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23 FebArticle

Foreign Direct Investment: Why Asia Must Reframe Its Economic Strategy

By: Muad Zaki,

Senior Fellow at Asia Middle East Center (AMEC)


For much of the past decade, foreign direct investment (FDI) was treated by governments as a largely technical and economic matter. Policymakers focused on macroeconomic stability, incentives, infrastructure readiness, and regulatory predictability. The underlying assumption was that global capital flowed within a broadly stable international framework—one governed by shared rules, multilateral institutions, and predictable norms. That framework has now broken.

Across Asia, including Malaysia, growth strategies were built on openness to investment from multiple directions, the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and China. Non-alignment was not merely a diplomatic posture; it was an economic strategy made possible by an international system that rewarded neutrality and constrained unilateral coercion. For years, this allowed Asian economies to attract capital while remaining largely insulated from geopolitical confrontation.

Those conditions no longer hold. Foreign direct investment today operates in an international environment where prior assumptions about restraint, enforcement, and predictability have collapsed. Economic integration is no longer insulated from power politics. Capital flows are increasingly shaped by geopolitical pressure, strategic rivalry, and long-term alignment considerations, alongside traditional market fundamentals.

This reality was stated plainly at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, when Mark Carney declared that the post-Cold War rules-based international order has already ruptured. His assessment was not a warning about future risk, but a diagnosis of present conditions. Trade, finance, supply chains, and regulatory systems are now routinely used as instruments of pressure rather than neutral mechanisms of cooperation. For a country as closely integrated with the United States as Canada, this public admission carried particular weight. For small and middle powers, the implications are even more serious.

In this fragmented global environment, sovereignty is increasingly respected only when it aligns with the strategic priorities of major powers. The experience of Venezuela illustrates this reality. External pressure was accompanied by unusually explicit statements linking strategic objectives directly to access to natural resources. Whatever one’s view of Venezuela’s domestic politics, the precedent is clear: when strategic assets are involved, international legal norms and multilateral restraint can be sidelined.

A similar logic, —expressed without military force,— was evident in Greenland. U.S. interest in Greenland was framed around security and strategic necessity, prompting firm rejection by Greenlandic and Danish authorities. The episode demonstrated that even stable, developed territories are not immune to from external pressure when geography or resources carry strategic value. These cases matter not because they are identical, but because they reflect a broader pattern with direct implications for long-term economic and investment policy.

Any serious discussion of foreign direct investment in Asia must also acknowledge the central role played by China in the region’s economic development over the past decade. Chinese investment has been a major driver of infrastructure expansion, industrial capacity building, manufacturing growth, logistics connectivity, and energy development across Asia, including Malaysia. These investments have focused on long-term economic fundamentals, such as—transport networks, industrial zones, ports, energy systems, and production facilities, —that directly support national development strategies and regional integration.

From the perspective of Asian governments and policymakers, Chinese investment has been widely regarded as practical, development-focused, and economically complementary. It has addressed financing gaps in large-scale projects that require scale, patience, and long investment horizons, often in areas where other sources of capital were limited or constrained. Importantly, China’s approach to investment engagement in Asia has emphasised economic outcomes rather than ideological or cultural conditionality, allowing host countries to pursue growth and infrastructure modernisation while preserving domestic policy autonomy.

At the same time, multinational corporations are adjusting rapidly to this new global landscape. Large firms now maintain dedicated geopolitical risk and strategic foresight units that assess medium- and long-term scenarios. These teams do not ask whether the old international system will return. They ask how host countries will manage alignment pressures once strategic competition intensifies further. The central concern for investors is policy durability and—whether regulatory frameworks, market access conditions, and compliance obligations will remain coherent over five to ten years.

In this context, countries that attempt to indefinitely hedge between competing power centres may be perceived as facing future policy disruption. This is not a judgement on the legitimacy of hedging, but a reflection of the narrowing space for sustained neutrality in a world where economic relations are increasingly politicised.

The breakdown of shared rules has also transformed how major powers approach investment. Foreign direct investment is increasingly used as leverage. Market access, technology cooperation, and even security partnerships are tied to political expectations. Policy signals from Washington suggest that preferential treatment for U.S. firms may become more explicit, sometimes at the expense of Canadian or European investors. Security arrangements can further complicate this environment when they indirectly constrain economic policy and raise questions about long-term regulatory independence.

At the same time, strategic divergence between the United States and the European Union, alongside Canada’s public reassessment of its global posture, is reshaping global investment behaviour. European scrutiny of major U.S. technology firms reflects a broader effort to reclaim regulatory and political autonomy in an increasingly fragmented international system. For Asia, this fragmentation presents both risks and opportunities.

What this means for Asian policymakers is clear. Foreign direct investment frameworks designed for a stable, rules-based international order are no longer sufficient. Governments must move from a model of passive investment attraction to one of strategic investment management. This requires integrating geopolitical foresight into economic policy, providing long-term clarity and predictability to investors, strengthening regional coordination within ASEAN, and embedding safeguards that protect sovereignty while preserving openness to productive partnerships.

This is not about choosing sides. It is about reducing vulnerability to coercion in a world where coercion has become normalised. The greatest risk facing policymakers today is not misjudgement, but delay. The assumption that the global system will self-correct has already been overtaken by events.Foreign direct investment will continue to flow. But in the current global environment, how it is governed —and the strategic clarity that underpins it —will increasingly determine not only economic outcomes, but national resilience itself.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
Read More
10 FebArticle

Starlink and the Risks of Digital Power Politics in the Middle East

By Muad M Zaki. 

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center 

 

For more than a decade, U.S. strategy has searched for ways to influence political outcomes abroad without repeating the political and human costs of direct military intervention. Wars are expensive, electorally damaging, and increasingly unpopular across Western societies. In this environment, technology has been elevated as a substitute for force, capable of applying pressure, shaping narratives, and sustaining political movements without crossing the threshold of armed conflict.

The confrontation surrounding Starlink and Iran exposes the limits—and dangers—of that assumption. What began as a non-kinetic experiment in influence has not only failed to deliver decisive outcomes but, has also accelerated military escalation while raising fundamental questions about sovereignty, international law, and the reliability of shared communications infrastructure for allies as well as adversaries.

At its core, this is not a story about satellites or bandwidth. It is about whether privately owned technology can be selectively deployed to advance state objectives without undermining the legal order it claims to support.

The Strategic Appeal of Starlink

From a U.S. strategic perspective, Starlink appeared to offer something unprecedented: a transnational communications layer that does not rely on domestic infrastructure and is therefore difficult for states to control. Satellite terminals operate independently of national networks, creating the perception that connectivity could be sustained even when governments attempted to shut information flows down.

Strategically, this offered three advantages. First, circumvention without invasion. Political pressure could be applied without troops or airstrikes, avoiding escalation and the costs of kinetic force. Second, persistence. Because the infrastructure was external, it was assumed to be resilient to state countermeasures. Third, political insulation. As a privately owned commercial service, Starlink could be presented as neutral technology even when its effects aligned closely with U.S. foreign-policy objectives.

In practice, Starlink functioned as a pressure-sustaining infrastructure, capable of maintaining internal connectivity during periods of unrest while preserving external narrative access. This role reflected operational decisions about where, when, and for whom access would be enabled.

Domestic Constraints and Strategic Incentives

These assumptions cannot be separated from political realities in Washington. For President Donald Trump, the costs of direct confrontation with Iran are not abstract. Military escalation in the Middle East carries clear electoral risks, particularly ahead of midterm elections, when public tolerance for new conflicts is limited.

This has produced a visible split within the U.S. policy establishment. On one side are interventionist factions pressing for decisive action against Iran, even at the risk of regional war. On the other are “America First” voices that view foreign conflict as a political liability and urge concentration on domestic priorities. In this context, technology-driven pressure appeared to offer a compromise: influence outcomes without triggering a war that could destabilize domestic politics.

The Miscalculation

What was underestimated was not Iran’s technical capacity alone, but the breadth of its statecraft, particularly its anticipation that non-kinetic pressure would be paired with covert, intelligence-driven efforts to destabilize its internal security environment.

Rather than attempting to destroy satellites or escalate militarily, Iran focused on denying usability within its territory. States do not need to control infrastructure globally; they need only control the legal, physical, and electromagnetic environment in which it operates domestically.

Iran combined electromagnetic interference, criminal enforcement against unlicensed communications equipment, and physical deterrence through confiscation and penalties. These measures raised the personal cost of reliance on the system and sharply reduced its strategic utility. Importantly, they fall squarely within established principles of international law governing spectrum regulation and telecommunications.

The Neutrality Claim and the Gaza Test

The episode also exposes a deeper inconsistency in claims that Starlink operates as a neutral or humanitarian platform.

If satellite connectivity were genuinely deployed to protect civilians, journalists, and medical workers during crises, Gaza would represent the clearest possible case for its use. For more than two full years, Gaza has endured sustained large-scale civilian destruction, the collapse of medical infrastructure, mass displacement, and prolonged information blackouts, conditions widely recognized as genocide under international law by United Nations investigative mechanisms and reflected in proceedings before international courts under the 1948 Genocide Convention.

Yet during this two-year period, Starlink did not provide unrestricted, civilian-focused access to doctors, hospitals, journalists, or humanitarian organizations operating under siege. This absence is not a technical oversight or logistical delay. After two years, it can only be understood as a deliberate political choice.

Selective deployment across crises transforms a technology from a neutral humanitarian tool into a discretionary instrument aligned with geopolitical priorities.

Alignment With U.S. Policy and the Risks Ahead

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Starlink has been used selectively in ways that support U.S. foreign-policy objectives, including in contexts where those objectives conflict with international legal obligations. Under international law, particularly the Genocide Convention, states and relevant actors have a duty to prevent genocide where possible. Withholding a capability that could materially assist civilians during a legally recognized genocide, while deploying that same capability elsewhere to sustain political pressure, carries legal and normative significance.

History suggests that escalation rarely begins with overt military strikes. It is more often preceded by covert action, intelligence operations, and proxy dynamics designed to weaken a target state from within. The Syrian war offers a sobering precedent: networks activated for short-term leverage quickly escaped control, producing regional instability that far outlasted their original objectives.

A similar risk now looms in the context of Iran. Such tactics may appear to offer deniability and leverage, but experience suggests they carry profound risks.

Europe and Global Consequences

The most significant danger revealed by the Starlink–Iran episode is not escalation with Iran alone, but the normalization of digital infrastructure as an instrument of geopolitical coercion. When private technology platforms can be selectively enabled or withheld in line with strategic priorities, they cease to function as neutral commercial services and instead become extensions of state power.

For Europe, the implications are acute. European states are deeply exposed to energy volatility, inflationary shocks, misinformation and political fragmentation driven by external crises. Yet they are also increasingly dependent on U.S.-based private infrastructure that operates under American jurisdiction. The Starlink precedent raises an unavoidable question: if such technologies can be used selectively against adversaries today, what guarantees exist that they will not be leveraged tomorrow in moments of transatlantic disagreement?

This is not a hypothetical concern. The selective deployment of Starlink—active in some politically aligned contexts, absent during two years of legally recognized genocide in Gaza—demonstrates that access is shaped by power, not principle. Once that reality is acknowledged, trust in shared infrastructure inevitably erodes.

The danger ahead is not simply escalation with Iran. It is the normalization of a system in which communications infrastructure becomes another instrument of coercion—quiet, deniable, and increasingly difficult to trust—undermining the sovereignty of independent states and destabilizing the international order.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
Read More
20 JanArticle

Canada–China Engagement in a Shifting Global Order: A Strategic Reset with Broader Implications for Asia—and Beyond

By: Muad Zaki,

Canada’s renewed engagement with China is often described as a tactical response to near-term geopolitical pressures. That interpretation understates what is unfolding.

What is taking shape reflects a deeper recognition: the assumptions that once governed alliance predictability, trade continuity, and economic risk are no longer reliable. Middle powers are adjusting accordingly—not loudly, not ideologically, but decisively.

The recent visit by the Canadian prime minister to Beijing, and the steps toward normalization that followed, signal an understanding that stability can no longer be assumed. In an environment shaped by persistent volatility—much of it originating from policy unpredictability in Washington—strategic resilience is increasingly defined by diversification rather than alignment alone.

Strategic Realism in an Era of U.S.-Driven Volatility

For decades, Canada operated within a U.S.-led economic system assumed to be institutionally stable. That assumption has weakened. The United States government has increasingly relied on unilateral trade actions, transactional diplomacy, and policy reversals driven by domestic political cycles.

These measures have affected allies as readily as adversaries. For export-dependent economies, this volatility translates directly into risk—discouraging investment, complicating planning, and exposing domestic sectors to external political shocks.

Canada’s recalibration should therefore be understood not as a rejection of partnership, but as a rational response to structural uncertainty.

Why Asia, and Why China

Asia remains the principal engine of global growth, and China sits at the center of global production and trade networks. Engagement reflects economic structure rather than political alignment.

Stabilizing relations with China expands Canada’s strategic options, strengthens supply-chain resilience, and reduces exposure to abrupt external shocks. In a deeply interdependent system, optionality has become a core strategic asset.

From Risk Mitigation to Structural Rebalancing

Engagement with China may begin as risk mitigation, but its longer-term implications are potentially far more consequential.

History suggests that shifts in global order rarely begin with declarations. They emerge through accumulated decisions taken by states adjusting to instability. Over time, those adjustments reshape strategic gravity.

If sustained, Canada’s recalibration may come to be viewed as an early indicator of a broader transition—one in which middle powers move away from singular strategic concentration toward more distributed and pragmatic alignment patterns.

Agriculture and Strategic Payoff

For Canadian agriculture, the implications are immediate. China has long been a critical market for Canadian canola, seafood, pulses, and agri-food exports. Disruptions in this relationship previously exposed farmers to sudden market closures and price instability unrelated to fundamentals.

Normalization restores predictability. For producers, that predictability translates into planning certainty, market confidence, and resilience. In commodity markets, certainty is value.

Inflation Risk and Economic Stability

The significance of engagement lies less in past price effects than in future risk avoidance.

Trade instability—particularly when driven by U.S. tariff escalation—has repeatedly introduced inflationary pressure into global markets. By reducing exposure to such shocks, Canada lowers the probability that external political volatility will transmit directly into domestic cost-of-living pressures.

Engagement functions not as stimulus, but as insulation.

Strategic Signaling

Canada’s approach also sends a signal. In a period marked by policy volatility from Washington, calm and deliberate engagement communicates competence and strategic autonomy.

This posture reflects neither naïveté nor confrontation. It reflects a judgment that economic security in the current era requires diversification—even among allies.

A Test Case for Europe

Canada’s recalibration may resonate beyond the Indo-Pacific. For Europe, which faces similar exposure to U.S. trade volatility and strategic uncertainty, the Canada–China trajectory could serve as a reference point.

Historically, the European Union has adjusted incrementally to external shocks—trade disputes, sanctions spillovers, energy dependence—rather than through abrupt realignment. The concept of strategic autonomy emerged from precisely such reassessments.

Canada’s experience may help clarify whether engagement with China can be recalibrated without abandoning alliances or political values. The question is no longer whether diversification is desirable, but whether delaying it remains viable.

A Strategic Imperative for Beijing

For this recalibration to endure, the next move matters. China should treat Canada’s decision not merely as a diplomatic opening, but as a strategic moment requiring speed, visibility, and tangible delivery.

The current Canadian government has taken a political risk by moving toward normalization at a time when neoconservative currents in Washington are likely to respond with pressure and disruption. If early benefits are not felt domestically, momentum can stall.

China therefore has a clear interest in front-loading benefits in ways that ordinary Canadian businesses and citizens can feel quickly.

Accelerated market access for Canadian agri-food exports, fast-tracked approvals for small and medium-sized enterprises, expanded business mobility, and visible near-term purchasing commitments would translate diplomacy into an immediate economic signal. These steps do not require new ideology. They require execution.

Canada has opened the door. The strategic task now is to ensure the corridor is used before it is contested.

Canada’s renewed engagement with China reflects a clear-eyed response to structural change in the international system. It prioritizes economic stability, protects key export sectors, and reduces exposure to external policy volatility—particularly that originating from an increasingly unpredictable United States.

If sustained—and matched by decisive, visible follow-through from Beijing—this approach may come to be understood not merely as prudent diversification, but as one of the earliest long-term adjustments to a shifting global order.

In a world where unpredictability has become structural, adaptability is no longer tactical. It is strategic.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow
WRITTEN BY:
Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
Read More
05 JanArticle

Power Without Restraint: What Asia Must Now Confront

By Muad M Zaki. 

Senior Fellow, Asia Middle East Center 

The assumption that Asian—or even Muslim—countries can continue to depend on an unreliable and unpredictable United States, or a visibly weakened Europe, as pillars of global stability must now be rigorously re-examined.

It is true that many Asians, including Muslims and others, were educated in politics, science, and numerous other disciplines in the West, and there remains genuine gratitude for that intellectual legacy. Yet the West that was once admired has steadily eroded due to its own strategic and ideological failures. The free marketplace of ideas and robust protection of free speech—once the cornerstone of Western political appeal—has largely vanished. Today, students paying premium tuition fees in many Western countries no longer encounter the intellectually open and pluralistic environments that earlier generations experienced. Instead, they face expanding regulatory, ideological, and institutional constraints on independent thought and expression.

For those who continue to argue that Asia somehow “owes” the West, the only obligation that remains is to remind Western policymakers why their systems were once respected—because at present, their governance trajectory is moving decisively in reverse gear.

The recent actions of the US neoconservative establishment in Venezuela—including the extraterritorial seizure of its leader and the hurried fabrication of legal justifications for what are fundamentally unlawful acts—underscore how selectively both international law and domestic US law are now applied. This should serve as a clear warning to every independent government that values the rule of law, or at minimum expects consistency and good faith from Washington.

If even long-standing US allies such as Canada and members of the European Union can no longer rely on American commitments, it is unrealistic for Asian states to assume that trade agreements or security arrangements engineered by the US will remain dependable. The strategic risk is simply too high.

Simultaneously, many Asian countries increasingly look toward China for economic partnership and security balance, albeit with unease stemming from Beijing’s long-standing non-interference doctrine. This presents China with a growing strategic dilemma. First, Beijing has effectively lost Venezuela, one of its most dependable economic partners in Latin America. If this lesson is not internalized swiftly, China risks a similar outcome with its most significant strategic partner in the Middle East: Iran.

Should this occur, it is entirely plausible that the US will escalate pressure on Asian states, coercing alignment regardless of domestic public opinion. Washington’s calculation, however, continues to rely on China maintaining strict adherence to non-interference—thereby allowing the US to incrementally encircle China, following a playbook previously deployed against Russia.

At present, China retains a strategic advantage in Asia. Across the region, there are credible political leaders prepared to accept China as a regional political and security anchor—provided China is willing to assume that role decisively. Yet as long as Beijing’s non-interference posture remains unchanged, Asian governments will continue to view open resistance to US pressure as a political and economic gamble, particularly when Chinese intervention is assumed but not guaranteed.

From Beijing’s perspective, substantial resources have rightly been devoted to people-to-people engagement and shared economic prosperity. However, the pace of this approach has not matched the speed or intensity of contemporary US geopolitical adventurism. While long-term societal engagement is essential, China could benefit from selectively adopting foreign-policy methods historically employed by Britain in Asia—particularly in distinguishing between leaders who view China merely as a financial resource for domestic patronage, and those who genuinely value China as a stabilizing regional partner.

As global geopolitics continue to deteriorate, Asia must adapt with realism rather than nostalgia—until, perhaps, the West eventually recognizes that perpetual confrontation and manufactured instability serve no one’s long-term interests.

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC
Read More
08 DecAsia Middle East Perspectives

Transitional justice between Peace, Memory and Reconciliation: Lessons from the Past for Syria’s Future

BY: Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

The persistent dilemma confronting post-conflict societies concerns the sequencing of transitional imperatives. When should the attainment of peace be prioritised, and when should demands for justice prevail? The Syrian conflict, like other instances scrutinised within the transitional-justice literature, has wrought not only material destruction but also an erosion of social trust and communal cohesion. Consequently, tensions emerge between imperatives of negotiated stability and claims for accountability for grave international crimes[1].

This article interrogates the enduring tension between peace and justice in post-conflict transitions and applies comparative lessons to Syria’s emerging transitional architecture. Building on insights shared by practitioners and scholars during the PILPG[2] 2025 Peace and Negotiation Summer School course, dedicated to the Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, it draws on cases from Sierra Leone, the Balkans, South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda, demonstrating that durable transitional outcomes require a context-specific mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, domestically anchored design and strategic sequencing.

Conceptual framework: instruments and sequencing

Transitional justice is not merely an alternative to ordinary criminal justice; rather, it encompasses a spectrum of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with varying degrees of international involvement (or none), including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking mechanisms, institutional reform (comprising vetting and removal from office) or combinations thereof, depending on the context.[3] The literature identifies several potential trajectories: privileging peace; prioritising justice; pursuing a “peace with justice” or experiencing a growing judicialization of peace processes – that is, the increasing influence of courts and judicial bodies on political negotiations, with ambivalent consequences for accountability and for the prospects of reaching and sustaining peace.

Sierra Leone and the coexistence of restorative and retributive mechanisms

The protracted civil war in Sierra Leone, partly a spillover from the conflict in Liberia and heavily fueled by the struggle to control diamond resources, illustrates the practical and moral challenges of balancing the imperatives of immediate peace with the demands of criminal accountability. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty clause that facilitated a ceasefire but simultaneously left deep wounds and sparked considerable controversy over questions of justice. In practice, the transitional response was dual and parallel: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a restorative and narrative mandate, tasked with collecting testimonies, documenting violations and fostering processes of reconciliation; and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established to prosecute those bearing “the greatest responsibility” for the gravest crimes (a mechanism that avoided blanket impunity without derailing the fragile peace process.

This experience demonstrates that the coexistence of restorative (TRC) and retributive (Special Court) mechanisms can succeed when their mandates are clearly delineated and communicated, when practical coordination is ensured (procedural sequencing, witness protection, allocation of resources) and when meaningful space is created for both symbolic and material redress for victims. Ambassador Yvette Stevens and other observers have emphasized that this multi-dimensional approach, together with the clarity in the distribution of responsibilities between commission and court, was central to preventing the Lomé amnesty from devolving into a perceived culture of impunity in Sierra Leone.[4]

Memory, symbols and institutional confidence in Montenegro and the Balkans

If the Sierra Leonean experience illustrates the delicate balance between peace, truth and accountability in a context marked by resource-driven conflict, the post-Yugoslav Balkans, and particularly Montenegro, highlight a different but equally crucial dimension of transitional justice: the reconstruction of trust in the aftermath of mass atrocity and the role of institutional, symbolic and economic measures in shaping reconciliation and state-building. The post-1995 Balkans demonstrate that collective traumas (Srebrenica above all) rapidly erode social trust, and that if civic culture and historical memory are not actively nurtured, the reconstruction of confidence becomes a project spanning decades.

The Montenegrin case is particularly instructive, as it combined political, symbolic and economic elements: the decision – controversial yet strategic – to introduce the Deutsche Mark at the end of 1999, and subsequently the euro, was not merely an economic maneuver to stabilize prices and safeguard savings, but also a political act of symbolic autonomy vis-à-vis Belgrade. The subsequent Belgrade Agreement and the constitutional framework established in 2002 created a pragmatic arrangement of “one State, two economic systems”, which allowed for the functional separation of economic and political spheres during the transitional period. Igor Lukšić, a key actor in Montenegro’s transition, has emphasized the importance of early confidence-building measures, predictable institutional rules and political symbols capable of ensuring minority inclusion, thereby pre-empting historical revisionism and competing narratives.[5]

The Montenegrin experience suggests that economic and symbolic measures (currency reform, autonomous fiscal policies) can serve as instruments of political stabilization, provided they are coupled with institutional reforms and underpinned by a minimal consensus on clear and predictable rules.

Alternatives and trade-offs from South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda

Whereas the Sierra Leonean and Montenegrin cases shed light on, respectively, the balance between peace and accountability and the role of economic-symbolic measures in rebuilding trust, a broader comparative perspective highlights further variations. Other transitional contexts (South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda) offer additional insights into how different societies have sought to reconcile truth, accountability and reconciliation through distinct institutional and culture mechanisms.

In South Africa, the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission – led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and his colleagues – adopted the mechanism of conditional amnesty in exchange for full public disclosure. The public revelation of truth was conceived as a form of symbolic healing, essential for the moral legitimacy of the new democracy, even as it left unresolved criticisms regarding the lack of material punishment.

In Colombia, the 2016 peace accord introduces the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), which provides alternative sanctions and reparative measures for those who acknowledge responsibility. This pragmatic model of compromise sought to maximize truth-telling, victim participation and the reintegration of former combatants, while in many cases avoiding traditional custodial sentences.

In Rwanda, the Gacaca courts – deeply rooted in local communal practices – enabled the mass processing of genocide-related cases in a relatively short period of time, fostering community involvement and testimonial exchange. Yet they also attracted criticism for shortcomings in procedural safeguards and for the tensions they generated between local justice and international legal standards.

Comparative synthesis: no one-size-fits-all

Taken together, these cases underscore a crucial lesson: there is no “one-size-fits-all” model of transitional justice. Instruments such as conditional amnesty, alternative sanctions and community-based justice must be tailored to the cultural fabric, institutional capacity and expectations of victims in each specific context. As Ambassador Amina Mohamed has stressed, no matter how urgent a political settlement may be, peace will falter unless it is built on a foundation of inclusivity and accountability.[6] Above all, local legitimacy and victim participation emerge as non-negotiable conditions for the durability and credibility of transitional outcomes.

Syria: context and recent institutional developments

Today, Syria stands at a critical juncture between continuity of established practices and the opportunity to innovate a genuinely domestic transitional justice process. In May 2025, transitional authorities established a National Transitional Justice Commission (NCTJ) – mandated to “uncover the truth about the grave violations caused by the former regime, hold those responsible accountable in coordination with the relevant authorities, compensate the victims, and consolidate the principles of non-repetition and national reconciliation” – and a Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) to address over one hundred thousand missing and detained persons. As stated on Amnesty International’s official website, between 2011 and 2024, it is estimated that over 100,000 individuals were subjected to enforced disappearance in Syria.[7] The overwhelming majority were forcibly disappeared by the Assad government within its extensive network of detention facilities, while additional cases have been linked to armed opposition groups.[8] These data clearly underscore the existence of a profound vacuum that must be addressed within a transitional justice process which, as emphasized by relevant international actors, such as Amnesty International and the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), requires transparency, independence and meaningful victim participation.

Syria: sequencing and policy design

Turning these bodies into credible mechanisms demands careful sequencing and a calibrated mix of measures. The ordering of elections, judicial proceedings, refugee returns, and institutional reforms is not neutral: comparative experiences from Sierra Leone and Colombia illustrate that truth-telling, graduated sanctions and non-custodial measures are effective only when paired with credible demobilization and reintegration strategies. At the same time, some grave crimes will demand formal judicial accountability; restorative or administrative measures cannot substitute for prosecution where atrocity crimes are implicated. As the United Nations has emphasized, any transitional-justice process must be nationally owned and sensitive to local conditions, centred on victims’ needs and inclusive of all relevant stakeholders (notably women, youth and minorities).[9] Thus, international actors should support the domestic design and implementation of context-specific, victim-centred processes that address the root causes and structural drivers of violations and thereby contribute to prevention, sustained peace, development and reconciliation.

Syria: memory, participation and legitimacy

Memory and truth are inseparable from institutional capacity: the Balkans and Rwanda demonstrate that public narratives require documentation, witness protection and educational initiatives to prevent revisionism. As Joud Monla-Hassan stresses, transitional justice must be genuinely “Syrian-led”, informed by survivors, civil society and the diaspora[10]; only through meaningful inclusion can the new commissions build legitimacy and public trust. This point is salient given that the transitional authorities’ own legitimacy may be contested: the commissions must therefore demonstrate independence, transparency and representative composition from the outset if they are to earn popular confidence. 

Timing and constitutional framing

Finally, Dr. Paul R. Williams emphasizes the complexity of rebuilding political, legal and social infrastructures after decades of dictatorship and conflict, noting that a return to the pre-war status quo is neither feasible nor desirable. Williams stresses that processes such as refugee returns, elections, establishment of legal mechanisms and institutional stabilization must be carefully coordinated.[11] The transitional period should be time-bound, governed by an interim constitutional framework and guided by a clear public roadmap. Strategic sequencing of these measures is essential, as holding elections prematurely, without an appropriate political and legal foundation, risks creating power vacuums or undermining democratic legitimacy.[12]

Practical recommendations

Building on comparative lessons and the Syrian context, five practical priorities emerge: 1) codify the mandates and legal safeguards for the NCTJ and NCM to guarantee independence and victim-centredness; 2) adopt a publicly negotiated sequencing roadmap that sequences elections, accountability measures and refugee returns by political feasibility and security considerations; 3) design a calibrated mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, including hybrid or internationalized modalities for the gravest crimes; 4) mainstream psychosocial support, reparations and service delivery to tangibly demonstrate benefits to victims; 5) establish independent monitoring and transparency mechanisms (including public reporting and civic oversight) to sustain public trust.

A further step to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of Syria’s emerging transitional justice institutions would be to establish a formal data-sharing framework between the National Transitional Justice Commission (NTJC), the National Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) and the UN-mandated Independent Institution for Missing Persons (IIMP). Such cooperation, grounded in informed victim consent, strict confidentiality and independent oversight, would serve several purposes. First, it would prevent duplication of investigative efforts and inconsistencies across national and international databases. Second, it would accelerate the identification of the disappeared by enabling secure exchange of genetic, testimonial and documentary evidence. Third, it would strengthen transparency and public trust by linking domestic mechanisms with an internationally recognised body. Finally, a harmonised and victim-centred data system would improve families’ access to truth, reparations and psychosocial support, thereby transforming fragmented documentation into meaningful outcomes for survivors.

Conclusion

Syria’s transitional framework stands at a crossroads: it can either generate institutions lacking legitimacy or evolve into a process capable of healing collective wounds and rebuilding social trust. The outcome will hinge on ensuring inclusion, transparency and coherence between memory, accountability and reform. If grounded in meaningful engagement with victims and designed with strategic realism, Syria’s path could offer an innovative model of transitional justice for the wider region.

[1] The core international crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) are: genocide (article 6), crimes against humanity (article7), war crimes (article 8) and crime of aggression (article 8 bis).

[2] The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) is a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance to parties involved in peace negotiations, drafting post-conflict constitutions, and war crimes prosecution/transitional justice.

[3] United Nations (UN), Guidance note of the secretary-general, “Transitional Justice. A Strategic Tool for People, Prevention and Peace”, 2023, p.2. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/03/202307guidancenotetransitionaljusticeen.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[4] Yvette Stevens, “Transitional justice – Lessons Learned from Sierra Leona” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability)

[5] Igor Lukšić “Case Study: Lessons Learned from Montenegro’s Transition” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[6] Amina Mohamed, “Legal Reforms and Constitution Building” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-governance-and-the-rule-of-law)

[7] Amnesty International, Syria: New Government must ensure Truth, Justice and Reparations for the disappeared, 2025. Available at: https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/syria-new-government-must-ensure-truth-justice-and-reparations-for-the-disappeared/#:~:text=He%20said%20the%20NCM’s%20core,by%20the%20rule%20of%20law.

[8] Ibidem.

[9] United Nations, OCHR: Transitional justice and human rights, 2025. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice

[10] Joud Monla-Hassan, “Domestic and Locally Owned Transitional Justice and State-Building Processes in Syria” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability#:~:text=international%20conferences—on%20the%20future%20of,and%20grounded%20in%20local%20realities) See also Nousha Kabawat, “To Syria’s New Justice Commissions: Victims Need You Now,” 31 July 2025, emphasizing that the new commissions must explicitly recognize violations wherever they occur, advocate for victims without discrimination or political pressure, ensure genuine independence, and reflect Syria’s full diversity in composition and decision-making so that all victims are represented and heard (available at: https://www.ictj.org/latest-news/syria’s-new-justice-commissions-victims-need-you-now#:~:text=independence%20by%20ensuring%20that%20no,see%20themselves%20represented%20and%20heard)

[11] Paul R. Williams, “Introduction to Post-Conflict State Building: Challenges and Opportunities”, presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[12] Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, Marie Forestier, Reimagining Syria: A Roadmap for Peace and Prosperity Beyond Assad, in Middle East Institute, 2025. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/reimagining-syria-roadmap-peace-and-prosperity-beyond-assad#:~:text=supported%20by%20a%20clear%2C%20public,framework%2C%20risks%20undermining%20democratic%20progress

Transitional_Justice_-_SyriaDownload

Auther’s Bio

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso holds a bachelor’s in history, Politics and International Relations and is pursuing a master’s in law in Strasbourg with a focus on minority rights. She has over four years of experience in private tutoring. She helps students understand complex historical, political, and legal topics through clear explanations. Based in Catania, she supports learners at different levels.

She can be reached at : roberta.lazzaro15@gmail.com

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08 DecReport

One-day International Conferenceon Palestine: Exploring Asian Perspectives

Executive Summary                                        

The One-day International Conference on Palestine: Exploring Asian Perspectives, held on 4 November 2024 at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was a collaborative initiative organized by the Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), University of Malaya, and the Hashim Sani Centre for Palestine Studies. The conference aimed to provide a platform for experts, academics, policymakers, and activists to engage in discussions on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, with a specific focus on the role and responses of Malaysia and the broader Asian community.


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12 SepReport

AMEC Visitations to UI and UMJ  Highlight Cross-Sector Advocacy for Palestine

Jakarta, 8 September 2025 — The Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC) conducted a series of academic and humanitarian engagements in Jakarta, strengthening partnerships with Universitas Indonesia (UI) and Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta (UMJ). Dr. Ferooze Ali, Senior Fellow at AMEC and lecturer at Sultan Zainal Abidin University, Malaysia, who were visiting Indonesia had these visitations focused on interfaith dialogue, youth activism, and humanitarian aid for Palestine.

The first visit took place at Universitas Indonesia (UI), where Dr. Ferooze met with Mr. Broto Wardoyo, Ph.D., Head of the International Relations Department. Their discussion explored how the Palestinian issue is understood among non-Muslim communities in Indonesia, particularly Christians, and emphasized that the conflict should be framed as a human rights crisis, not merely a religious one.

Mr. Wardoyo shared how organizations like the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI) are often included in Muslim-led Palestine solidarity actions by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), sending a clear message of interfaith unity. They also discussed the limited influence of Evangelical Christian groups in Indonesia. 

The conversation further highlighted the growing role of youth in Palestine advocacy. Student organizations, digital activism, and grassroots movements are increasingly framing the issue within a global justice narrative. Dr. Ferooze noted this as a promising trend for sustaining inclusive, values-based support for Palestinian rights.

Later that day, Dr. Ferooze and AMEC Indonesia’s team visited Dr. Asep Setiawan (AMEC’s Regional Coordinator) and Mr. Hamka, M.Si (Senior Lecturer at UMJ) at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP) at Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta (UMJ) for a closed discussion in preparation for his upcoming book on NGOs and Malaysian Foreign Aid to Palestine. The session was co-organized by AMEC and UMJ’s Political Science Program.

In the discussion, Dr. Ferooze stressed the urgency of increasing and improving humanitarian aid to Gaza, particularly in light of ongoing Israeli aggression. He called on NGOs to enhance their professionalism, coordination, and transparency to ensure that aid is both effective and ethically delivered. He noted that aid has spiritual and moral significance in Islam, and its proper management reinforces public trust and accountability.

Mr. Hamka, M.Si shared findings from his year-long research on Muhammadiyah’s humanitarian efforts in Gaza. He highlighted Muhammadiyah’s role in humanitarian diplomacy, in strengthening Indonesia’s global image as a humanitarian actor, and in supporting peace aligned with national foreign policy.

Recent figures show that Malaysian NGOs, through the Humanitarian Trust Fund for Palestine (AAKRP), have distributed over 99 million Ringgit (approx. IDR 383.4 billion) in aid between 2023 and 2025. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah has contributed IDR 40 billion across two periods. Other Indonesian NGOs—such as Dompet Dhuafa, Aqsha Working Group (AWG), Maemuna Center Indonesia, and MER-C—also remain active in Gaza relief efforts.

These visitations reaffirm AMEC’s commitment to fostering academic dialogue, interfaith understanding, and sustained humanitarian support for the people of Palestine. Through partnerships with Indonesian institutions, AMEC continues to amplify advocacy that is grounded in justice, collaboration, and compassion.

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09 Julتقارير

 التفاعلات بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون الخليجي في ظل نظام عالمي متغيّر: جسـرٌ بين المنطقتين – الفرص والتحديات

 التاريخ: الثلاثاء، 8 يوليو 2025
المكان: قاعة المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإسلامية المتقدمة (IAIS)، كوالالمبور
الجهات المنظّمة: مركز آسيا والشرق الأوسط للبحث والحوار (AMEC) بالشراكة مع المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإسلامية المتقدمة (IAIS) ماليزيا

مقدمة

في ظل تسارع التحولات الجيوسياسية والاقتصادية على مستوى العالم، يبرز كل من رابطة دول جنوب شرق آسيا (آسيان) ومجلس التعاون الخليجي (GCC) كقوتين إقليميتين لهما تأثير متزايد على الساحة الدولية. وانطلاقًا من هذه الأهمية، نظّم مركز آسيا والشرق الأوسط للبحث والحوار (AMEC) بالتعاون مع المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإسلامية المتقدمة (IAIS)، حلقة نقاشية مغلقة تحت عنوان:
“التفاعلات بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون الخليجي في ظل نظام عالمي متغيّر: جسـرٌ بين المنطقتين – الفرص والتحديات”، وذلك بتاريخ 8 يوليو 2025.

جاءت هذه الفعالية متزامنة مع رئاسة ماليزيا لعام 2025 لرابطة آسيان، وشكّلت منصة جمعت دبلوماسيين ومفكرين وصانعي سياسات لاستكشاف سُبل التكامل الاقتصادي، والتقارب الثقافي، والتعاون الاستراتيجي بين المنطقتين.

الكلمات الافتتاحية والرئيسية

الدكتور مسلم عمران (مدير AMEC)
 افتتح الدكتور مسلم عمران الجلسة مؤكّدًا التزام المركز بتعزيز الشراكة بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون. وربط النقاش بمخرجات المؤتمر الدولي الذي نظمه AMEC في جاكرتا عام 2024، مؤكدًا أن الحوار المستمر هو حجر الأساس لتعاون فعّال.
سلط الضوء على أهمية أن تتبنى آسيان ومجلس التعاون مسارًا تشاركيًا قائمًا على الاحترام المتبادل، والحياد الاستراتيجي، والقيم المشتركة، مشيرًا إلى محاور رئيسية، أبرزها:

  • التكامل الاقتصادي: ارتفاع التجارة المتوقعة من 130 مليار دولار (2023) إلى 180 مليار دولار بحلول 2032، مع التركيز على الاقتصاد الرقمي، وصناعة الحلال، وتمويل المناخ.
  • الأمن المشترك: الدعوة إلى التعاون في الأمن البحري والسيبراني، ومواجهة التطرف والأزمات المناخية.
  • بناء الثقة الثقافية: عبر التعليم، وبرامج الشباب، والتعاون الأكاديمي، مدعومًا باتفاقيات وقّعها AMEC مع جامعات في كلا المنطقتين.
  • دور ماليزيا القيادي: كرئيس حالي لآسيان، تمتلك ماليزيا فرصة استراتيجية لقيادة جهود الدمج الدبلوماسي والفكري والاقتصادي بين المنطقتين.

“دعونا نواصل هذه المسيرة بصدق ووضوح وهدف مشترك.”

الأستاذ الدكتور معزلي مالك (رئيس مجلس IAIS ماليزيا)
 في كلمته الترحيبية، شدد على ضرورة تجاوز العلاقات الرمزية إلى شراكات عملية، شاملة، وقابلة للتكيّف. واقترح بناء ما سماه “البنية التحتية الفكرية” القائمة على شبكات الثقة وسرديات السياسات المشتركة كأساس للتعاون المستدام.

تان سري سيد حامد البر (المستشار الفخري لـ AMEC)
 أبرز في كلمته الجذور التاريخية للتقارب بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون من خلال التجارة والقيم المشتركة. ودعا إلى إنشاء آليات مؤسسية مثل القمم، ومجموعات العمل، وبرامج تبادل المجتمع المدني. واقترح التركيز على مجالات التمويل الإسلامي، الطاقة المتجددة، والسيادة الرقمية كمساحات للتكامل.

🔹 النائب توان ليو تشين تونغ (نائب وزير MITI)
 أكد على أهمية تحويل التعاون بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون إلى شراكة واقعية. وأشار إلى القطاعات ذات الأولوية مثل سلاسل الإمداد، والتحول في الطاقة، والحوكمة الرقمية، معتبراً أن رئاسة ماليزيا لآسيان تمثل لحظة مناسبة لدفع جهود اتفاقية تجارة حرة شاملة.

العروض التقديمية من الخبراء

السيدة مريم إسماعيل (ISIS ماليزيا)
 سلّطت الضوء على أهمية الإعلام والتعليم ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في تعزيز الدبلوماسية الثقافية وبناء الثقة المتبادلة.

السيدة نبيلة ناتاشا عثمان (AMEC)
 قدّمت نموذج العلاقات بين قطر وسنغافورة كمثال ناجح يمكن استنساخه لتعزيز التكامل الاقتصادي والدبلوماسي بين آسيان ودول الخليج.

السيدة مسني محمد (MIDA)
 استعرضت حجم الاستثمارات الماليزية الذي تجاوز 378.5 مليار رنجيت، مشيرة إلى اهتمام دول الخليج بالطاقة النظيفة والبنية التحتية الرقمية وصناعة الحلال. وشددت على ضرورة وضع الأسس القانونية والتجارية لاتفاقية تجارة حرة بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون.

المداخلات الختامية

الدكتور أحمد البدري عبد الله (نائب الرئيس التنفيذي لـ IAIS)
 وضع التعاون بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون ضمن ما سماه “النظام الآسيوي الناشئ”، ودعا إلى تطوير أطر سياسات متعددة الأطراف، ومبادرات للطاقة النظيفة، ومنصات رقمية مشتركة. واقترح ما يلي:

  • ممر اقتصادي مشترك بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون
  • شبكات تفكير وتعاون مجتمعي مشترك
  • منصات للابتكار وتسهيل التجارة

الأستاذ معاذ صيام (مدير RTD – AMEC)
 اختتم النقاش باستعراض الركائز الأساسية التي برزت خلال الجلسة، وهي:

  • الانسجام القطاعي: التمويل الأخضر، الاقتصاد الرقمي، تجارة الحلال
  • الدبلوماسية الثقافية والتعليمية: الشباب، الإعلام، الجامعات
  • التنسيق الاستراتيجي: الاستجابة للأزمات، الحوكمة، سلاسل التوريد

وأشاد بالفعالية كمحطة انطلاق نحو شراكة أكثر تنظيمًا واستدامة بين المنطقتين، متماشية مع قيادة ماليزيا الدبلوماسية في 2025.

“لتكن هذه البداية لعلاقات أعمق وأكثر تنظيمًا بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون.”

خلاصات رئيسية

  • العلاقات بين آسيان ومجلس التعاون استراتيجية وليست رمزية، تستند إلى تاريخ مشترك ورؤى عالمية متقاربة.
  • هناك فرص اقتصادية واعدة، خاصة في التجارة، وسوق الحلال، والتقنية المالية، والاقتصاد الرقمي.
  • الثقة بين الشعوب عنصر أساسي لبناء شراكة مرنة ومستدامة.
  • ماليزيا مؤهلة لقيادة الجهود نحو أطر تعاون قائمة على قواعد واضحة وشمولية.

التزام AMEC

يواصل مركز AMEC التزامه ببناء الجسور بين آسيا والشرق الأوسط، من خلال البحث، والحوار، وتيسير الشراكات. وسيبقى فاعلًا في دعم شراكة آسيان–مجلس التعاون بطريقة شاملة واستراتيجية ومستدامة.

 

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09 JulReport

ASEAN-GCC Interactions in a Changing Global Order: Bridging Regions – Opportunities and Challenges

Date: 8 July 2025 (Tuesday)
Venue: IAIS Hall, Kuala Lumpur
Organizers: Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC) & International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia
Format: Round Table Discussion (RTD)
Language: English

Introduction

In an era of accelerating geopolitical and economic transformation, ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stand as critical regional blocs with rising global influence. To address shared challenges and explore new synergies, the Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC) and the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia jointly hosted a Round Table Discussion (RTD) on “ASEAN-GCC Interactions in a Changing Global Order: Bridging Regions – Opportunities and Challenges” on 8 July 2025.

Timed with Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN Chairmanship, the event brought together diplomats, thought leaders, and policy practitioners to explore avenues for economic integration, cultural connectivity, and strategic cooperation.

Opening and Keynote Remarks

Dr. Muslim Imran (Director, AMEC)

Dr. Muslim Imran opened the round table by reaffirming AMEC’s commitment to deepening ASEAN-GCC engagement. Building upon the momentum of AMEC’s 2024 international conference in Jakarta, he positioned the event within a broader trajectory of sustained dialogue.

He emphasized that in today’s multipolar and uncertain global context, ASEAN and the GCC must chart a collaborative course grounded in mutual respect, strategic neutrality, and shared values.
Key themes included:

  • Economic Synergies: Trade is projected to grow from US$130B (2023) to US$180B by 2032, especially in digital infrastructure, halal industries, and climate finance.
  • Security Collaboration: Advocated for maritime and cyber cooperation, as well as shared frameworks to address extremism and climate-related crises.
  • Cultural Trust: Called for deeper people-to-people diplomacy through education, youth programs, and academic cooperation—supported by recent AMEC university MoUs.
  • Malaysia’s Leadership: As ASEAN Chair, Malaysia has the opportunity to bridge regions intellectually, diplomatically, and economically.

“Let us continue this journey together—with sincerity, clarity, and purpose.”

Prof. Dr. Maszlee Malik (Chairman, IAIS Malaysia)

In his welcoming remarks, Dr. Maszlee emphasized that ASEAN-GCC ties must evolve beyond symbolism into functional, inclusive, and adaptive partnerships. He proposed building “intellectual infrastructure”—trust networks and shared policy narratives—as the foundation for durable cooperation.

Tan Sri Syed Hamid Albar (Honorary Advisor, AMEC)

Tan Sri Syed Hamid’s keynote highlighted the historical convergence between ASEAN and GCC through trade and shared values. He urged the development of institutional mechanisms (e.g., summits, working groups, civil society exchanges) and identified key areas for cooperation such as Islamic finance, renewable energy, and digital sovereignty.

YB Tuan Liew Chin Tong (Deputy Minister, MITI)

YB Liew Chin Tong reinforced the need for practical, region-to-region cooperation. He cited ASEAN-GCC trade volumes and prioritized sectors like supply chains, energy transition, and digital governance, affirming that Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship presents a timely opportunity to push toward a formal FTA framework.

Expert Presentations

  • Ms. Maryam Ismail (ISIS Malaysia)
    On cross-cultural connectivity, she spotlighted social media, education, and media as critical avenues for diplomacy and mutual trust.
  • Ms. Nabila Natasha Osman (AMEC)
    Presented Qatar-Singapore relations as a replicable model for ASEAN-GCC economic, innovation, and diplomatic integration.
  • Ms. Masni Muhammad (MIDA)
    Highlighted Malaysia’s RM378.5B investment record, and GCC interest in green energy, digital infrastructure, and halal industries—urging groundwork for an ASEAN-GCC FTA.

Reflections and Closing Remarks

Dr. Ahmad Badri Abdullah (Deputy CEO, IAIS)

Dr. Badri positioned ASEAN-GCC cooperation within a larger “Asian order”, calling for multilateral policy frameworks, clean energy consortiums, and shared digital platforms. He proposed:

  • ASEAN-GCC Economic Corridor
  • Think tank and civil society networks
  • Joint innovation and trade facilitation platforms

Mr. Muath Seyam (Director, RTD – AMEC)

Mr. Muath Seyam closed the session by summarizing the core pillars that emerged:

  1. Sectoral Synergy (green finance, digital, halal trade)
  2. Cultural & Educational Diplomacy (youth, media, academia)
  3. Strategic Coordination (crisis response, governance, supply chains)

He praised the event as a launchpad for structured, enduring engagement, aligning with Malaysia’s diplomatic leadership in 2025.

“Let this be the beginning of deeper and more structured engagements between our regions.”

Key Takeaways

  • ASEAN-GCC relations are strategic, not symbolic, built on shared history and aligned global visions.
    Economic potential is vast—trade, halal markets, fintech, and digital economies are growth sectors.
  • Deep people-to-people trust is essential for resilient cooperation.
  • Malaysia, as ASEAN Chair, is well positioned to lead efforts in rule-based, inclusive frameworks.

AMEC’s Commitment

AMEC remains dedicated to building bridges between Asia and the Middle East. Through research, dialogue, and partnership facilitation, it will continue to promote inclusive and strategic ASEAN-GCC engagement.

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08 Julpress statement

Bridging Regions: ASEAN-GCC Round Table Highlights Strategic Cooperation in a Changing Global Order


 8 July 2025 | Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

The Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), in collaboration with the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia, convened a high-level Round Table Discussion (RTD) on “ASEAN-GCC Interactions in a Changing Global Order: Bridging Regions – Opportunities and Challenges” on Tuesday, 8 July 2025 at the IAIS Hall, Kuala Lumpur.

Amidst rapid global transformation, the event provided a timely platform for strategic dialogue between two influential regional blocs: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As Malaysia assumes the ASEAN Chairmanship for 2025, the discussion underscored the country’s longstanding commitment to regional diplomacy and multilateral cooperation.

The round table gathered leading scholars, policymakers, and diplomatic voices from across ASEAN and the Gulf region. Opening remarks were delivered by Dr. Muslim Imran, Director of AMEC, and Dr. Maszlee Malik, Chairperson of IAIS Malaysia. The keynote address, titled “The ASEAN-GCC Nexus”, was delivered by Tan Sri Dr. Syed Hamid Albar, Honorary Advisor of AMEC. YB Tuan Liew Chin Tong, Deputy Minister of International Trade and Industry, officiated the session with remarks emphasizing the importance of deepening interregional economic ties.

The RTD featured five expert presentations exploring the multifaceted nature of ASEAN-GCC cooperation:

  • Ms. Maryam Ismail (ISIS Malaysia) offered insights into cross-cultural understanding and human connectivity.
    Ms. Nabila Natasha Osman (AMEC Fellow) presented a case study on Singapore-Qatar relations.
  • Mr. Samer Allawi (Al Jazeera International) discussed media, narratives, and regional perception.
    Ms. Masni Muhammad (Malaysian Investment Development Authority, MIDA) addressed investment trends and development opportunities in ASEAN-GCC interactions.

With a shared emphasis on economic cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and strategic coordination, the RTD aimed to:

  • Identify sectoral synergies in trade, energy, digital transformation, and the halal economy;
  • Promote educational, cultural, and religious exchange to foster mutual trust and social cohesion;
  • Explore joint strategies for navigating multipolar geopolitical realities.

Closing remarks were given by Dr. Ahmad Badri bin Abdullah, Deputy CEO of IAIS Malaysia, followed by a summary and acknowledgements by Muath Seyam, Director of the RTD from AMEC.

As global power centers continue to shift, ASEAN and the GCC are well-positioned to lead inclusive and balanced regional partnerships. The discussion affirmed a growing consensus: interregional engagement is no longer optional—it is essential.

Press Release_ ASEAN-GCC RTDDownload
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