba’s oil access demonstrated just how unrestrained the US can be in advancing its interests.

These moves from the US signify a change in its approach to its pursuit of interests. It demonstrates how selective the US has come to value the many international institutions it has spearheaded and stood by in the past. In other words, it now relies on its example of force as opposed to the force of its example. 

To add to this, the capriciousness of the US is also important to note, primarily in the way it defines its interests and security, which may result in abandonment of its past commitments. With such a giant on the horizon, not to mention one that many states have developed a reliance on, it will inevitably force changes to the way they manage their ties with the US.

The heart of the Indo-Pacific: ASEAN and Southeast Asia

The capricious nature of the US causes concerns for many states, including here in Southeast Asia. Other writers have posited that the same fate that befell Venezuela can also manifest in Southeast Asia. There exist some holes that can be poked by the US should it find the region and the timing fitting for its interests. This is further amplified by how some states there have leaned closer to either the US or China.

When talking about Southeast Asia, one cannot dismiss its regional bloc, ASEAN, which has witnessed various developments both internally and externally. For the former, ASEAN has come to cater to new fields in which the interests of its member states lie. The same goes for the latter, as it bridges its member states’ interests with those of the external partners. As a result, it is no surprise that ASEAN has come to have its centrality in the region.

While ASEAN’s centrality can still be felt with its vast network of partners, ASEAN must navigate the future with extreme caution in the strategic landscape. It is true that the US has its attention on accentuating its presence in the Western Hemisphere, but one cannot eliminate its presence in the Indo-Pacific as its object of interest, especially given the strong show of force it has there.

To add it up, its recent moves can be seen as warning shots for everyone, including Southeast Asia as the heart of the Indo-Pacific, that the US would take a no-holds-barred approach in pursuing its interests or responding to anyone it deems as a threat. For this, as Hoang Thi Ha and Aries A. Arugay note, it is important for the region to overcome its vulnerabilities lest the US use it as a pretext to accentuate its presence in the region. While the prior Cambodia-Thailand conflict was not used as a pretext for something akin to Venezuela’s case, the capricious nature of the US makes it best to reduce any leeway that can be capitalized.

Amidst the presence of a capricious and powerful giant, ASEAN’s relevance and centrality will be tested. This puts in more considerations, given the already enormous attention the region has received, specifically from the US and China. For all of China’s far-reaching presence, one cannot discount the presence and influence the US has as a Pacific power. To this end, ASEAN needs to maintain its centrality hand in hand with that of the US, considering the interconnectedness they share.

Additionally, ASEAN also needs to bolster its ties with its other partners. For this, ASEAN can benefit from the many strategic partnerships it has developed over the decades. They can serve as the foundation for more diversified ties that can cushion any tumults that emerge from the unilateral strides of the US or other partners. Such a feat is not only something that won’t cause alarm, given ASEAN’s record, but it also resonates with its other partners who seek to diversify their ties.

Now, with the long road ahead in 2026, ASEAN and its member states must brace themselves for the volatile landscape before them. Against such a rough sea, the states of Southeast Asia have the choice to use ASEAN as the very forum to harmonize and synergize their strides. Afterall, for all its shortcomings, ASEAN still has countless things to offer. However, it can only be materialized provided the member states have the willingness to navigate through their differences.

The fork in the road will then open the door for the question of whether ASEAN persist and maintains its cohesion as a regional bloc or will it succumb to the force of the great powers. The answer to this question will show itself over the coming months and years.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

About the writer:

Abel Josafat Manullang is a writer at SiPalingHI! Media and a researcher of the Research Development House. He has developed numerous works surrounding maritime security and regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and other regions, which can be accessed through his Google Scholar page. Instagram: instagram.com/abel_jman