Prepared by:
Muhammad Daffa Aulia Ridwan

The Iran War of 2026 was to be used to put order back. Rather, it revealed the lack of control that is left. What started as a joint U.S. and Israel attack on Iran on 28 February 2026 became an action to end a long-held concern about The advances of Tehran towards its nuclear capabilities and influence in the region. However, instead of asserting dominance, the war has shown a different truth that U.S. influence in the Middle East is not absolute, and its conventional instruments are yielding less and less returns. Over the decades, Washington has been following a time-tested agenda in the region: ensuring influence, accessing strategic routes, and protecting allies. These priorities remain the same. The issue was that the environment in which they work has changed. The Middle East is now more fragmented, more independent, and more influenced by various actors in the world. Not only has America become dependent on negotiating the influence, rather than enforcing it despite its military power, but it is now also functioning within a system that mandates it. That’s how it should be within the past history with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

This contradiction is present in this tension that underlies the current U.S. policy. On the one hand, it can be clearly seen in the will to diminish long-term commitments, a kind of hydro-retaliatory shrink, which can be said to be a strategic pullback. Conversely, instances of crisis also provoke aggressive responses. It is exactly the same pattern we are witnessing in the war of 2026: a state tries to de-escalate, but is again and again lured into the battle when its credibility or its interests are questioned.

But the consequences of such a strategy are more and more counterproductive. This is demonstrated with the war itself. The first attacks were aimed at the Iranian leadership, military infrastructure and nuclear-related assets, as an attempt to weaken Iranian capabilities. But Iran did not react with the normal escalation. Rather, it depended on asymmetric warfare, missile attacks and drone attacks on various fronts; missiles were used to attack not only Israel but also the U.S. bases and other allied countries in the Gulf. More to the point, Iran proved its strategic advantage in the place where it is most needed: global energy. Interfering with the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran reminded the world that its ability to influence events is not eradicated by any military pressure. On the one hand, it strengthens Iran as one of the main actors in the system of the region and all over the world.

The war soon escalated into a wider conflict. Proxy networks were initiated, such as the Hezbollah and tacitly Eastern block (Russia, China, etc.), and Israel’s interest in contesting major power in the Middle East (weakening Iran) with their own means, they started a parallel war in the region. It is not the conventional war between states anymore because it is a networked war where influence is exerted in many ways by a number of actors. The sheer might of the military in such a situation is not a guarantee of a decisive victory.

And that is the main wrong estimation. U.S. strategy continues to be based on the premise that an excellent force has the ability to deliver strategic results. However, the Middle East today does not operate in such a manner. Power flow is decentralized, coalitions are prone to change, and smaller players have been able to create substantial costs for bigger rivals. Iran was also capable of surviving a cumulative pressure, which is not a one-off event, but an indication of how contemporary war operates in the area.

The larger geopolitical implications merely drive this point home. The Middle East is in a new period of instability brought about by the war. Energy channels have been shaken, world markets disrupted, and tensions heightened in regions. However, especially, the reaction of the states of the Middle East has been tentative instead of concerted. Even critics of Iran have not completely concurred with U.S. activities, as they are afraid of escalation and revenge. Meanwhile, other external forces like China and Russia have opposed U.S.-led efforts, which is an indication that the conflict cannot be confined to the region anymore. It belongs to a bigger geopolitical game, in which U.S. influence is no longer presumed. Even the U.S.’s own allies, such as European countries, have raised concerns about the war and have taken an ambiguous stance not to support it.

This begs an uncomfortable question: by what exactly have they been done?. The result indicates otherwise, in case the intention was to weaken Iran. The last thing that would have been desired is to stabilize the region, but that is the opposite of what has happened. And, had the goal been to strengthen American leadership, the war has rather shown its weaknesses. All this does not imply that the United States is no longer super-powerful. It is still the strongest military player in the region, has far-reaching alliances and a global presence. Yet no longer is power enough. The efficiency of such power, its capacity to achieve the desirable results, becomes more and more limited. The Iran War 2026 is not purely regional. It is reflecting a signal strategically. It demonstrates that in a complicated, multipolar setting, coercive strategies usually result in escalation, rather than resolution. It shows that alliances, however, continue to be significant, but they do not compensate enough for the changes in regional dynamics. And it highlights that these enemies, such as Iran, have changed so as to be much more difficult to contain using traditional methods.

And, assuming that there is a moral to be learned, it is an easy, yet disagreeable one: that the control is not so sure any more. To be effective, the U.S. policy can no longer afford to be reactive in its military efforts, but instead it should be more coherent, long-term, one that incorporates diplomacy, recognizes regional autonomy, and adapts to the realities of a multipolar world. Without such a change, nothing more is to be expected of future interventions; the same cycle is bound to be repeated: bold initiation, inconclusive culminations, a cycle of instability ever-deepening.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Prepared by:
Muhammad Daffa Aulia Ridwan

“In Sudan, more than 40,000 lives have been lost, 13 million people displaced, and 30 million

are now in need of humanitarian assistance.”¹

“In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II

— claiming over six million lives — continues to rage. Driven by the struggle for vast mineral wealth, it has brought unimaginable suffering,

especially to women and children.”

— Panzi Hospital, 2025²

Executive Summary:

The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan cannot be attributed solely to ethnic or religious divisions. A comprehensive understanding requires consideration of multiple interrelated factors; chief among them, the exploitation of natural resources in these resource-rich states. This dynamic of domination and extraction predates colonization and continues to shape the political and economic landscapes of both countries today. In the current global context, the energy transition and the growing demand for critical minerals, driven largely by industrialized nations, have intensified competition over access to these resources. Minerals essential for green technologies and artificial intelligence have become strategic assets, further entrenching instability and fueling violence. A lasting resolution to these conflicts requires a fundamental re-evaluation of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. Without addressing the structural inequalities and exploitative practices underlying resource extraction, sustainable peace and development in the DRC and Sudan will remain unattainable.

Introduction:

The Berlin Conference of 1885 led to the division of Africa by European powers, with the aim of partitioning the continent for economic purposes, such as access to cheap labor and mineral resources, often acquired by force³. Among these territories were the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which at the time were composed of tribes and not yet organized according to the Westphalian system we know today⁴. The DRC gained independence from Belgium in 1960, while Sudan achieved independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom in 1956. These states, initially serving the needs of European powers, were thus granted independence, but some territories continue to face deadly conflicts. While independence may appear to have been achieved in the eyes of the United Nations, it is necessary to analyze it critically, as it results from complex historical processes shaped by the economic and political interests of former colonial powers.⁵

Sudan’s independence was not straightforward. Administered jointly by Egypt and the United Kingdom from 1899 to 1956, the country saw its lands and primary resources exploited by these powers, each pursuing its own interests.⁶ Even after 1922, Egypt claimed sovereignty, while the United Kingdom sought to maintain control. These rivalries contributed to the country’s ethnic and religious fragmentation, ultimately leading to the division of Sudan into North and South Sudan. The Egyptian nationalist movement demanded full independence for the Nile Valley, while the British sought to separate Sudan from Egypt to develop agriculture, particularly in the Gezira region north of Khartoum.⁷ This policy aimed to exploit the Nile’s waters for cotton cultivation, without Egypt being able to limit British access to these resources. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 officially granted independence to all externally dominated countries, consolidating Britain’s position over Sudan. However, this formal independence did not allow effective territorial control, as Sudanese authorities remained strongly influenced by former powers.

The case of the DRC shows similar patterns. As a former Belgian colony, the country was subjected to massive exploitation of its mineral resources by King Leopold II, to the detriment of the local population, leading to severe human rights violations, including slavery and mass violence. As Adam Hochschild emphasizes in King Leopold’s Ghost, this exploitation resulted in a veritable genocide.⁸ Darfur, rich in primary resources, constitutes another example where resources were at the center of crimes against humanity.⁹ These examples demonstrate that natural resources play a decisive role in humanitarian crises and armed conflicts.

Modern civil wars are defined as “an armed conflict between the government of a sovereign state and one or more organized groups capable of substantial resistance”¹⁰. Several factors have contributed to the increase in civil wars in the 20th and 21st centuries: decolonization, which left states with contested authorities; the end of the Cold War, which resulted in a decline in superpower financial support; and the reduction of peacekeeping operations coupled with the collapse of authoritarian regimes. Today, the main hotspots of civil wars include Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Chad, the DRC, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, and Ukraine.

Two main factors explain the outbreak of these conflicts: ethnicity and economy¹¹. Ethnicity is not a natural cause of conflict but a social and political construct. Anthony Smith defines an ethnic group as a collective sharing a common name, beliefs, and ancestry, shared cultural elements, collective historical memories, and attachment to a territory. Ethnicity is often instrumentalized to divide and mobilize populations for strategic purposes. The economic factor manifests as the “resource curse”: resource-rich states develop rentier economies at the expense of public institutions, limiting state control over their territory and favoring the emergence of rebellions. These mechanisms are particularly evident in peripheral, hard-to-access regions, such as certain areas of Sudan and the DRC, where post-colonial resource management has contributed to the persistence of civil conflicts¹².

Limiting the analysis to an ethnic dimension would be reductive: ethnicity is often used as a tool by elites to control populations and exploit resources at low cost. It is therefore important to ask: have these states truly benefited from their independence? Who truly profits from primary resources? What tactics are employed in these mining-related conflicts? The answers to these questions show that current civil conflicts are not generated by ethnic factors but by economic ones, with ethnicity serving as a political lever to divide and exploit resources cheaply¹³.

I.  Mineral Exploitation Made Possible by a Favorable Military and Political Context

A. The Role of Central Politics in the Countries in Question

1) A Political and Economic Transition (20th Century) – Benefiting Former Colonies

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, which granted independence to formerly colonized peoples, should not be interpreted as a guarantee of true political and economic autonomy¹⁴. The new states inherited profound political instability, exacerbated by the imposition of the Westphalian state system, which brought historically distinct tribes together on a single territory, sometimes with no social or cultural ties.¹⁵ This instability was reinforced by the installation of leaders and governors serving the interests of former colonial powers, ensuring the continuity of economic exploitation post-independence.¹⁶

This political and ethnic construction, inherited from colonization, often led to the exclusion of certain populations. In the United States, for example, a central role was played in the secession of South Sudan through joint support for the Sudanese government and the South Sudanese rebel movement (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement), culminating in the 2005 peace treaty.¹⁷ The official justification relied on a racial and ethnic discourse, attributing conflicts to a legacy of slavery. However, the understanding of Arab-Saharan slavery cannot be reduced to the European slavery lens, as Adam Hochschild emphasizes in King Leopold’s Ghost.¹⁸ Reducing the conflict to a racial opposition, as is often done, obscures the historical and economic complexity of the Sudanese crises.

The division of Sudan into North and South allowed former powers to strategically control the Nile and primary resources, to the detriment of local populations. Amir Idris, in Historicizing Race, Ethnicity, and the Crisis of Citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan, considers that the conflict results from a citizenship crisis: “Postcolonial states adopted definitions of indigeneity, inherited from the colonial era, to frame their own definitions of citizenship.” ¹⁹This approach excludes certain populations and fuels the foundations of civil wars. Citizenship comprises three dimensions: legal, political, and as membership in a political community. Idris emphasizes the third dimension, which is essential for understanding systemic exclusion and identity conflicts.²⁰

These identity and racial constructions were reinforced by colonial propaganda and the prejudices of Western missionaries and administrators, as illustrated by Reverend J. Lowrie Anderson, who considered Arabs practical and Blacks less stable and easier to influence.²¹ These views legitimized the division of Sudan and facilitated control over the populations and resources of the South. Similarly, the DRC, a former Belgian colony, saw its resources exploited by administrators trained to serve colonial interests, as Adam Hochschild shows for Leopold II’s Congo.²²

Territorial division also altered traditional land management systems. According to Jean- Philippe Colin and Charlin Rangé (Les dimensions intrafamiliales du rapport à la terre), land relations were historically structured around the family nucleus and neighborhood relations²³. The colonial state, by imposing centralized administration, disrupted this millennia-old system, transforming relationships with land and resources.

After independence, local politicians often pursued policies serving Western interests. Alden Young, in Transforming Sudan – Decolonization, Economic Development and State Formation, shows that the generation of independents (1954–1958), educated at Western universities such as Oxford, managed major economic projects like the Gezira Scheme, centralizing over 50% of state revenue and ensuring economic control aligned with interests inherited from colonialism²⁴. Even Sudanese economists, such as Sa’ad al-Din Fawzi, had to frame their analyses around unstable political and institutional constraints, with Northern elites favoring a vision of national development focused on economic growth rather than regional redistribution²⁵.

Finally, instability and limited development conditions are exacerbated by the influence of international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. While their goal is to assist financially struggling states, their policies impose market opening and economic liberalization, often to the detriment of local populations, particularly economic minorities²⁶.

2)  Central Powers Under the Grip of Corruption – To the Detriment of the Local Population

In Sudan, following the 2021 coup d’état, a military council led by two generals took control of the country. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the armed forces, de facto assumed the presidency, while General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo leads the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF, created in 2013,²⁷ originated from the Janjaweed militia that had fought rebels in Darfur and was accused of ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab population in the region (BBC). Dagalo strengthened this military force and involved it in international conflicts, notably in Yemen and Libya, while also developing local economic interests, such as controlling certain gold mines in Sudan.

The current conflict does not affect the entire Sudanese territory uniformly. Fighting is concentrated in strategic areas where the two leaders exercise control based on natural resources, notably gold and oil. Northern Sudan, for instance, contains agricultural zones along the Nile, while oil is mainly found in the South, and the strategic Red Sea port remains a key stake. This unstable situation turns the Sudanese state into an economic prey, where local militias profit from resources at the expense of the civilian population.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exhibits similar dynamics. Since 2016, Amnesty International has denounced corruption within central authorities and local military forces. ²⁸In the DRC, the Code of Conduct on artisanal mining defines in Article 21 artisanal mining as “any activity by which a Congolese national extracts and concentrates mineral substances using artisanal tools, methods, and processes, within an artisanal mining area limited in surface and depth, up to a maximum of thirty meters.” ²⁹The code specifies that only adults holding a valid permit may carry out this activity, under penalty of sanctions by the government.

However, these legal provisions are insufficient: they do not take into account the health and safety of miners, remain silent on cobalt handling, and impose no standards for mine construction or organization. Additionally, the government does not create enough Artisanal Mining Zones (ZEA), which forces miners to work in unauthorized areas or illegally enter industrial sites to access cobalt and other minerals. These regulations reveal a complete disconnect between the government and local realities.³⁰

A direct consequence of these gaps is child labor, a violation of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the DRC is a party.³¹ Arthur’s testimony, collected by Amnesty International, illustrates this point: “I worked in the mines because my parents couldn’t afford to pay for food and clothes for me. Papa is unemployed, and mama sells charcoal.”³² This exploitation occurs in a context of widespread structural corruption: local authorities profit from resource extraction, tolerating and effectively organizing illegal activities in the ZEA. Volunteers from Amnesty International and Afrewatch have observed mines controlled by police officers, who regulate access and supervise operations, thereby ensuring the continuity of an exploitation system supported by central authorities.³³

Whether in Sudan or the DRC, central powers serve only their immediate interests, to the detriment of local populations. The abundance of natural resources in these states, combined with elite corruption and a lack of institutional oversight, fuels conflicts specifically centered on competition for these resources, exacerbating political and social instability.

B.   Specific Typologies of Conflicts Related to Primary Resources

Currently, both the DRC and Sudan are experiencing bloody conflicts, largely linked to their abundant mineral resources. In this regard, Welsch notes that recent armed conflicts are often connected to the exploitation of natural resources. A study conducted between 1989 and 2002 across 54 countries showed that an abundance of mineral resources significantly increases the likelihood of internal armed conflict, whereas the productivity of “normal” production and the quality of governance reduce this likelihood. Relevant productivity variables include agricultural capital and human capital, rather than manufactured capital. In other words, “it is not the abundance of natural resources in general that fosters conflict, but the abundance of non-renewable resources” ³⁴. The availability of renewable agricultural resources, such as pastures, croplands, or forests, tends instead to reduce the incidence of armed conflict by increasing labor productivity.

These theoretical observations apply to the Sudanese and Congolese cases. In Sudan, during British colonization, the main issue was the exploitation of farmland near the Nile. After decolonization, new strategic resources were discovered, notably oil, and conflicts enabled the illegal exploitation of gold. The DRC, on the other hand, has been described by Sam Kean as “the richest country in the world and simultaneously the poorest.” It possesses all the primary resources needed for modern industries, artificial intelligence, and the energy transition. Yet, despite this wealth, it remains plagued by violent conflicts.³⁵ Focusing solely on ethnic or religious causes would be a simplistic reading: these violences are primarily the consequence of economic and historical factors.

Philippe Le Billon, in his theory of “political ecology,” distinguishes between conflicts related to resource scarcity, mainly renewable, and those linked to the abundance of non-renewable resources. In scarcity cases, actors fight to ensure survival. In abundance cases, conflicts are driven by greed, as resources provide armed groups with the “loot” necessary to acquire military equipment. These conflicts often become economic: the trade of natural resources structures the economy of armed groups and transforms a political agenda into a private agenda.

Sudan illustrates this transition. During British colonization, it fell under resource scarcity, with access to farmland near the Nile being the main concern. In the 1970s, and especially from 2010 onwards, gold became a new strategic resource, with the introduction of affordable metal detectors and the expansion of artisanal mining activities across the country, notably in the Eastern Desert, the Nile Valley, the Red Sea region, and Darfur, with the discovery of the Jebel Amir deposit in 2012. This abundance led to new political destabilizations and transformed the nature of conflicts, shifting them from territorial or agricultural issues to economic stakes linked to gold.

Zimmerman summarizes this dynamic by stating that “resources are not, they become.” The example of diamonds perfectly illustrates this idea: an industrial material with limited uses, its economic and symbolic value was socially constructed, turning it into a prized resource, a symbol of purity and eternal love. Today, diamonds have become the “best friend” of belligerents, fueling conflicts and the ruin of countries such as Angola, the DRC, or Sierra Leone. As Le Billon emphasizes, mining and conflicts in several African countries are not mere accidents: they are part of the historical continuity of colonization, where the primary beneficiaries are Northern countries, which organize an international trade in these resources while pursuing trade and foreign policies distinct from their domestic policies.³⁷

Thus, conflicts in these states cannot be separated from their history. According to Le Billon, these conflicts are not only motivated by scarcity or greed but are the historical product of social construction and a political economy of resources.³⁸ Geographic position, the creation of markets, and value chains—based on the social construction of desirable resources—determine the nature of these conflicts. These economic interests sometimes lead armed actors to succumb to greed and trigger coups or civil violence, as illustrated by the current Sudanese conflict or the 1997 coup in Congo-Brazzaville by Denis Sassou Nguesso against elected President Pascal Lissouba, closely linked to the control of oil rents.

C.    A Military Context Favoring the Lack of Empathy from External Actors

The causes of the Sudanese and Congolese conflicts are deeply historical, and one of the main reasons lies in the exploitation of natural resources. Philippe Le Billon emphasizes that the economic agenda related to these resources strongly influences the course of conflicts, particularly through their “criminalization” when financial motivations outweigh political ones.³⁹ This analysis applies equally to Sudan and the DRC, where belligerents and certain state authorities see their survival and power closely linked to mining, often at the expense of the local population.

The economic aspect incentivizes soldiers, local commanders, and political backers to maintain a profitable conflict. This logic generates a form of anarchy in which violent competition is exacerbated by the economic and political opportunities provided by the conflict: opportunities that are impossible to obtain in times of peace or even after a victory.⁴⁰ Peace becomes even more distant with the intervention of external powers seeking their own share of resources. Le Billon notes that “access to resources acts as a divisive factor among international actors.” This division intensifies when bilateral actors accommodate local anti-reform interests to secure commercial benefits, particularly for their companies.⁴¹

Thus, states become protectors of private interests, further complicating the conflict. In contemporary armed conflicts, flows of private capital play a more decisive role than foreign aid: they prioritize the commercial interests of transnational corporations over local populations.⁴² Notable examples include the French companies ELF and TOTAL, or the Canadian company Talisman, whose activities have been linked to conflicts and human rights violations.⁴³

This impunity in exploitation is facilitated by the permissive or cynical attitude of external actors, including certain advocacy NGOs. The absence of effective counterbalances and public exposure of abuses perpetuates a nearly uninterrupted cycle of violence⁴⁴. It is therefore essential that local and international NGOs fully play their role, demanding transparency and accountability from international companies, particularly when the resources they exploit are directly linked to conflicts.

II. The Green Transition in Northern Countries as a Source of Tension in Southern Countries

Global warming and the revolution driven by artificial intelligence have led to significant technological innovation in Northern countries. These transformations have triggered a green transition, encouraging these countries to produce and consume goods necessary for this energy transition, such as electric vehicles.

However, this transition often comes at the expense of Southern countries, where essential materials for this energy revolution are located, such as lithium and cobalt. Aware of the impacts of mining in contexts of corruption and weak regulation, several legislations have been implemented to limit resource-related conflicts. Among them, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010, United States) aims to prevent the financing of “conflict minerals” from the DRC by holding companies accountable for the supply chains of their suppliers⁴⁵.

Yet, this law has significant limitations. It only concerns the so-called 3TG minerals: tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold; thereby excluding other materials essential for the green transition, such as lithium or certain diamonds. Sudan, for example, is not covered by these provisions. To address these gaps and improve their image with consumers, companies have gradually incorporated “responsible sourcing” into their corporate social and environmental responsibility policies, based on the principle of due diligence. According to the OECD, “due diligence is the process that companies must carry out to identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for the actual or potential negative impacts of their operations, supply chains, and other business relationships.”⁴⁶ This principle aims to hold companies accountable for how resources are extracted.

In practice, however, these measures are far from effective. The Congolese conflict, for instance, is exacerbated by the green transition toward a decarbonized economy led by Northern countries. The development of electric vehicles has increased the exploitation of non-conflict minerals, particularly cobalt, 60–70% of which comes from the DRC.⁴⁷ Despite the EU adopting a similar text to Section 1502 in 2014, the situation on the ground remains catastrophic, with resources continuing to be exported to wealthy countries while conflicts and human rights violations persist. Raphaël Deberdt and Philippe Le Billon identify five major limitations to the implementation of responsible sourcing. First, the scope of artisanal mining: this activity supports the livelihoods of over 40 million people worldwide. In eastern and southeastern DRC, the International Peace Information Service visited nearly 3,000 extraction sites in 2020 and found that tracing minerals through complex chains involving hundreds to thousands of suppliers is extremely difficult⁴⁸. Second, the geographical scope: Section 1502 only concerns nine countries bordering the DRC, immediately excluding other states affected by mining conflicts, such as Sudan.⁴⁹

Other identified limitations include market access, hindered by high taxes and corruption; the integration of certification mechanisms; and the ability of companies to implement technological solutions to ensure traceability and compliance. These obstacles illustrate that the green transition in Northern countries can exacerbate tensions in Southern countries, fueling resource-related conflicts and increasing economic and social imbalances.

Conclusion

Congolese and Sudanese conflicts cannot be reduced to religious or ethnic disputes. They are primarily the result of mining exploitation, directly inherited from colonization. Today, these countries face severe human rights violations, exacerbated by our massive consumption of resources. It is essential to rethink our relationship with others and adopt a comprehensive, in- depth analysis to understand the real causes of these conflicts.

The exploitation of land and resources in Southern countries led to colonization and the establishment of economic and political systems that sustainably disadvantage local populations. The absence of sustainable development policies, in which all parties could benefit fairly, fuels conflicts and weakens the affected states. This issue will become even more pressing in the future, especially in the face of global warming, where essential resources such as water will become increasingly scarce and sources of additional tension.

Books and Reports

1. International Monetary Fund. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa – Holding Steady. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, October 2025.
2. Young, Alden. Transforming Sudan: Decolonization, Economic Development, and State Formation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
3. Hanotaux, Gabriel. Le Soudan perdu et reconquis: Histoire de la nation égyptienne. Paris: Académie française.
4. David, Charles Philippe, and Olivier Schmitt. La guerre et la paix. 4th ed. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2020.
5. République Démocratique du Congo. Rapport du Projet Mapping concernant les violations les plus graves des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire commises entre mars 1993 et juin 2003 sur le territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo. August 2010.
6. Amnesty International. “This Is What We Die For”: Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt. London: Amnesty International, 2016.
7. Agence européenne pour l’orientation et l’information économiques. Lettre économique de l’AEOI: Soudan.September 2024.

Book Chapters

• Fazi, Thomas. “From Central Bank Independence to Government Dependence: Monetary Colonialism in the Eurozone.” In Economic and Monetary Sovereignty in 21st Century Africa, edited by Maha Ben Gadha, Fadhel Kaboub, Kai Koddenbrock, Ines Mahmoud, and Ndongo Samba Sylla. London: Pluto Press,

2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv244ssnb.11.

• Cross, Harry. “Banking, Business, and Sovereignty in Sudan (1956–2019).”

In Economic and Monetary Sovereignty in 21st Century Africa, edited by Maha Ben Gadha, Fadhel Kaboub, Kai Koddenbrock, Ines Mahmoud, and Ndongo Samba Sylla. London: Pluto Press, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv244ssnb.6.

1. De Beule, Filip, and Daniël Van den Bulcke. “China’s Opening Up, from Shenzhen to Sudan.” In The New Presence of China in Africa, edited by Meine Pieter van Dijk. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46n2kj.4.
2. Ongolo, Symphorien, and Max Krott, eds. Power Dynamics in African Forests: The Politics of Global Sustainability.

Journal Articles

1. Mahé, Anne-Laure. “Soudan: Après la chute d’Omar el-Béchir, les défis de la transition.” Politique étrangère, no. 2019/4 (Winter 2019): 99–112. Paris: Éditions Institut français des relations internationales. https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.194.0101.
2. Mamdani, Mahmood. “Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 43, no. 4 (October 2001): 651–664. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2696665.
3. Idris, Amir. “Rethinking Identity, Citizenship, and Violence in Sudan.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 44, no. 2 (May 2012): 324–

326. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41475022.

1. Idris, Amir. “Historicizing Race, Ethnicity, and the Crisis of Citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan.” Middle East Journal 73, no. 4 (Winter 2019): 591–

606. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26933113.

1. Sharkey, Heather J. “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race.” African Affairs 107, no. 426 (January 2008): 21–

43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27666997.

1. Vasiliev, A. M., D. A. Degterev, and T. M. Shaw. “Decolonization, Postcolonialism, Multiple Modernities, and Persistent East–West Divide in African Studies.”
2. Stoop, Nik, Marijke Verpoorten, and Peter van der Windt. “More Legislation, More Violence? The Impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC.” PLOS ONE.
3. Silná, Zuzana, and Zuzana Kittová. “International Trade in Conflict Minerals: Solutions for the EU Regulatory Framework.” Stavebnícky

Časopis (2014). https://doi.org/10.2478/stcb-2014-0059.

• Greenfield, Aaron, and T. E. Graedel. “The Omnivorous Diet of Modern Technology.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling.
• Deberdt, Raphaël, and Philippe Le Billon. “Conflict Minerals and Battery Materials Supply Chains: A Mapping Review of Responsible Sourcing Initiatives.” The

Extractive Industries and Society 8 (2021):

100935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.100935.

• Welsch, Heinz. “Resource Abundance and Internal Armed Conflict: Types of Natural Resources and the Incidence of ‘New Wars.’” Ecological Economics 67 (2008): 503–

513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.11.021.

• Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography20 (2001): 561–584. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-

6298(01)00015-4.

• De Gayffier-Bonneville, Anne-Claire. “La rivalité anglo-égyptienne au Soudan: Les enjeux de la décolonisation.” Relations internationales 2008/1, no. 133 (2008): 71–89. Éditions Presses Universitaires de France. https://doi.org/10.3917/ri.133.0071.
• Hanai, Kazuyo. “Conflict Minerals Regulation and Mechanism Changes in the DR Congo.” Resources Policy 74 (2021):

102394. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142072100059X.

• Elagiba, Nadir Ahmed, Muhammad Khalifa, Abbas E. Rahma, Zryab Babker, and Suad Ibrahim Gamaledin. “Performance of Major Mechanized Rainfed Agricultural Production in Sudan: Sorghum Vulnerability and Resilience to Climate since 1970.” Agricultural and Forest Meteorology. Elsevier.
• Dalla Via, Nicola, and Paolo Perego. “Determinants of Conflict Minerals Disclosure Under the Dodd–Frank Act.” RSM Erasmus University, Rotterdam; Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy.

News Articles

• England, Andrew. “Glimpse of Better Life Recedes as Investment in Sudan Slips Away: Despite Its Oil and Mineral Wealth, Conflict and Poor Leadership Have Held Back Africa’s Largest Nation.” Financial Times, September 7, 2004.
• Le Monde. “La communauté internationale se doit d’agir pour mettre fin aux souffrances du peuple congolais.” June 6, 2025.

By Abel Josafat Manullang
The international system we live in now has witnessed numerous tumultuous chapters in the past year alone. From the development in the Middle East to the ongoing war in Eastern Europe, one giant was present through it all: the United States.

Recently, the US has embarked on some voyages that caused ripples across the globe. The unilateral tariffs and the following transactional diplomacy that followed are the harbingers of what is to come from the US under its new administration.

However, these unilateral moves do not exclusively revolve around trade activities. The recent capture of Venezuela president in its own national territory and the recent blockade on Cuba’s oil access demonstrated just how unrestrained the US can be in advancing its interests.

These moves from the US signify a change in its approach to its pursuit of interests. It demonstrates how selective the US has come to value the many international institutions it has spearheaded and stood by in the past. In other words, it now relies on its example of force as opposed to the force of its example. 

To add to this, the capriciousness of the US is also important to note, primarily in the way it defines its interests and security, which may result in abandonment of its past commitments. With such a giant on the horizon, not to mention one that many states have developed a reliance on, it will inevitably force changes to the way they manage their ties with the US.

The heart of the Indo-Pacific: ASEAN and Southeast Asia

The capricious nature of the US causes concerns for many states, including here in Southeast Asia. Other writers have posited that the same fate that befell Venezuela can also manifest in Southeast Asia. There exist some holes that can be poked by the US should it find the region and the timing fitting for its interests. This is further amplified by how some states there have leaned closer to either the US or China.

When talking about Southeast Asia, one cannot dismiss its regional bloc, ASEAN, which has witnessed various developments both internally and externally. For the former, ASEAN has come to cater to new fields in which the interests of its member states lie. The same goes for the latter, as it bridges its member states’ interests with those of the external partners. As a result, it is no surprise that ASEAN has come to have its centrality in the region.

While ASEAN’s centrality can still be felt with its vast network of partners, ASEAN must navigate the future with extreme caution in the strategic landscape. It is true that the US has its attention on accentuating its presence in the Western Hemisphere, but one cannot eliminate its presence in the Indo-Pacific as its object of interest, especially given the strong show of force it has there.

To add it up, its recent moves can be seen as warning shots for everyone, including Southeast Asia as the heart of the Indo-Pacific, that the US would take a no-holds-barred approach in pursuing its interests or responding to anyone it deems as a threat. For this, as Hoang Thi Ha and Aries A. Arugay note, it is important for the region to overcome its vulnerabilities lest the US use it as a pretext to accentuate its presence in the region. While the prior Cambodia-Thailand conflict was not used as a pretext for something akin to Venezuela’s case, the capricious nature of the US makes it best to reduce any leeway that can be capitalized.

Amidst the presence of a capricious and powerful giant, ASEAN’s relevance and centrality will be tested. This puts in more considerations, given the already enormous attention the region has received, specifically from the US and China. For all of China’s far-reaching presence, one cannot discount the presence and influence the US has as a Pacific power. To this end, ASEAN needs to maintain its centrality hand in hand with that of the US, considering the interconnectedness they share.

Additionally, ASEAN also needs to bolster its ties with its other partners. For this, ASEAN can benefit from the many strategic partnerships it has developed over the decades. They can serve as the foundation for more diversified ties that can cushion any tumults that emerge from the unilateral strides of the US or other partners. Such a feat is not only something that won’t cause alarm, given ASEAN’s record, but it also resonates with its other partners who seek to diversify their ties.

Now, with the long road ahead in 2026, ASEAN and its member states must brace themselves for the volatile landscape before them. Against such a rough sea, the states of Southeast Asia have the choice to use ASEAN as the very forum to harmonize and synergize their strides. Afterall, for all its shortcomings, ASEAN still has countless things to offer. However, it can only be materialized provided the member states have the willingness to navigate through their differences.

The fork in the road will then open the door for the question of whether ASEAN persist and maintains its cohesion as a regional bloc or will it succumb to the force of the great powers. The answer to this question will show itself over the coming months and years.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

About the writer:

Abel Josafat Manullang is a writer at SiPalingHI! Media and a researcher of the Research Development House. He has developed numerous works surrounding maritime security and regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and other regions, which can be accessed through his Google Scholar page. Instagram: instagram.com/abel_jman

By Beatrice Liverzani:

The Kurdish political landscape is shaped by a complex and evolving pursuit of self-governance across four states—Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—each of which presents distinct political, legal, and historical conditions. Despite shared linguistic and cultural markers, Kurdish political trajectories have diverged significantly, reflecting the interaction between post-imperial state formation, regional security considerations, and international legal norms as described by Gunter, (2014).

Historical Roots and the Absence of Kurdish Statehood

Kurdish aspirations for self-determination emerged prominently in the aftermath of the First World War, influenced by international principles such as Wilson’s Fourteen Points and early post-Ottoman treaties. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) initially envisaged the possibility of Kurdish autonomy, while the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) ultimately consolidated the territorial integrity of the new Turkish Republic and neighbouring states, effectively excluding Kurdish claims from the emerging international order (Gunter, 2014).

From the perspective of international law, this settlement embedded a structural constraint on Kurdish secession. The principle of territorial integrity became dominant, while external self-determination remained applicable primarily to decolonisation contexts. As a result, Kurdish claims were subsumed within the sovereignty of existing states, leaving autonomy and minority rights as the primary—though uneven—avenues for political recognition.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the post-Lausanne order did more than delimit borders; it institutionalised a regional norm that external actors have been reluctant to disrupt. Even major powers that have tactically cooperated with Kurdish actors, such as the United States in Iraq and Syria, have stopped short of endorsing Kurdish statehood. This reflects a broader international consensus: while minority protections may be encouraged, redrawing borders in the Middle East risks cascading instability. Thus, Kurdish aspirations are evaluated not only through legal doctrine but also through geopolitical risk calculus.

For regional governments, Kurdish self-determination is not viewed in isolation. It is perceived through the prism of precedent. Any concession that resembles secession could embolden parallel claims elsewhere, whether ethnic, sectarian, or regional. Diplomatically, this creates a shared, even if rarely coordinated, interest among Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tehran in preventing full Kurdish independence, even when their bilateral relations remain adversarial.

Iraq: Institutionalised Autonomy Without Sovereignty

Among the four scenarios, Iraq represents the most evolved form of Kurdish self-rule. Since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the early 1990s, Iraqi Kurds have exercised a substantial degree of de facto autonomy. This process was later consolidated following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which reshaped the country’s political system and formally recognised the Kurdistan Region within a federal framework. As Gunter (2014) argues, under the leadership of Masoud Barzani, who served as President of the Kurdistan Region from 2005 to 2017, the KRG expanded its institutional capacity, consolidating authority over regional governance, education, and security forces, including the Peshmerga.

This autonomy, however, has been shaped by internal political divisions, particularly the 1994 civil war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which exposed the challenges of Kurdish political fragmentation and competing centres of authority within the region (Gunter, 2014). Moreover, Kurdish identity within Iraq has historically occupied an ambivalent position in national narratives. As reflected in Iraqi Arabic-language literature, Kurdish experiences were often marginalised or portrayed as peripheral to Iraqi national identity, reinforcing perceptions of Kurds as outsiders or potential challenges to state unity (Zeidel, 2011).

Despite post-1991 political transformations and increased engagement between Arab and Kurdish regions, Kurdish representation in Iraqi cultural and political discourse remains uneven. According to Zeidel (2011), this suggests that while autonomy has been institutionalised at the political and administrative level, it has not fully translated into broader societal integration within the Iraqi national framework.

From a diplomatic perspective, the Iraqi case demonstrates the outer limits of what the international system is currently willing to tolerate. The 2017 Kurdish independence referendum illustrated this boundary clearly. Despite strong domestic support within the Kurdistan Region, regional states uniformly opposed the move, and international actors declined to recognise the outcome. Baghdad’s reassertion of authority over disputed territories, including Kirkuk, proceeded without meaningful external resistance.

This episode underscores a critical diplomatic lesson: autonomy may be negotiated, but sovereignty remains guarded by both regional consensus and international inertia. The Kurdistan Regional Government today operates within a delicate equilibrium—leveraging energy diplomacy, foreign investment, and security partnerships, while avoiding steps that would trigger collective regional pushback.

Turkey: Identity, Security, and Contested Integration

In Turkey, the Kurdish question has been primarily framed as an issue of national unity and internal security. As Loizides (2010) notes, Kurdish national identity developed comparatively late, shaped by geographic dispersion, internal fragmentation, and prolonged state policies aimed at linguistic and cultural homogenisation. The Turkish state’s Kemalist ideology historically denied the existence of distinct ethnic identities, restricting Kurdish language use and political expression, which paradoxically contributed to the consolidation of Kurdish ethnic consciousness (Loizides, 2010).

Kurdish political movements in Turkey have adopted varied strategies, ranging from armed resistance to political participation and civil society mobilisation. Influenced by Abdullah Öcalan’s concept of Democratic Confederalism, segments of the Kurdish movement have articulated alternatives to statehood, advocating decentralised governance, cultural recognition, and participatory democracy without formal secession (Gunter, 2014).

From a realist perspective, Turkey’s response reflects a prioritisation of territorial integrity and regime security. Loizides (2010) observes that while limited political openings, such as EU-related reforms, diaspora media, and legal changes, have facilitated expressions of Kurdish identity, Kurdish demands continue to be assessed through a security lens, constraining institutional accommodation. 

However, realism alone does not fully capture Ankara’s evolving calculations. Turkey’s Kurdish policy is also shaped by its external diplomatic positioning—particularly relations with the European Union, NATO allies, and neighbouring Syria and Iraq. Periods of reform have often coincided with moments when Ankara sought to project democratic credentials internationally. Conversely, heightened security operations have tended to align with domestic political consolidation and regional instability.

Diplomatically, Turkey seeks to prevent the internationalisation of its Kurdish issue. It resists framing the matter as one of minority rights subject to external adjudication and instead asserts sovereign jurisdiction. This approach reflects a broader regional sensitivity: once internal identity conflicts become items on international diplomatic agendas, external leverage increases. Hence, Ankara’s consistent effort to define the issue primarily through a counterterrorism framework rather than as one of self-determination.

Syria: De Facto Autonomy and Recent Developments

In Syria, Kurdish political space expanded significantly during the civil war, as Kurdish-led administrations established de facto autonomous governance structures aligned with Democratic Confederalist principles (Gunter, 2014). These arrangements prioritised local councils, gender equality, and cultural recognition, while formally rejecting statehood claims.

Recent developments suggest a shift in the Syrian state’s approach. In 2026, Damascus issued a decree granting citizenship to stateless Kurds, recognising Kurdish as a national language and signalling an attempt to reintegrate Kurdish populations within a reconstituted state framework (Al Jazeera, 2026). These steps have taken place amid shifting military and diplomatic circumstances, including cooperation with Russia, and reflect the incorporation of Kurdish governance arrangements into broader processes of national consolidation.

The Syrian case introduces an additional diplomatic complexity: Kurdish actors have emerged not merely as domestic stakeholders but as intermediaries within broader geopolitical competition. Their cooperation with U.S.-led forces as local security partners, subsequent negotiations with Damascus, and tactical coordination with Russia illustrate how sub-state actors can acquire strategic relevance beyond their demographic weight.

Yet this relevance remains conditional. External powers have supported Kurdish-led administrations insofar as they serve immediate security objectives. Long-term political recognition, however, remains contingent upon reconciliation with central state authority. This reinforces a pattern observable across the region: Kurdish leverage increases during moments of state fragmentation but contracts as central governments reconstitute control.

Comparative Observations

Across all four cases, Kurdish political trajectories reflect the limits imposed by international norms, regional power balances, and domestic state structures. While Iraq demonstrates the possibility of sustained autonomy within a federal framework, Turkey and Iran continue to prioritise integration and security, and Syria’s evolving position remains closely tied to post-conflict state reconstruction.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the Kurdish question ultimately tests the flexibility of the Westphalian state system in the Middle East. It raises a recurring tension between stability and representation: regional governments prioritise territorial integrity, while Kurdish movements prioritise political recognition and self-administration. International actors, meanwhile, oscillate between normative support for minority rights and pragmatic commitment to existing borders.

The comparative evidence suggests that the future of Kurdish politics will not be determined by a singular breakthrough toward independence, but by incremental negotiations over autonomy, integration, and decentralisation. Where states perceive accommodation as strengthening stability, political space may expand. Where identity claims are securitised, political contraction is likely to follow.

In this sense, the Kurdish question remains less a frozen conflict than an evolving diplomatic negotiation embedded within broader regional transformations.

Bibliography 

Gunter, M., M. (2014), “Unrecognized De Facto States in World Politics: The Kurds.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 20 (2): 161–178.

Loizides, N., G (2010), “State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 46 (4): 513–527. 

Zeidel, R. (2011), “The Iraqi Novel and the Kurds.” Review of Middle East Studies 45 (1): 19–34.

Al Jazeera (2026), “Syria Grants Immediate Citizenship to Kurds in Wake of Gains against SDF.” January 29, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/29/syria-grants-immediate-citizenship-to-kurds-in-wake-of-gains-against-sdf.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.