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08 Julpress statement

Bridging Regions: ASEAN-GCC Round Table Highlights Strategic Cooperation in a Changing Global Order


 8 July 2025 | Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

The Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), in collaboration with the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia, convened a high-level Round Table Discussion (RTD) on “ASEAN-GCC Interactions in a Changing Global Order: Bridging Regions – Opportunities and Challenges” on Tuesday, 8 July 2025 at the IAIS Hall, Kuala Lumpur.

Amidst rapid global transformation, the event provided a timely platform for strategic dialogue between two influential regional blocs: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As Malaysia assumes the ASEAN Chairmanship for 2025, the discussion underscored the country’s longstanding commitment to regional diplomacy and multilateral cooperation.

The round table gathered leading scholars, policymakers, and diplomatic voices from across ASEAN and the Gulf region. Opening remarks were delivered by Dr. Muslim Imran, Director of AMEC, and Dr. Maszlee Malik, Chairperson of IAIS Malaysia. The keynote address, titled “The ASEAN-GCC Nexus”, was delivered by Tan Sri Dr. Syed Hamid Albar, Honorary Advisor of AMEC. YB Tuan Liew Chin Tong, Deputy Minister of International Trade and Industry, officiated the session with remarks emphasizing the importance of deepening interregional economic ties.

The RTD featured five expert presentations exploring the multifaceted nature of ASEAN-GCC cooperation:

  • Ms. Maryam Ismail (ISIS Malaysia) offered insights into cross-cultural understanding and human connectivity.
    Ms. Nabila Natasha Osman (AMEC Fellow) presented a case study on Singapore-Qatar relations.
  • Mr. Samer Allawi (Al Jazeera International) discussed media, narratives, and regional perception.
    Ms. Masni Muhammad (Malaysian Investment Development Authority, MIDA) addressed investment trends and development opportunities in ASEAN-GCC interactions.

With a shared emphasis on economic cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and strategic coordination, the RTD aimed to:

  • Identify sectoral synergies in trade, energy, digital transformation, and the halal economy;
  • Promote educational, cultural, and religious exchange to foster mutual trust and social cohesion;
  • Explore joint strategies for navigating multipolar geopolitical realities.

Closing remarks were given by Dr. Ahmad Badri bin Abdullah, Deputy CEO of IAIS Malaysia, followed by a summary and acknowledgements by Muath Seyam, Director of the RTD from AMEC.

As global power centers continue to shift, ASEAN and the GCC are well-positioned to lead inclusive and balanced regional partnerships. The discussion affirmed a growing consensus: interregional engagement is no longer optional—it is essential.

Press Release_ ASEAN-GCC RTDDownload
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26 JunArticle

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: IS THE WEST’S CREDIBILITY AT STAKE?

In recent years, the notion of judicial independence – long perceived as a settled pillar of liberal democracy – has come under increasing strain. From political interference in Hungary and Poland to growing concerns in the United States, the very idea that justice can operate free from political pressure is being tested. This article explores how judicial independence underpins not only domestic rule of law, but also international credibility, economic trust, and diplomatic legitimacy. Is the West still fit to champion these values globally? To fully grasp what is at stake today, it is essential to revisit the historical foundations and the pivotal role judicial independence has played in shaping Western democracies.

I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE : PILLAR OF THE RULE OF LAW AND RELEVANT STANDARDS

Judicial independence stands as one of the most powerful embodiments of the foundational ideal of Western liberal democracies: the rule of law. Far from being a mere institutional arrangement, it is a centuries-old pillar rooted in the democratic architecture of the separation of powers – an idea most famously articulated by Montesquieu. Within this framework, the judiciary emerges not just as a branch of government, but as an autonomous authority, shielded from the influence of both the legislature and the executive. Crucially, this independence is not only external: the principle of internal independence ensures that no hierarchical interference distorts the impartial exercise of judicial power from within.(1)

Why is it important to discuss judicial independence today ?  As  Giacomo OBERTO, judge at the Court of Turin, points out, « every legal system recognizes, at least in principle, the independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches ; however, in practice, this independence cannot yet be considered a fully and durably achieved reality everywhere in the world and, upon closer inspection, not even within our own continent ».(2) Indeed, our era seems marked by a theory-practice gap that sometime diverges significantly from what might be described as a true international – or perhaps transnational(3) – legal framework protecting judicial independence.

This specific body of law, expressing the formal commitment of States to uphold and protect individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, is reflected in numerous regional instruments – for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (Article 6), and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges, adopted by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 10 July 1998 – as well as in universal ones, such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted in 1985, along with the Procedures for their Effective Implementation (1989), and the Universal Charter of the Judge. The latter, originally approved in 1999 by the Central Council of the International Association of Judges (IAJ), was most recently updated in 2017 in Santiago de Chile.

The recent failure to uphold the principles of judicial independence and impartiality recognized in these texts (and beyond)(4) in certain contexts has increased awareness of what might be described as a genuine crisis of judicial independence within the rule of law, both in Europe and the United States. Yet, the current landscape reveals a much more fragile reality: in several European countries, judicial autonomy is increasingly under threat, raising serious concerns about the erosion of the rule of law.

II. INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY THREATS : JURISPRUDENCE BETWEEN DEFENSE AND CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL AUTONOMY

The essential nature of the judicial independence has been reaffirmed in several judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, such as in the cases of Yalçinkaya v. Turkey (2023), in which the Court notes « the perceived erosion of the independence of the Turkish judiciary and the concerns over undue interference by the executive »(5), and Baka v. Hungary (2016)(6). Repeatedly, the ECtHR emphasizes « the cardinal importance of maintaining the independence of national courts in order to ensure effective judicial protection » (Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 2020).(7) In the same judgment, the Court affirms that the three elements of independence, impartiality, and a tribunal « established by law » are interrelated through « the institutional requirements of Article 6 § 1, in that they are guided by the aim of upholding the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers » (Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021).(8)

Remaining within the European sphere, Gaetano DE AMICIS(9) reports that the Court of Justice of the European Union has progressively affirmed judicial independence as an essential component of the rule of law, as enshrined in Article 2 TEU(10). In landmark rulings, such as Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C-64/16)(11), it underlined that Member States are required to guarantee such independence as an indispensable condition for the proper functioning of the Union’s legal order.

Beyond the EU borders, on the American continent, the Trump-era United States has not been exempting from violations of the independence principle. Recently, District Judge Jeannette Vargas granted a motion by over a dozen Democratic state attorneys general to order a preliminary

injunction halting the Department of Government Efficiency’s (DOGE)(12) access to the payment

system. Due to intense media pressure immediately exerted following the author’s decision, this case raises concerns regarding judicial independence and the security of judges.

These developments are far from isolated legal issues. They have far-reaching implications for democratic stability, the protection of fundamental rights, and the credibility of Western institutions as a whole.

III. JUDGES UNDER PRESSURE : CURRENT QUESTIONS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

From the entirety of these cases arise three essential questions that Fredrik Sundberg(13) raised during the conference on “The importance of Judicial Independence in Europe in the light of two case studies : Yalçinkaya v. Türkiye and Baka v. Hungary”, held on 17 February 2025 in Strasbourg. In that context, he asked himself : a) can national judges defend themselves against such attacks and pressures ? ; b) can the European Union or the Council of Europe effectively intervene to protect judicial independence ? ; c) is judicial independence truly essential, or can a democracy survive without it ?

As he himself invites us to observe, these three questions bring us back to the necessity of considering judicial independence not from an isolated perspective, but rather from its interaction with other components – such as politics – which remind us why it is important : it is the task of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, to act as a safeguard against abuses of power and to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, even (or especially) when majority governments neglect them.

In this perspective, it is also essential to invoke the principle of subsidiarity(14) on which the very existence of the European Court of Human Rights is founded and which may recall the principle of complementarity(15) that characterizes the functioning of the International Criminal Court. Thus, the dynamic that emerges from the interaction between national bodies and international bodies guarantees an additional justice option for the victims of state dysfunctions. And the essential nature of this observation has been demonstrated precisely by the interventions of the Strasbourg Court and the Luxembourg Court, whose (binding) judgments are designed to regulate the overreach of state actors.

In this same spirit, an open letter was recently published by a group of academics, legal professionals, and members of the national, European, and international criminal justice communities. Presented during the third colloquium in Paris in honor of Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty, under the theme Raisonner la raison d’État: Où en est l’Europe?, this initiative responds to the open letter signed on 22 May 2025 by nine heads of government from EU and Council of Europe member states—an alarming statement that, according to its critics, reveals an intention to challenge the authority of the European Court of Human Rights and, more broadly, to undermine human rights protections. The counter-letter expresses deep concern over these developments and calls on national, European, and international actors to reaffirm their commitment to safeguarding the independence of the judiciary and preserving the authority of the Strasbourg Court.

However, this dynamic does not end with judicial bodies and institutions alone. For example, within the European Union, an important role of monitoring and ensuring respect for the rule of law by Member States is played by the Commission. In the framework of infringement procedures, in fact, the European Commission can initiate legal actions against Member States that violate EU law, including in matters related to the rule of law – for example, judicial independence. The case of Poland is one such example : following the concerns raised in 2017, the Commission initiated a formal procedure for the risk of a serious breach of the rule of law. Only after the adoption of an action plan by the Polish authorities and the observation that this risk had subsided did it withdraw the reasoned proposal, while still maintaining the monitoring mechanism through the Rule of Law

Report.(16) This shows how European institutions can exercise effective political and institutional

pressure in defense of the Union’s fundamental values.

 In light of this crisis, coordinated responses are urgently needed: the European Union, national institutions, and civil society all have a critical role to play in safeguarding judicial independence as a cornerstone of democracy.

IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AD AN INSTRUMENT OF TRUST, DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In a globalized world, the guarantee of a judiciary free from interference is an essential condition not only for the protection of fundamental rights, but also for the stability of international relations. The connection is clear : a well-functioning judicial system inevitably attracts individuals and external partners who will have trust in it. The Court of Justice of the European Union itself tends to emphasize the close link between the principle of mutual trust and respect for the fundamental values of Article 2 TEU, describing it as a key for establishing and maintaining the mutual trust that underlies the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions.

Indeed, it is above all true that an authoritative and impartial judicial system contributes to creating an environment of legal certainty and predictability, an essential requirement to attract foreign investment and stimulate international economic cooperation. This assertion is shared by the European Commission which, in the paragraph Perceptions of judicial independence of the already mentioned Report, observes that « well-functioning and fully independent justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for investments protection, and therefore contribute to growth and competitiveness ».(17)

In accordance with this logic, the 2021 Versi Maplecroft Human Rights Outlook report states that « for companies in ‘high’ risk jurisdictions, this [the growing political interference in the legal systems] could mean a lack of recourse in contract renegotiations, or unfair legal sanctions imposed

by governments to punish perceived slights or to achieve geopolitical aims ».(18) Furthermore,

beyond the economic and financial sphere alone, it « undermines the protection of human rights by enabling states to pursue political opponent, activists and journalists with legal penalties, while removing access to remedy for victims of violations ».(19)

Ultimately, what is at stake goes far beyond national judicial reforms: it is the integrity of the democratic project in the West that is being put to the test.

V. THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE OF TRUST

Thus, judicial independence bolsters a State’s credibility in multilateral settings, constituting an indicator of compliance with the rule of law and human rights. As the Italian Andrea ORLANDO recalls, in Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : independence, efficiency and responsibilities ”, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe point out that the independence of judges « is not a privilege for judges, but a guarantee of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing every person to have confidence in the justice system ».(20)

The question then becomes whether, in today’s world, this trust is being strengthened or weakened. Indeed, the crisis of independence in influential powers such as the United States of America – especially under the Trump administration – and Europe calls into question the stability of judicial system that has traditionally represented a model of democratic guarantee, and affects the international perception of the reliability of U.S. institutions. Judicial instability in key geopolitical contexts generates ripple effects, influencing diplomatic balances and global economic relations.

As judicial independence erodes in the very nations that once exported rule-of-law standards, a critical question emerges: can the West still lead by example? If trust in the judiciary falters domestically, its influence abroad is bound to wane. What is at stake is not only the impartiality of courts, but the moral authority of democratic systems on the global stage. Finally, it could be argued that the Western model of judicial independence is not the only possible one, nor necessarily the best in absolute terms. Could other, more ‘politicized’ or integrated judicial systems function effectively without compromising justice or the protection of rights?

1 Rule of Law Checklist (CDL-AD(2016)007), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (11-12 March 2016) , par. 74 : « […] Independence means that the judiciary is free from external pressure, and is not subject to political influence or manipulation, in particular by the executive branch. This requirement is an integral part of the fundamental democratic principle of the separation of powers. Judges should not be subject to political influence or manipulation ».

2 Translated by the author from : Giacomo OBERTO, Un Nuovo Statuto per un Nuovo Giudice. Available in PDF format since 2017 at the following link: https://www.iaj-uim.org/iuw/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ Oberto_Un_nuovo_statuto_per_un_nuovo_giudice_2017.pdf (p. 6)

3 Ibid., p.8.

4 Ibid., p. 8-10. OBERTO also mentions the following international and regional instruments concerning judicial independence (note : this list dates back to 2017 and may not reflect the most recent developments) : the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) ; the Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on the “Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges”, adopted in 1994 and late updated by Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on “Judges : Independence, Efficiency and Responsibilities” ; the Victoria Falls Proclamation 1994 “For and Independent Judiciary through Judicial Education”, issued by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association ; the Resolution on the Role of the Judiciary in a State governed by the Rule of Law, adopted in Warsaw on 4 April 1995 by the Ministers participating in the Round Table of Ministers of Justice from Central and Eastern European countries ; the European Parliament Resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the European Union in 1998 and 1999 (11350/1999 – C5-02265/1999 – 1999/2001 (INI)), adopted on 16 March 2000 ; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in Nice on 7 December 2000 (Article 47) ; various Opinions of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), including the one on “Standards concerning the independence of the Judiciary and the Irrevocabilità of Judges”, and the “Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles)”, a compilation of such opinions published in 2010 ; the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) ; ECOSOC Resolution 2006/23; the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council of Europe, in particular Opinion No. 494/2008 on the independence of the judiciary ; the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, adopted in 2010 ; various Opinions of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) ; the Status of Magistrates’ in the Commonwealth, adopted in 2013 by the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association.

5 ECtHR, GC, Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye, 2016, §363.

6 ECtHR, GC, Baka c. Hungary, 2016.

7 ECtHR, GC, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland, 1 december 2020, § 139.

8 ECtHR, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 260.

9 Gaetano DE AMICIS, “Stato di diritto, garanzie europee di indipendenza della magistratura e cooperazione giudiziaria penale : quadri di un’esposizione in fieri”, Sistema Penale, 2021. PDF available at the following link: https://www.sistemapenale.it/pdf_contenuti/1639342956_deamicis-2021a-stato-di-diritto-garanzie- indipendenza-magistratura-cooperazione-giudiziaria-unione-europea.pdf

10 Article 2 TEU : « The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail ».

11 CJEU, GC, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 2018.

12 Formally the “ US DOGE Service Temporary Organization ”, it is an organization established at the initiative of the second Trump administration and led by Elon Musk.

13 Former Chief of the department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.

14 This subsidiarity is implicitly expressed in Articles 1 ( « The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention »), 13 ( « Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority […] ») and 35 (1) ( « The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted […] ») of the ECHR. With the entry into force of Protocol No. 15, it is also explicitly reaffirmed in the Preamble ( « […] Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto […] »).

15 Rome Statute, Article 17.

16 2024 Rule of Law Report, p. 7. PDF available at the following link : https://commission.europa.eu/

d o c u m e n t / d o w n l o a d / 2 7 d b 4 1 4 3 – 5 8 b 4 – 4 b 6 1 – a 0 2 1 – a 2 1 5 9 4 0 e 1 9 d 0 _ e n ?  filename=1_1_58120_communication_rol_en.pdf

18 S. NAZALYA, O. MARIN, S. HAYNES, W. NICHOLS, J. LOCKHART-SMITH, E. GAVIN, F. WOLF, C.

MAY, Human Rights Outlook, Verisk Maplecroft, 2021. PDF available at the following link : https:// h u m a n t r a f f i c k i n g s e a r c h . o r g / w p – c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 2 1 / 1 0 / Verisk_Maplecroft_Human_Rights_Outlook_2021.pdf

19 Ibid.

20 Andrea ORLANDO, “Judges in Poland and in the Republic of Moldova must remain independent”, (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights), doc. 15204, 2021. Available at the following link : https:// pace.coe.int/en/files/28907/html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

WRITTEN BY:

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

 

  • Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
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30 MayArticle

Understanding the Syrian Conflict: Internal Resilience and External Influences

The Syrian crisis, lasted from 2011 to 2024, shows how complicated the interactions between internal social processes and external geopolitical factors are in the Middle East. A critical, research-based analysis shows that both internal factors like regime consolidation, sectarian divisions, and the legacy of colonial state-building played a big role in the conflict’s path, as did external actors in shaping its course and outcomes.
Using theoretical frameworks like Neoclassical Realism (NCR) helps us comprehend how domestic political systems deal with and respond to systemic foreign forces in a more complex way. In Syria’s case, continued assistance from regional and global allies, especially Iran and Russia, gave the regime military, economic, and diplomatic support that helped it stay in power and strengthen its position. Iran’s intervention in Syria went beyond ideological affinity and was strategically embedded in a wider goal of maintaining and expanding its “axis of resistance” across the Levant. This was evident in Iran’s coordination of Shi’a militias, including fighters from Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, and Afghan Fatemiyoun units, mobilized under the command of the IRGC to secure key areas such as the Damascus–Aleppo corridor and the Sayyida Zaynab shrine. Tehran’s strategy included establishing permanent military infrastructure in Syria, such as the Imam Ali base near the Iraqi border in 2019, reflecting broader security and logistical interests. These efforts aligned with NCR’s emphasis on how systemic ambitions are translated into concrete actions through domestic capabilities and regional alliances. This outside help helped keep the country together, especially because the dictatorship controlled cities and networks of loyalists.
On the other hand, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and others tried to weaken Assad’s grip on power. But these interventions often had different goals, which made the region more divided and the conflict last longer. Some of these initiatives didn’t take into account how strong existing connections and internal processes were for keeping the regime in power, which made Assad’s position stronger.
Turkey’s involvement was shaped not only by its domestic security concerns about Kurdish autonomy but also by its broader aim to influence the post-conflict order. In addition to “Operation Euphrates Shield” in 2016, Ankara launched “Operation Olive Branch” in 2018 and “Operation Peace Spring” in 2019, targeting Kurdish-held areas in Afrin and northeast Syria, respectively. These operations were not solely counterterrorism efforts but served Ankara’s goal to establish a buffer zone and demographic reconfiguration in areas like Afrin, where local displacement and repopulation strategies followed5. Furthermore, Turkey’s establishment of observation posts under the Astana agreement and its military presence in Idlib province showed an attempt to carve out a strategic sphere of influence, consistent with NCR’s notion of power projection filtered through domestic concerns and regional rivalries.
Furthermore, the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Syria illustrates how their divergent strategies were tied to systemic competition with Iran and regional leadership ambitions. Qatar’s early support for Islamist factions, such as those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, led to its backing of groups like Liwa al-Tawhid and Ahrar al-Sham, which operated predominantly in northern Syria from 2012 to 2014. In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s support coalesced around more secular or Salafist-leaning factions, culminating in the creation of the Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam) in the Damascus suburbs in 2013. Despite their financial and logistical investments, both states struggled to maintain cohesive opposition fronts. Their rivalry was evident during the Geneva II peace talks in 2014, where opposition delegations backed by each state clashed on strategic priorities and political concessions. This fragmentation diluted the effectiveness of external support and highlights the way domestic ambitions and rival threat perceptions—central to NCR—shaped their Syrian policies.
The Syrian regime’s survival did not depend only on help from other countries. The administration used careful plans to keep control of the land, keep the loyalty of the elite, and break up the resistance. But Syria also had significant internal problems, such the fracturing of the opposition, changing demography, and the displacement of millions of people. These things changed the social fabric and made it hard to rule and make peace in the long run.
A post-colonial view also helps us understand how the rest of the world has dealt with the Syrian situation. External powers’ narratives and actions typically ignored the political dynamics of the indigenous people and instead focused on their own strategic objectives. This shows how colonial borders and state institutions still affect the problems and weaknesses in modern Syria.
These case studies make clear that while external actors sometimes aligned with local needs—such as defeating ISIS or providing humanitarian aid—their primary motivations were geostrategic. Whether it was Russia seeking influence and military presence, Iran attempting to sustain a regional alliance network, or Turkey aiming to suppress Kurdish autonomy, their interventions reflect the NCR model of systemic pressures filtered through national interests and domestic agendas. In this sense, external involvement was not an altruistic effort to stabilise Syria, but a continuation of regional and global competition by other means, shaping not only the survival and defeat of Assad but the wider trajectory of Syrian statehood.

WRITTEN BY:

Beatrice Liverzani

 

  • Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.
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06 MayAnalysis

GCC and ASEAN: Common Ground in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

It was a privilege to speak for the first time in Jakarta, at the University of Indonesia, and to engage with such a vibrant and forward-thinking academic community. I would like to express my gratitude to the organizers for hosting this important dialogue on the evolving dynamics between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and ASEAN.

Before diving into the heart of my presentation, it is essential to acknowledge the ongoing tragedy in Gaza and the wider region. The Israeli occupation and its military aggression not only cause immense human suffering but also destabilize the broader Middle East. This reality cannot be ignored when we speak of regional cooperation and global partnerships.

Key Focus: Opportunities and Challenges in GCC-ASEAN Relations

Contrary to initial references to “superpowers,” my talk focused on shared interests and common ground between the GCC and ASEAN in the context of shifting geopolitical currents. Two guiding questions structured the presentation:

  1. What are the opportunities for deepening relations between the GCC and ASEAN?
  2. What are the challenges, and how can they be addressed collectively?

A Brief History of Engagement

While the spotlight often falls on GCC-China relations, the GCC-ASEAN relationship has a much earlier origin, dating back to 1990. However, this partnership remains under-documented and underexplored.

Key historical milestones include:

  • 2009 Manama Meeting (Bahrain): Outlined cooperation in three areas—Free Trade, Economic Development, and Cultural/Educational Exchange.
  • 2010–2011: A series of meetings on education (Bangkok), food security (Doha), tourism (Laos), and economic affairs (Salalah) showcased shared ambitions.

Despite these efforts, implementation has remained limited—largely because GCC engagement with ASEAN has been more bilateral than multilateral. Each GCC member state tends to forge its own ties with ASEAN countries, limiting the potential for a bloc-to-bloc partnership.

Case Study: Qatar’s Bilateral Momentum

The 2017 GCC blockade against Qatar became a catalyst for Qatar to diversify its alliances.
Key outcomes included:

  • Over 90% of Qatar’s exports now head to Asian markets.
    Strategic investments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines (e.g., Nebras Power, QNB, and Ooredoo).
  • Shift of World Cup-related real estate investment focus from traditional GCC sources to Asia and Turkey.

Missed Strategic Alignment—But Not Lost Opportunity

There is no doubt the relationship is growing, especially in trade and economics.
Examples include:

  • Gulf exports to ASEAN: Crude oil, plastics, aluminum.
  • ASEAN exports to GCC: Food, electronics, vehicles.

However, what’s missing is a clear strategic alignment between the two blocs. Turning bilateral progress into collective initiatives is crucial.

Seizing New Opportunities: Diversification and Green Energy

The GCC is undergoing a significant economic transformation, moving beyond oil dependence (Vision 2023/2025). This opens space for meaningful ASEAN collaboration, especially in:

  1. Economic Diversification Initiatives
     ASEAN can partner with GCC states on non-oil sectors like tourism, logistics, fintech, and education.
  2. Energy Transition & Climate Collaboration
     Both regions are prioritizing climate change and sustainability. Opportunities include:
    • Carbon markets
    • Low-carbon technologies
    • Green hydrogen partnerships
  3. Financial Cooperation
     With the GCC’s GDP over $2 trillion and ASEAN surpassing $3.6 trillion, the case for a GCC-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement is stronger than ever.

Looking Ahead

As U.S. economic interest in the region wanes, East and Southeast Asia are becoming the primary markets for Gulf hydrocarbons. This underscores the need for GCC states to pivot East strategically—not just economically.

It’s time we move from episodic meetings to sustainable frameworks, from bilateral deals to multilateral, institutionalized cooperation between the GCC and ASEAN.

Together, we can shape a more resilient, diversified, and interconnected future.

 

WRITTEN BY:

By Dr. Maryam Mohammed Al-Kuwari

Director, Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University

Presented at the International Conference on “Assessing Opportunities and Challenges in ASEAN-GCC Interaction”
17 December 2024, University of Indonesia, Jakarta

 

  • Disclaimer: this article is constructed based on presentation by the speaker during the conference last year.
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26 MarArticle

From Plan to Action: Localising Circular Economy from the Youth Perspective

Presented at the International Conference on ASEAN-GCC Relations, Jakarta, Indonesia | 17 December 2024

Introduction

The transition to a circular economy (CE) is crucial for addressing environmental challenges and ensuring sustainable economic growth. The traditional linear economic model of “take, make, dispose” has led to significant resource depletion and waste generation. This article explores the need for transitioning to a circular economy, the existing ASEAN framework, policy initiatives in Malaysia, and the role of youth in driving this transformation.

The Urgency of Circular Economy Transition

Malaysia produces approximately 39,000 tonnes of waste daily, with municipal solid waste largely composed of food waste (44%), plastic (13%), and paper (12%). Despite efforts to improve recycling rates, which reached 35.38% in 2023 against a target of 40% by 2025, challenges persist. The “Business as Usual” approach exacerbates the Triple Planetary Crises of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss, highlighting the urgent need for a shift to a CE model.

ASEAN’s Circular Economy Framework

The ASEAN Circular Economy Framework identifies several gaps that need to be addressed:

  • Policy Alignment: Greater integration of CE principles within national and regional policies in trade, technology, and finance sectors is necessary.
  • Standardised Metrics: The lack of monitoring mechanisms hinders progress assessment.
  • Public-Private Partnerships: Increased investment in circular innovations is essential for bridging the gap between theory and practical implementation.
  • Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR): Holding manufacturers accountable for the entire product lifecycle, including waste management, is critical.

Circular Economy Policies in Malaysia

Malaysia has implemented several policies aimed at fostering a circular economy:

  1. National Industrial Policy (MITI): Incorporates CE as a driver for net-zero commitments.
  2. Energy Transition Roadmap (NRES): Focuses on bioenergy and waste-to-energy solutions.
  3. Plastic Circular Economy Framework (KPKT): Promotes plastic circularity across the value chain.
  4. Solid Waste Management Strategic Framework: Aims to transform waste management into a CE model.
  5. Manufacturing CE Framework (MITI): Supports Net Zero 2050 goals and aligns with NIMP2030.

Regional Initiatives

  • Indonesia CE Roadmap (2025-2045): Focuses on resource efficiency, sustainable production, and implementing the 9R principles (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, Repair, Refurbish, Remanufacture, Repurpose, Recover, and Redesign).
  • Thailand CE Ecosystem Framework: Promotes a shift from consumption to resource management.
  • Ipoh City Council’s Doughnut Economy Model: Balances economic modernization with cultural heritage preservation, addressing urban poverty and food security.

Role of Youth in Circular Economy

Youth play a pivotal role in advocating for and implementing CE practices:

  • Equitable Platforms: Ensuring youth voices are included in decision-making processes.
  • Social and Environmental Advocacy: Raising awareness and mobilizing action.
  • Intergenerational Knowledge Exchange: Learning from older generations to implement effective CE strategies.

Challenges and Solutions

  • Fragmented CE Implementation: Need for harmonized standards and a regional framework.
  • Limited MSME Support: Nearly 48% of MSMEs lack policy and financial backing.
  • Structural Inequalities: Need to balance modern CE solutions with traditional practices.

Key solutions include:

  1. Expanding Regional Integration: Strengthening the ASEAN Circular Economy Business Alliance (ACEBA).
  2. Developing Innovative Financing: Implementing venture debt, blended finance, and carbon credit monetization.
  3. Enhancing Stakeholder Collaboration: Promoting partnerships between academia, businesses, and policymakers.
  4. Bridging Traditional and Modern Practices: Strengthening university-community collaboration.

KWAP’s Commitment to Sustainability

As a major institutional investor, KWAP integrates sustainability principles into its operations:

  • DEI Policies: Ensuring diversity, equity, and inclusion.
  • Human Capital Development: Investing in leadership and employee engagement.
  • Community Empowerment: Supporting NGOs and government initiatives.
  • Net Zero Goals: Committing to a net zero portfolio by 2050.
  • Circular Economy Young Leaders for Change (CYCLE): Empowering young leaders to drive sustainability initiatives.

Conclusion

A successful transition to a circular economy in ASEAN and the GCC requires comprehensive policies, active youth participation, and collaboration across sectors. With the right strategies in place, the region can move towards a more sustainable and resilient future.

Disclaimer: This article is based on a presentation by Mohammad Zulhafiy Zol Bahari from Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) [KWAP] during the International Conference on ASEAN-GCC Relations in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 17 December 2024.

WRITTEN BY:

Mohammad Zulhafiy Zol Bahari, 
Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) [KWAP]
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24 MarArticle

The US Operation Against Houthis: Implications, Limitations and Strategic Objectives

On Saturday, March 15th, the United States (US) Navy and Air Force initiated a joint military operation targeting the Houthi group in Sanaa, Yemen. The assault, which focused on the group’s stronghold in the Jeraf district of Sanaa, resulted in the deaths of nine senior Houthi members, whose identities remain undisclosed, as well as several civilian casualties. This operation is believed to be part of a broader campaign aimed at undermining the Houthis’ human and military capital. The strikes carry both domestic and regional implications, directly impacting the Houthis in Yemen while also serving as a strategic message to Iran, the group’s primary regional ally.

Strategic Objectives: Coercion or Decisive Action?

The US strikes against the Houthis can be interpreted as serving one of two potential strategic objectives. The first is coercion, aimed at restoring a deterrence equation by compelling the Houthis to cease their operations against Red Sea shipping. The second is a more decisive effort to dismantle the group’s offensive capabilities entirely.
In the context of coercion, the US strikes send a strong message to the Houthis, drawing parallels to previous experiences with Hezbollah and the Assad regime, where Iranian-backed groups faced significant setbacks, in conjunction with Iran’s relative passivity, which may drive the Houthis to de-escalate.
However, the Houthis’ recent attacks in the Red Sea, which they claim are a response to the Israeli military operations in Gaza, have become a central element of their strategic positioning, especially against their Yemeni counterparts. This complicates the likelihood of their immediate submission to US pressure.
Given these dynamics, it is unlikely that the Houthis will hastily capitulate. Instead, they are expected to leverage domestic and international sentiments, amplified by potential civilian casualties, as an instrument to resist US actions, utilizing the operations as evidence of their credibility and pushing for a US de-escalation. In such scenario, the intensity and accuracy of US operations, avoiding civilian casualties, is crucial for achieving deterrence.

On the other hand, achieving a decisive outcome against the Houthis presents significant challenges for the United States. The group’s operational flexibility and ability to utilize existing infrastructure limit the effectiveness of air and sea-based operations. While such strikes may degrade some of the Houthis’ assets, they are unlikely to deliver a decisive blow without complementary ground operations. This would require the involvement of a reliable Yemeni proxy, though such a partnership is fraught with several challenges and limitations.
Furthermore, a qualitative targeted approach aimed at decapitating the Houthi leadership, similar to Hezbollah, would necessitate in-depth intelligence, which the US Central Command (CENTCOM) may lack due to its limited focus on the Houthis over the past decade. Without precise intelligence, efforts to dismantle the group’s leadership structure are likely to face significant obstacles.

Prospects:
In light of these challenges, the US is more likely to focus on restoring deterrence rather than pursuing a comprehensive dismantling of the Houthi movement. This would involve limiting the group’s offensive capabilities, particularly along the Yemeni western coast, while pushing the insurgents toward the central and northern regions of the country, probably with limited assistance from a Yemeni military partner. Additionally, the US is expected to strengthen its military presence in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic chokepoint where the US geopolitical interest extends even beyond curbing the Houthis

 

Khaldoon Ahmed Hasson Abdulla

Senior fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Khaldoon A.H. Abdulla
Senior Research Fellow at Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

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10 MarArticle

Trade War: The Political Strategy Behind this Madness

The US trade war with the world—particularly China, Europe, Mexico, and Canada—has evolved into a weaponized economic policy under Trump, creating market instability and strategic uncertainty on a global scale. His cycle of tariff imposition, temporary halts, and renewed threats keeps both domestic and international markets in a state of flux, forcing businesses and governments to hedge against unpredictable US trade policies.

Trump’s “tariff diplomacy” follows a pattern:

  • Announces or implements tariffs (e.g., on steel, aluminum, or tech products).
  • Pauses or temporarily removes them (often as leverage in negotiations).
  • Threatens new or higher tariffs if the opposing party does not comply with US demands.
  • Repeats the cycle, ensuring continuous uncertainty.

This approach creates an unstable business environment where both American and international companies struggle to plan for the future, impacting global supply chains, investment strategies, and economic growth.

China: The US-China trade war has seen increased tariffs on Chinese exports (up to 25% on certain goods), forcing China to retaliate with countermeasures (higher tariffs on US agricultural products, tech restrictions). This disrupts global supply chains and accelerates China’s rise towards self-sufficiency in key industries.

Europe: The EU is caught in a balancing act—it needs the US for security but resents Trump’s trade aggression. His threats to impose tariffs on European car exports keep European policymakers on edge, pushing the EU towards a more independent trade and defense policy. In the short outlook the EU has practically no chance to win a trade war against the US.

Mexico & Canada: The USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), which replaced NAFTA, was supposed to stabilize North American trade. However, Trump’s sporadic reimposition of tariffs (e.g., on steel/aluminum) undermines the agreement and raises costs for industries that rely on cross-border supply chains. In addition, this confirms further insecurity for future trade agreements made with the United States.

The constant tariff uncertainty has several destabilizing effects:

Reduced Foreign Investment: Investors hesitate to commit capital in industries affected by US tariffs, leading to slower economic growth. International investors are reluctant to accept being strong armed by the US, when other economies are open to mutually beneficial environments.

Volatile Markets: Stock markets react negatively to trade war escalations, triggering sell-offs and currency fluctuations. Not even Trump’s closest associates seem to be able to predict what will happen the days ahead, creating an overall negative economic outlook.

Supply Chain Disruptions: Companies must constantly shift suppliers to avoid tariffs, increasing production costs.

Encouraging De-dollarization: Countries like China and Russia push for trade in local currencies, reducing US dollar dominance. Other nations are doing the same secretly while keeping good relations with the US, showing the lack of confidence of the US as a positive partner to world trade.

So what’s the political strategy behind this madness?

Trump’s tariff threats signal strength to his voter base—framing himself as the leader who “protects American jobs.” This has definitely kept his domestic popularity rating at an all-time high compared with former President Biden.

The “pause-resume” tactic keeps foreign leaders off-balance, preventing them from crafting a consistent counter-strategy. He is weaponizing uncertainty as a negotiation tool, creating a world economy that is reactive rather than proactive.

While Trump’s tactics yield short-term wins and maybe even the possibility of re-election at home, they risk permanently damaging the US’s economic credibility. Global players are actively seeking alternatives to US trade dominance, leading to fragmented trade blocs and a less predictable global economy.

In essence, Trump’s tariff game isn’t just about trade—it’s about power projection, using economic pressure to maintain US leverage in an increasingly multipolar world. But the instability it causes might just push the world to permanently reduce its dependence on the US.

 

 

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

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25 JanArticle

Powering Partnerships: Qatar’s Trade Dynamics with ASEAN

By: Nabila Osman

This article examines Qatar’s trade with ASEAN countries through the lens of 2022 trade data, highlighting a strong economic relationship shaped by energy exports and trade imbalances. This asymmetry underscores potential areas for diversification and deeper bilateral relationships, while also exploring the key dynamics, regional trends, and implications for both Qatar and ASEAN.

1- Qatar’s Trade Surplus and Export Dominance:


Qatar enjoys a substantial trade surplus with all ASEAN countries, primarily driven by exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), crude oil, and petrochemicals. In recent years, Qatar’s trade relations with ASEAN members have grown significantly, with the bloc collectively accounting for around 50% of Qatar’s trade market in 2017. The export of Qatari gas to the region has also contributed to Qatar’s economic resilience during the 2017 blockade by ensuring stable revenue streams and maintaining vital trade connections.

These energy exports cater to the industrial needs of economies like Thailand ($3.92 billion), Singapore ($3.83 billion), and Indonesia ($856 million). Smaller nations such as Laos ($633 million), Brunei ($546 million), and Myanmar ($670.35 million) also demonstratesignificant reliance on Qatari energy, though reciprocal trade remains minimal. This reliance underscores both the dependence of these countries on Qatari resources and the untapped potential for diversifying trade relationships.

Although ASEAN countries possess strong manufacturing and agro-industrial capabilities, their market penetration in Qatar remains limited. This may be due to mismatched demand or restricted trade agreements that hinder further market expansion for both regions. Malaysia has suggested establishing a free trade agreement (FTA) between ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the first ASEAN-GCC Summit held in October 2023, but this proposal remains in the preliminary stages. Similarly, though the first round of FTA negotiations between the GCC and Indonesia commenced in September 2024, its realization could potentially take a few years. Notably, Singapore is excluded from this challenge, as it already has an FTA with the GCC, including Qatar, since 2013.

2- Regional Economic Relationships:


Singapore stands out as a pivotal trade hub in Qatar-ASEAN relations. Facilitating $3.83 billion in Qatari exports and $658 million in imports to Qatar, Singapore leverages its strategic location, robust financial infrastructure, and neutral foreign policy to act as a bridge between the Gulf and Southeast Asia. This role reflects Qatar’s broader strategy of diversifying its economic and political ties beyond the GCC.
Other ASEAN nations also contribute significantly to Qatar’s imports. For instance, Thailand ($379 million), Malaysia ($354 million), and Indonesia ($315 million) supply a mix of high value goods that reflect their manufacturing and agro-industrial strengths. Thailand exports machinery and transport equipment to Qatar, while Indonesia supplies mineral fuels and oils.
Emerging economies like Vietnam ($175 million in exports to Qatar) and the Philippines ($83.4 million in exports to Qatar) present opportunities for growth as they continue to industrialize and diversify. These nations are poised to enhance their economic engagements with Qatar as they expand their manufacturing and export capacities.
Meanwhile, less developed nations such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar maintain minimal trade flows with Qatar. These limited engagements highlight untapped potential for deeper economic integration between Qatar and ASEAN’s smaller economies.

3- Implications for Qatar and ASEAN:


The trade dynamics between Qatar and ASEAN highlight both opportunities and challenges for the two regions, underscoring the need for strategic adjustments to enhance mutual benefits. For Qatar, its reliance on hydrocarbon exports poses significant risks as the global energy transition gains momentum. While ASEAN has emerged as a key market for Qatar, the country’s limited diversification beyond energy products leaves its economy vulnerable to future shifts in global energy demand. Expanding its export portfolio to include value-added products could reduce this risk and create a more sustainable trade framework. Additionally, ASEAN’s advanced manufacturing capabilities offer Qatar an opportunity to diversify its imports. Enhancing these import ties could bolster Qatar’s supply chain resilience and reduce dependency on traditional trading partners.
ASEAN’s energy security is a multifaceted issue, with member countries sourcing LNG from various global suppliers. While nations like Thailand have diversified their LNG imports, including recent agreements with Oman LNG, others such as Vietnam are expanding their LNG infrastructure to reduce coal dependence. Smaller economies like Laos have minimal or no LNG import activity, reflecting their limited demand or alternative energy strategies, while Brunei is a notable LNG exporter with no need for imports. To enhance energy security, ASEAN countries are focusing on diversifying energy sources and suppliers, thereby mitigating risks associated with over-reliance on a single source and reducing exposure to potential supply disruptions.
ASEAN countries also have untapped potential to expand their export footprint in Qatar, targeting sectors like halal food, which caters to the dietary preferences of Qatar’s Muslim-majority population; textiles, leveraging ASEAN’s established manufacturing base, especially in countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Myanmar, which are known for their competitive garment and textile industries; and electronics, reflecting the region’s growing expertise in high-tech industries. While trade between Qatar and ASEAN demonstrates strong growth potential, the significant imbalance in export-import dynamics reveals a need for proactive strategies on both sides. Qatar has already made notable investments in ASEAN’s infrastructure, renewable energy, and technology sectors, reflecting its commitment to fostering strong economic ties. Building on these existing efforts and further diversifying into emerging industries within ASEAN could ensure reciprocal benefits and solidify long-term partnerships. For ASEAN, fostering stronger trade agreements and targeting high-value export opportunities in Qatar would enhance regional integration and economic security.

4- Additional Observation:


An interesting dynamic is that Qatar’s top two trade partners in ASEAN, Thailand and Singapore, are non-Muslim majority countries. This indicates that Qatar’s trade in the region is driven by economic pragmatism rather than cultural or religious alignment. Singapore’s strategic role as a financial and logistics hub and Thailand’s industrial capacity underscore their significance as trade partners. This fact reflects Qatar’s ability to prioritize mutual economic benefits over cultural considerations, enhancing its reach and influence in diverse markets.

5- Conclusion:


Qatar’s trade dynamics with ASEAN go beyond economics, reflecting a strategic blend of energy diplomacy and Qatar’s use of energy exports to expand its geopolitical reach. Singapore’s role as a major trade hub underscores its significance as a key economic partner for Qatar. Smaller trade partnerships with countries like Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia reflect Qatar’s efforts to diversify its diplomatic relationships and reduce over-reliance on Gulf neighbors. Moving forward, strengthening trade agreements and diversifying exports and imports could solidify Qatar’s economic influence while creating sustainable benefits for both regions.

By: Nabila Osman

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

Sources:

Atlantic Council. (2017, July 7). ASEAN and the Qatar crisis. Atlantic Council.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/asean-and-the-qatar-crisis/

Gulf Cooperation Council. (2024, September 13). The first round of free trade agreement
negotiations between the GCC and the Republic of Indonesia. Gulf Cooperation Council.
https://gaft.gov.sa/en/media-center/news/Pages/The-First-Round-of-Free-Trade-Agreeme
nt-Negotiations-Between-the-GCC-and-the-Republic-of-Indonesia.aspx

Gulf Times. (2018, November 15). Asia a key trading partner for Qatar: FM. Gulf Times.
https://www.gulf-times.com/story/568009/Asia-a-key-trading-partner-for-Qatar-FM

Reuters. (2024, August 23). Vietnam’s second LNG terminal seeks cargo to begin commissioning
tests. Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnams-second-lng-terminal-seeks-cargo-be
gin-commissioning-tests-2024-08-23/

Reuters. (2023, October 20). Malaysia PM proposes free trade pact between ASEAN, Gulf
Council. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-pm-proposes-free-trade-pact-betwe
en-asean-gulf-council-2023-10-20/

Reuters. (2024, September 16). Thailand’s PTT signs 5-year LNG deal with Oman LNG.
Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/thailands-ptt-signs-5-year-lng-deal-with-oman-ln
g-2024-09-16/

The Observatory of Economic Complexity. (n.d.). Bilateral trade profiles with Qatar. Retrieved
January 8, 2025, from

https://oec.world

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10 JanArticle

Foreign Policy Analysis – Trump: A Game of Russian Roulette with the World

Will Trump Drown America with the World or Make It Great Again? 

This is an enduring question about Trump’s presidency, debated long before he even won the election. Most people already understood that Trump was on the brink of a historic victory against the relentless push from corporate globalist forces. Yet, the tight-knit circles controlling the Biden administration obstinately refused to heed external counsel or consider alternative perspectives. 

Over a week ahead of Trump’s inauguration, he and his team began dropping hints about the planned dismantling of the existing global governance structures that sought to keep him from power. The blunt and unapologetic threats directed at sovereign nations are the sort of rhetoric one might expect from countries like India and Pakistan, where political decorum often takes a backseat to raw, unfiltered power struggles. 

The overt hostility displayed towards Canada and other traditionally friendly nations has shaken the bedrock of Western political stability—a foundation that once distinguished the West from more chaotic political arenas. It echoes the crumbling illusion of Israel’s once-invincible military dominance, which, when truly tested, has repeatedly faltered. It seems increasingly clear that 2025 will be one of the most turbulent years in recent memory for Western nations. 

Timing and Narrative Control: The Musk Factor 

It is important to ask why Trump and his team are making these pronouncements at these specific moments. Elon Musk’s recent attacks on the British government were not random—they were strategically timed. Just as Trump’s MAGA base erupted in fury over his suggestion of bringing in large numbers of Indian workers to the U.S.—a stark reversal of his earlier vow to dismantle foreign work visa schemes—Musk conveniently launched his tirade. His enormous following on X (formerly Twitter) makes it the perfect tool to steer narratives and subdue dissent within Trump’s base. 

When discourse around grooming gangs in Britain escalated and was painted broadly as an “Asian problem,” Musk swiftly reshaped the narrative by retweeting posts suggesting it was a Pakistani issue, not an Indian one. This was not a coincidence. Yet, India remains one of the world’s leading countries for reported sexual assaults—an uncomfortable fact seemingly ignored by Trump and his team for reasons of political convenience. 

During his first term, Trump met India’s far-right Prime Minister Narendra Modi on three occasions: once in Washington D.C., another time at the grandiose “Howdy Modi” rally in Texas attended by 50,000 Indian-Americans, and finally during his state visit to India in February 2020. Back then, Trump likely viewed India primarily as a lucrative market for American goods. However, in his second term, India’s influence appears set to grow within Trump’s inner circle, with key Indian-American figures holding influential positions or even being married into his core team. 

This is a significant development. Apart from the long-standing Israeli dual national influence in U.S. politics, India now seems poised to become the second most influential foreign power in shaping American domestic and foreign policy over the next four years. Trump appears likely to prioritise India even above Europe and Canada—a notable irony considering the severe diplomatic fallout between Canada and India in June 2023, when Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a prominent Sikh separatist leader and Canadian citizen, was assassinated outside a gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia. Canadian intelligence directly accused the Indian government of orchestrating the assassination. 

Canada, India, and the Fragile Western Alliance 

India’s growing proximity to Trump is being conspicuously overlooked by many analysts, despite its obvious significance as a key piece on Trump’s geopolitical chessboard. However, Trump seems blind to the repercussions of alienating Canada, Panama, and Europe simultaneously. Such confrontations will likely push these nations to band together in opposition to the United States, causing instability not just abroad but within American borders. 

Russia, meanwhile, will likely observe the unfolding chaos with detached amusement, popcorn in hand. The friction that Russia once faced with NATO seems now to be brought to NATO’s doorstep by Trump and his team—an ironic twist orchestrated, in part, by the world’s richest man. 

NATO: A House in Disarray 

Following Trump’s first term, some European nations, notably France, floated the idea of forming a European army to ensure collective security independent of American whims. However, Biden’s presidency largely shelved these ambitions, redirecting focus towards NATO’s war efforts in Ukraine. 

With Trump back in power, NATO may face paralysis, or worse, disintegration. Individual member states might break ranks, showing loyalty to Trump in exchange for economic benefits rather than prioritising collective security. This would spell disaster for NATO, which could soon become a hollow shell of its former self. 

Trump’s Economic Gambit: A Risky Transaction 

Trump has always portrayed himself first and foremost as a businessman, and his foreign policy reflects this transactional mindset. While his approach may generate short-term economic gains, it risks leaving the U.S. isolated on the global stage and could severely disrupt international supply chains. 

If Trump aggressively targets Canada, the UK, or European nations with economic warfare, the resulting fractures will deter foreign investors. Already wary of America’s unpredictable political climate, they may pivot towards other, more stable economies. 

Simultaneously, Trump’s expected crackdown on illegal immigration and potential skirmishes with Panama and Mexico could wreak havoc on cross-border cooperation, exacerbating economic tensions. 

The Ripple Effect: Global Stability in Question 

The question now arises: as the Western hemisphere grows increasingly unstable, what ripple effects will emerge in the next one to four years? How will foreign investors interpret Trump’s relentless attacks on America’s traditional allies? If Trump alienates multiple key partners simultaneously, they are likely to unite against America for at least the duration of his presidency. Such a scenario would create severe investor instability not only in the U.S. but across the Western world. 

Will European countries begin to see China as a more dependable trading partner? Could Trump’s brash style inadvertently gift China strategic advantages while undermining India, which seems to have gone all-in on Team Trump? Asia seems poised to become a more stable region, but this will depend heavily on how individual nations play their cards. 

Meanwhile, Trump will attempt to manage crises on multiple fronts: illegal immigration in the U.S., potential military tensions with Panama and Mexico, and economic wars with Canada, the UK, and Europe. At the same time, he will likely seek to secure support from select Asian countries to counterbalance China in the twilight years of his presidency. 

Trump: A Game of Russian Roulette 

Trump’s presidency increasingly resembles a high-stakes game of Russian Roulette. And this is without even touching on the complexities of the Middle East. His grandiose claim of resolving a conflict that even Israel has been unable to win after a year of brutal warfare is unlikely to lead to meaningful negotiations. Instead, it seems more plausible that Trump will continue to blow hot air in the media while privately making contradictory promises and threats to both sides, playing the role of the ultimate salesman. 

His primary goal will be to secure a symbolic victory—something he can showcase to his voter base as proof that he’s not only an entertainer but also a peacemaker capable of solving conflicts that have endured for decades. 

As world leaders clamber for Trump’s attention, eager for a metaphorical (and literal) selfie with the man of the hour, they must tread carefully. Beyond the photo-op lies a precarious balance, where one wrong step could lead to either unparalleled economic prosperity or a catastrophic geopolitical downfall. 

Mr. Muad M Zaki   

Senior Fellow

WRITTEN BY:

Muad Zaki
Director of Democracy & Transparency Initiative,
AMEC

*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

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17 Decpress statement

One Day International Conference on ‘Assessing Opportunities and Challenges in ASEAN-GCC Interactions’

Leaders, academics, and experts from across ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) convened in Jakarta for the International Conference on ‘Assessing Opportunities and Challenges in ASEAN-GCC Interactions.’ This landmark event explored the potential for collaboration between these two dynamic regions amid shifting global geopolitics.

Organized by the Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC) in collaboration with prominent academic and research institutions, the conference featured keynotes and panel discussions by policymakers, academics, and industry representatives from ASEAN and GCC countries.

Highlights of the Conference
The conference hosted distinguished speakers from various nations, showcasing a diversity of perspectives and expertise:

Keynote Addresses:
The opening keynote was delivered by Mr. Yayan Ganda Hayat Mulyana, Head of the Foreign Policy Strategy Agency, who represented H.E. Bapak Anis Matta, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Indonesia.

Plenary Sessions:
Experts from Qatar, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines led discussions on topics ranging from economic diversification in the GCC, ASEAN’s engagement with West Asia, and opportunities for greater cultural integration.
Key speakers included:

  • Dr. Maryam Mohammed Al-Kuwari (Qatar)
  • Dr. Abdolreza Alami (Malaysia)
  • Dr. Henelito A. Sevilla, Jr. (Philippines)

MOU Signing Ceremony:
A significant highlight was the signing of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between AMEC, Universitas Indonesia, Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta, Universitas Padjadjaran, and Asia West East Centre. These agreements formalized collaborations aimed at strengthening ties between ASEAN and GCC regions.

Objectives and Themes
The conference focused on:

  • Fostering geopolitical alignment and identifying common interests.
  • Promoting economic integration by leveraging complementary strengths.
  • Enhancing cultural understanding through educational and people-to-people exchanges.

Collaborating Institutions
The conference was co-hosted by:

  • Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC)
  • Universitas Indonesia (UI)
  • Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta (UMJ), Indonesia
  • Universitas Padjadjaran (UnPad), Indonesia
  • Asia West East Centre, Malaysia

About the Conference
The International Conference on ‘Assessing Opportunities and Challenges in ASEAN-GCC Interactions’ provided a unique platform to deepen understanding, foster cooperation, and build stronger bridges between ASEAN and GCC nations. The outcomes of this dialogue are expected to contribute significantly to global stability, economic growth, and cultural exchange.

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