By Abel Josafat Manullang
The international system we live in now has witnessed numerous tumultuous chapters in the past year alone. From the development in the Middle East to the ongoing war in Eastern Europe, one giant was present through it all: the United States.

Recently, the US has embarked on some voyages that caused ripples across the globe. The unilateral tariffs and the following transactional diplomacy that followed are the harbingers of what is to come from the US under its new administration.

However, these unilateral moves do not exclusively revolve around trade activities. The recent capture of Venezuela president in its own national territory and the recent blockade on Cuba’s oil access demonstrated just how unrestrained the US can be in advancing its interests.

These moves from the US signify a change in its approach to its pursuit of interests. It demonstrates how selective the US has come to value the many international institutions it has spearheaded and stood by in the past. In other words, it now relies on its example of force as opposed to the force of its example. 

To add to this, the capriciousness of the US is also important to note, primarily in the way it defines its interests and security, which may result in abandonment of its past commitments. With such a giant on the horizon, not to mention one that many states have developed a reliance on, it will inevitably force changes to the way they manage their ties with the US.

The heart of the Indo-Pacific: ASEAN and Southeast Asia

The capricious nature of the US causes concerns for many states, including here in Southeast Asia. Other writers have posited that the same fate that befell Venezuela can also manifest in Southeast Asia. There exist some holes that can be poked by the US should it find the region and the timing fitting for its interests. This is further amplified by how some states there have leaned closer to either the US or China.

When talking about Southeast Asia, one cannot dismiss its regional bloc, ASEAN, which has witnessed various developments both internally and externally. For the former, ASEAN has come to cater to new fields in which the interests of its member states lie. The same goes for the latter, as it bridges its member states’ interests with those of the external partners. As a result, it is no surprise that ASEAN has come to have its centrality in the region.

While ASEAN’s centrality can still be felt with its vast network of partners, ASEAN must navigate the future with extreme caution in the strategic landscape. It is true that the US has its attention on accentuating its presence in the Western Hemisphere, but one cannot eliminate its presence in the Indo-Pacific as its object of interest, especially given the strong show of force it has there.

To add it up, its recent moves can be seen as warning shots for everyone, including Southeast Asia as the heart of the Indo-Pacific, that the US would take a no-holds-barred approach in pursuing its interests or responding to anyone it deems as a threat. For this, as Hoang Thi Ha and Aries A. Arugay note, it is important for the region to overcome its vulnerabilities lest the US use it as a pretext to accentuate its presence in the region. While the prior Cambodia-Thailand conflict was not used as a pretext for something akin to Venezuela’s case, the capricious nature of the US makes it best to reduce any leeway that can be capitalized.

Amidst the presence of a capricious and powerful giant, ASEAN’s relevance and centrality will be tested. This puts in more considerations, given the already enormous attention the region has received, specifically from the US and China. For all of China’s far-reaching presence, one cannot discount the presence and influence the US has as a Pacific power. To this end, ASEAN needs to maintain its centrality hand in hand with that of the US, considering the interconnectedness they share.

Additionally, ASEAN also needs to bolster its ties with its other partners. For this, ASEAN can benefit from the many strategic partnerships it has developed over the decades. They can serve as the foundation for more diversified ties that can cushion any tumults that emerge from the unilateral strides of the US or other partners. Such a feat is not only something that won’t cause alarm, given ASEAN’s record, but it also resonates with its other partners who seek to diversify their ties.

Now, with the long road ahead in 2026, ASEAN and its member states must brace themselves for the volatile landscape before them. Against such a rough sea, the states of Southeast Asia have the choice to use ASEAN as the very forum to harmonize and synergize their strides. Afterall, for all its shortcomings, ASEAN still has countless things to offer. However, it can only be materialized provided the member states have the willingness to navigate through their differences.

The fork in the road will then open the door for the question of whether ASEAN persist and maintains its cohesion as a regional bloc or will it succumb to the force of the great powers. The answer to this question will show itself over the coming months and years.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

About the writer:

Abel Josafat Manullang is a writer at SiPalingHI! Media and a researcher of the Research Development House. He has developed numerous works surrounding maritime security and regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and other regions, which can be accessed through his Google Scholar page. Instagram: instagram.com/abel_jman

By Beatrice Liverzani:

The Kurdish political landscape is shaped by a complex and evolving pursuit of self-governance across four states—Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—each of which presents distinct political, legal, and historical conditions. Despite shared linguistic and cultural markers, Kurdish political trajectories have diverged significantly, reflecting the interaction between post-imperial state formation, regional security considerations, and international legal norms as described by Gunter, (2014).

Historical Roots and the Absence of Kurdish Statehood

Kurdish aspirations for self-determination emerged prominently in the aftermath of the First World War, influenced by international principles such as Wilson’s Fourteen Points and early post-Ottoman treaties. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) initially envisaged the possibility of Kurdish autonomy, while the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) ultimately consolidated the territorial integrity of the new Turkish Republic and neighbouring states, effectively excluding Kurdish claims from the emerging international order (Gunter, 2014).

From the perspective of international law, this settlement embedded a structural constraint on Kurdish secession. The principle of territorial integrity became dominant, while external self-determination remained applicable primarily to decolonisation contexts. As a result, Kurdish claims were subsumed within the sovereignty of existing states, leaving autonomy and minority rights as the primary—though uneven—avenues for political recognition.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the post-Lausanne order did more than delimit borders; it institutionalised a regional norm that external actors have been reluctant to disrupt. Even major powers that have tactically cooperated with Kurdish actors, such as the United States in Iraq and Syria, have stopped short of endorsing Kurdish statehood. This reflects a broader international consensus: while minority protections may be encouraged, redrawing borders in the Middle East risks cascading instability. Thus, Kurdish aspirations are evaluated not only through legal doctrine but also through geopolitical risk calculus.

For regional governments, Kurdish self-determination is not viewed in isolation. It is perceived through the prism of precedent. Any concession that resembles secession could embolden parallel claims elsewhere, whether ethnic, sectarian, or regional. Diplomatically, this creates a shared, even if rarely coordinated, interest among Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tehran in preventing full Kurdish independence, even when their bilateral relations remain adversarial.

Iraq: Institutionalised Autonomy Without Sovereignty

Among the four scenarios, Iraq represents the most evolved form of Kurdish self-rule. Since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the early 1990s, Iraqi Kurds have exercised a substantial degree of de facto autonomy. This process was later consolidated following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which reshaped the country’s political system and formally recognised the Kurdistan Region within a federal framework. As Gunter (2014) argues, under the leadership of Masoud Barzani, who served as President of the Kurdistan Region from 2005 to 2017, the KRG expanded its institutional capacity, consolidating authority over regional governance, education, and security forces, including the Peshmerga.

This autonomy, however, has been shaped by internal political divisions, particularly the 1994 civil war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which exposed the challenges of Kurdish political fragmentation and competing centres of authority within the region (Gunter, 2014). Moreover, Kurdish identity within Iraq has historically occupied an ambivalent position in national narratives. As reflected in Iraqi Arabic-language literature, Kurdish experiences were often marginalised or portrayed as peripheral to Iraqi national identity, reinforcing perceptions of Kurds as outsiders or potential challenges to state unity (Zeidel, 2011).

Despite post-1991 political transformations and increased engagement between Arab and Kurdish regions, Kurdish representation in Iraqi cultural and political discourse remains uneven. According to Zeidel (2011), this suggests that while autonomy has been institutionalised at the political and administrative level, it has not fully translated into broader societal integration within the Iraqi national framework.

From a diplomatic perspective, the Iraqi case demonstrates the outer limits of what the international system is currently willing to tolerate. The 2017 Kurdish independence referendum illustrated this boundary clearly. Despite strong domestic support within the Kurdistan Region, regional states uniformly opposed the move, and international actors declined to recognise the outcome. Baghdad’s reassertion of authority over disputed territories, including Kirkuk, proceeded without meaningful external resistance.

This episode underscores a critical diplomatic lesson: autonomy may be negotiated, but sovereignty remains guarded by both regional consensus and international inertia. The Kurdistan Regional Government today operates within a delicate equilibrium—leveraging energy diplomacy, foreign investment, and security partnerships, while avoiding steps that would trigger collective regional pushback.

Turkey: Identity, Security, and Contested Integration

In Turkey, the Kurdish question has been primarily framed as an issue of national unity and internal security. As Loizides (2010) notes, Kurdish national identity developed comparatively late, shaped by geographic dispersion, internal fragmentation, and prolonged state policies aimed at linguistic and cultural homogenisation. The Turkish state’s Kemalist ideology historically denied the existence of distinct ethnic identities, restricting Kurdish language use and political expression, which paradoxically contributed to the consolidation of Kurdish ethnic consciousness (Loizides, 2010).

Kurdish political movements in Turkey have adopted varied strategies, ranging from armed resistance to political participation and civil society mobilisation. Influenced by Abdullah Öcalan’s concept of Democratic Confederalism, segments of the Kurdish movement have articulated alternatives to statehood, advocating decentralised governance, cultural recognition, and participatory democracy without formal secession (Gunter, 2014).

From a realist perspective, Turkey’s response reflects a prioritisation of territorial integrity and regime security. Loizides (2010) observes that while limited political openings, such as EU-related reforms, diaspora media, and legal changes, have facilitated expressions of Kurdish identity, Kurdish demands continue to be assessed through a security lens, constraining institutional accommodation. 

However, realism alone does not fully capture Ankara’s evolving calculations. Turkey’s Kurdish policy is also shaped by its external diplomatic positioning—particularly relations with the European Union, NATO allies, and neighbouring Syria and Iraq. Periods of reform have often coincided with moments when Ankara sought to project democratic credentials internationally. Conversely, heightened security operations have tended to align with domestic political consolidation and regional instability.

Diplomatically, Turkey seeks to prevent the internationalisation of its Kurdish issue. It resists framing the matter as one of minority rights subject to external adjudication and instead asserts sovereign jurisdiction. This approach reflects a broader regional sensitivity: once internal identity conflicts become items on international diplomatic agendas, external leverage increases. Hence, Ankara’s consistent effort to define the issue primarily through a counterterrorism framework rather than as one of self-determination.

Syria: De Facto Autonomy and Recent Developments

In Syria, Kurdish political space expanded significantly during the civil war, as Kurdish-led administrations established de facto autonomous governance structures aligned with Democratic Confederalist principles (Gunter, 2014). These arrangements prioritised local councils, gender equality, and cultural recognition, while formally rejecting statehood claims.

Recent developments suggest a shift in the Syrian state’s approach. In 2026, Damascus issued a decree granting citizenship to stateless Kurds, recognising Kurdish as a national language and signalling an attempt to reintegrate Kurdish populations within a reconstituted state framework (Al Jazeera, 2026). These steps have taken place amid shifting military and diplomatic circumstances, including cooperation with Russia, and reflect the incorporation of Kurdish governance arrangements into broader processes of national consolidation.

The Syrian case introduces an additional diplomatic complexity: Kurdish actors have emerged not merely as domestic stakeholders but as intermediaries within broader geopolitical competition. Their cooperation with U.S.-led forces as local security partners, subsequent negotiations with Damascus, and tactical coordination with Russia illustrate how sub-state actors can acquire strategic relevance beyond their demographic weight.

Yet this relevance remains conditional. External powers have supported Kurdish-led administrations insofar as they serve immediate security objectives. Long-term political recognition, however, remains contingent upon reconciliation with central state authority. This reinforces a pattern observable across the region: Kurdish leverage increases during moments of state fragmentation but contracts as central governments reconstitute control.

Comparative Observations

Across all four cases, Kurdish political trajectories reflect the limits imposed by international norms, regional power balances, and domestic state structures. While Iraq demonstrates the possibility of sustained autonomy within a federal framework, Turkey and Iran continue to prioritise integration and security, and Syria’s evolving position remains closely tied to post-conflict state reconstruction.

From a diplomatic standpoint, the Kurdish question ultimately tests the flexibility of the Westphalian state system in the Middle East. It raises a recurring tension between stability and representation: regional governments prioritise territorial integrity, while Kurdish movements prioritise political recognition and self-administration. International actors, meanwhile, oscillate between normative support for minority rights and pragmatic commitment to existing borders.

The comparative evidence suggests that the future of Kurdish politics will not be determined by a singular breakthrough toward independence, but by incremental negotiations over autonomy, integration, and decentralisation. Where states perceive accommodation as strengthening stability, political space may expand. Where identity claims are securitised, political contraction is likely to follow.

In this sense, the Kurdish question remains less a frozen conflict than an evolving diplomatic negotiation embedded within broader regional transformations.

Bibliography 

Gunter, M., M. (2014), “Unrecognized De Facto States in World Politics: The Kurds.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 20 (2): 161–178.

Loizides, N., G (2010), “State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 46 (4): 513–527. 

Zeidel, R. (2011), “The Iraqi Novel and the Kurds.” Review of Middle East Studies 45 (1): 19–34.

Al Jazeera (2026), “Syria Grants Immediate Citizenship to Kurds in Wake of Gains against SDF.” January 29, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/29/syria-grants-immediate-citizenship-to-kurds-in-wake-of-gains-against-sdf.

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*Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization, institution, or group with which the author is affiliated.

BY: Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso

The persistent dilemma confronting post-conflict societies concerns the sequencing of transitional imperatives. When should the attainment of peace be prioritised, and when should demands for justice prevail? The Syrian conflict, like other instances scrutinised within the transitional-justice literature, has wrought not only material destruction but also an erosion of social trust and communal cohesion. Consequently, tensions emerge between imperatives of negotiated stability and claims for accountability for grave international crimes[1].

This article interrogates the enduring tension between peace and justice in post-conflict transitions and applies comparative lessons to Syria’s emerging transitional architecture. Building on insights shared by practitioners and scholars during the PILPG[2] 2025 Peace and Negotiation Summer School course, dedicated to the Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, it draws on cases from Sierra Leone, the Balkans, South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda, demonstrating that durable transitional outcomes require a context-specific mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, domestically anchored design and strategic sequencing.

Conceptual framework: instruments and sequencing

Transitional justice is not merely an alternative to ordinary criminal justice; rather, it encompasses a spectrum of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with varying degrees of international involvement (or none), including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking mechanisms, institutional reform (comprising vetting and removal from office) or combinations thereof, depending on the context.[3] The literature identifies several potential trajectories: privileging peace; prioritising justice; pursuing a “peace with justice” or experiencing a growing judicialization of peace processes – that is, the increasing influence of courts and judicial bodies on political negotiations, with ambivalent consequences for accountability and for the prospects of reaching and sustaining peace.

Sierra Leone and the coexistence of restorative and retributive mechanisms

The protracted civil war in Sierra Leone, partly a spillover from the conflict in Liberia and heavily fueled by the struggle to control diamond resources, illustrates the practical and moral challenges of balancing the imperatives of immediate peace with the demands of criminal accountability. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty clause that facilitated a ceasefire but simultaneously left deep wounds and sparked considerable controversy over questions of justice. In practice, the transitional response was dual and parallel: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a restorative and narrative mandate, tasked with collecting testimonies, documenting violations and fostering processes of reconciliation; and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, established to prosecute those bearing “the greatest responsibility” for the gravest crimes (a mechanism that avoided blanket impunity without derailing the fragile peace process.

This experience demonstrates that the coexistence of restorative (TRC) and retributive (Special Court) mechanisms can succeed when their mandates are clearly delineated and communicated, when practical coordination is ensured (procedural sequencing, witness protection, allocation of resources) and when meaningful space is created for both symbolic and material redress for victims. Ambassador Yvette Stevens and other observers have emphasized that this multi-dimensional approach, together with the clarity in the distribution of responsibilities between commission and court, was central to preventing the Lomé amnesty from devolving into a perceived culture of impunity in Sierra Leone.[4]

Memory, symbols and institutional confidence in Montenegro and the Balkans

If the Sierra Leonean experience illustrates the delicate balance between peace, truth and accountability in a context marked by resource-driven conflict, the post-Yugoslav Balkans, and particularly Montenegro, highlight a different but equally crucial dimension of transitional justice: the reconstruction of trust in the aftermath of mass atrocity and the role of institutional, symbolic and economic measures in shaping reconciliation and state-building. The post-1995 Balkans demonstrate that collective traumas (Srebrenica above all) rapidly erode social trust, and that if civic culture and historical memory are not actively nurtured, the reconstruction of confidence becomes a project spanning decades.

The Montenegrin case is particularly instructive, as it combined political, symbolic and economic elements: the decision – controversial yet strategic – to introduce the Deutsche Mark at the end of 1999, and subsequently the euro, was not merely an economic maneuver to stabilize prices and safeguard savings, but also a political act of symbolic autonomy vis-à-vis Belgrade. The subsequent Belgrade Agreement and the constitutional framework established in 2002 created a pragmatic arrangement of “one State, two economic systems”, which allowed for the functional separation of economic and political spheres during the transitional period. Igor Lukšić, a key actor in Montenegro’s transition, has emphasized the importance of early confidence-building measures, predictable institutional rules and political symbols capable of ensuring minority inclusion, thereby pre-empting historical revisionism and competing narratives.[5]

The Montenegrin experience suggests that economic and symbolic measures (currency reform, autonomous fiscal policies) can serve as instruments of political stabilization, provided they are coupled with institutional reforms and underpinned by a minimal consensus on clear and predictable rules.

Alternatives and trade-offs from South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda

Whereas the Sierra Leonean and Montenegrin cases shed light on, respectively, the balance between peace and accountability and the role of economic-symbolic measures in rebuilding trust, a broader comparative perspective highlights further variations. Other transitional contexts (South Africa, Colombia and Rwanda) offer additional insights into how different societies have sought to reconcile truth, accountability and reconciliation through distinct institutional and culture mechanisms.

In South Africa, the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission – led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and his colleagues – adopted the mechanism of conditional amnesty in exchange for full public disclosure. The public revelation of truth was conceived as a form of symbolic healing, essential for the moral legitimacy of the new democracy, even as it left unresolved criticisms regarding the lack of material punishment.

In Colombia, the 2016 peace accord introduces the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), which provides alternative sanctions and reparative measures for those who acknowledge responsibility. This pragmatic model of compromise sought to maximize truth-telling, victim participation and the reintegration of former combatants, while in many cases avoiding traditional custodial sentences.

In Rwanda, the Gacaca courts – deeply rooted in local communal practices – enabled the mass processing of genocide-related cases in a relatively short period of time, fostering community involvement and testimonial exchange. Yet they also attracted criticism for shortcomings in procedural safeguards and for the tensions they generated between local justice and international legal standards.

Comparative synthesis: no one-size-fits-all

Taken together, these cases underscore a crucial lesson: there is no “one-size-fits-all” model of transitional justice. Instruments such as conditional amnesty, alternative sanctions and community-based justice must be tailored to the cultural fabric, institutional capacity and expectations of victims in each specific context. As Ambassador Amina Mohamed has stressed, no matter how urgent a political settlement may be, peace will falter unless it is built on a foundation of inclusivity and accountability.[6] Above all, local legitimacy and victim participation emerge as non-negotiable conditions for the durability and credibility of transitional outcomes.

Syria: context and recent institutional developments

Today, Syria stands at a critical juncture between continuity of established practices and the opportunity to innovate a genuinely domestic transitional justice process. In May 2025, transitional authorities established a National Transitional Justice Commission (NCTJ) – mandated to “uncover the truth about the grave violations caused by the former regime, hold those responsible accountable in coordination with the relevant authorities, compensate the victims, and consolidate the principles of non-repetition and national reconciliation” – and a Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) to address over one hundred thousand missing and detained persons. As stated on Amnesty International’s official website, between 2011 and 2024, it is estimated that over 100,000 individuals were subjected to enforced disappearance in Syria.[7] The overwhelming majority were forcibly disappeared by the Assad government within its extensive network of detention facilities, while additional cases have been linked to armed opposition groups.[8] These data clearly underscore the existence of a profound vacuum that must be addressed within a transitional justice process which, as emphasized by relevant international actors, such as Amnesty International and the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), requires transparency, independence and meaningful victim participation.

Syria: sequencing and policy design

Turning these bodies into credible mechanisms demands careful sequencing and a calibrated mix of measures. The ordering of elections, judicial proceedings, refugee returns, and institutional reforms is not neutral: comparative experiences from Sierra Leone and Colombia illustrate that truth-telling, graduated sanctions and non-custodial measures are effective only when paired with credible demobilization and reintegration strategies. At the same time, some grave crimes will demand formal judicial accountability; restorative or administrative measures cannot substitute for prosecution where atrocity crimes are implicated. As the United Nations has emphasized, any transitional-justice process must be nationally owned and sensitive to local conditions, centred on victims’ needs and inclusive of all relevant stakeholders (notably women, youth and minorities).[9] Thus, international actors should support the domestic design and implementation of context-specific, victim-centred processes that address the root causes and structural drivers of violations and thereby contribute to prevention, sustained peace, development and reconciliation.

Syria: memory, participation and legitimacy

Memory and truth are inseparable from institutional capacity: the Balkans and Rwanda demonstrate that public narratives require documentation, witness protection and educational initiatives to prevent revisionism. As Joud Monla-Hassan stresses, transitional justice must be genuinely “Syrian-led”, informed by survivors, civil society and the diaspora[10]; only through meaningful inclusion can the new commissions build legitimacy and public trust. This point is salient given that the transitional authorities’ own legitimacy may be contested: the commissions must therefore demonstrate independence, transparency and representative composition from the outset if they are to earn popular confidence. 

Timing and constitutional framing

Finally, Dr. Paul R. Williams emphasizes the complexity of rebuilding political, legal and social infrastructures after decades of dictatorship and conflict, noting that a return to the pre-war status quo is neither feasible nor desirable. Williams stresses that processes such as refugee returns, elections, establishment of legal mechanisms and institutional stabilization must be carefully coordinated.[11] The transitional period should be time-bound, governed by an interim constitutional framework and guided by a clear public roadmap. Strategic sequencing of these measures is essential, as holding elections prematurely, without an appropriate political and legal foundation, risks creating power vacuums or undermining democratic legitimacy.[12]

Practical recommendations

Building on comparative lessons and the Syrian context, five practical priorities emerge: 1) codify the mandates and legal safeguards for the NCTJ and NCM to guarantee independence and victim-centredness; 2) adopt a publicly negotiated sequencing roadmap that sequences elections, accountability measures and refugee returns by political feasibility and security considerations; 3) design a calibrated mix of judicial and non-judicial instruments, including hybrid or internationalized modalities for the gravest crimes; 4) mainstream psychosocial support, reparations and service delivery to tangibly demonstrate benefits to victims; 5) establish independent monitoring and transparency mechanisms (including public reporting and civic oversight) to sustain public trust.

A further step to enhance the effectiveness and credibility of Syria’s emerging transitional justice institutions would be to establish a formal data-sharing framework between the National Transitional Justice Commission (NTJC), the National Commission for Missing Persons (NCM) and the UN-mandated Independent Institution for Missing Persons (IIMP). Such cooperation, grounded in informed victim consent, strict confidentiality and independent oversight, would serve several purposes. First, it would prevent duplication of investigative efforts and inconsistencies across national and international databases. Second, it would accelerate the identification of the disappeared by enabling secure exchange of genetic, testimonial and documentary evidence. Third, it would strengthen transparency and public trust by linking domestic mechanisms with an internationally recognised body. Finally, a harmonised and victim-centred data system would improve families’ access to truth, reparations and psychosocial support, thereby transforming fragmented documentation into meaningful outcomes for survivors.

Conclusion

Syria’s transitional framework stands at a crossroads: it can either generate institutions lacking legitimacy or evolve into a process capable of healing collective wounds and rebuilding social trust. The outcome will hinge on ensuring inclusion, transparency and coherence between memory, accountability and reform. If grounded in meaningful engagement with victims and designed with strategic realism, Syria’s path could offer an innovative model of transitional justice for the wider region.

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[1] The core international crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) are: genocide (article 6), crimes against humanity (article7), war crimes (article 8) and crime of aggression (article 8 bis).

[2] The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) is a global pro bono law firm providing free legal assistance to parties involved in peace negotiations, drafting post-conflict constitutions, and war crimes prosecution/transitional justice.

[3] United Nations (UN), Guidance note of the secretary-general, “Transitional Justice. A Strategic Tool for People, Prevention and Peace”, 2023, p.2. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/03/202307guidancenotetransitionaljusticeen.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[4] Yvette Stevens, “Transitional justice – Lessons Learned from Sierra Leona” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability)

[5] Igor Lukšić “Case Study: Lessons Learned from Montenegro’s Transition” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[6] Amina Mohamed, “Legal Reforms and Constitution Building” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-governance-and-the-rule-of-law)

[7] Amnesty International, Syria: New Government must ensure Truth, Justice and Reparations for the disappeared, 2025. Available at: https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/syria-new-government-must-ensure-truth-justice-and-reparations-for-the-disappeared/#:~:text=He%20said%20the%20NCM’s%20core,by%20the%20rule%20of%20law.

[8] Ibidem.

[9] United Nations, OCHR: Transitional justice and human rights, 2025. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice

[10] Joud Monla-Hassan, “Domestic and Locally Owned Transitional Justice and State-Building Processes in Syria” presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/day-3-transitional-justice-and-accountability#:~:text=international%20conferences—on%20the%20future%20of,and%20grounded%20in%20local%20realities) See also Nousha Kabawat, “To Syria’s New Justice Commissions: Victims Need You Now,” 31 July 2025, emphasizing that the new commissions must explicitly recognize violations wherever they occur, advocate for victims without discrimination or political pressure, ensure genuine independence, and reflect Syria’s full diversity in composition and decision-making so that all victims are represented and heard (available at: https://www.ictj.org/latest-news/syria’s-new-justice-commissions-victims-need-you-now#:~:text=independence%20by%20ensuring%20that%20no,see%20themselves%20represented%20and%20heard)

[11] Paul R. Williams, “Introduction to Post-Conflict State Building: Challenges and Opportunities”, presented at the PILPG 2025 Peace Negotiation Summer School: Post-Conflict Statebuilding and the Case of Syria, July 2025 (available at: https://pilpg-trainings.squarespace.com/post-conflict-state-building-key-concepts-and-perspectives)

[12] Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, Marie Forestier, Reimagining Syria: A Roadmap for Peace and Prosperity Beyond Assad, in Middle East Institute, 2025. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/reimagining-syria-roadmap-peace-and-prosperity-beyond-assad#:~:text=supported%20by%20a%20clear%2C%20public,framework%2C%20risks%20undermining%20democratic%20progress

Auther’s Bio

Roberta Lazzaro Danzuso holds a bachelor’s in history, Politics and International Relations and is pursuing a master’s in law in Strasbourg with a focus on minority rights. She has over four years of experience in private tutoring. She helps students understand complex historical, political, and legal topics through clear explanations. Based in Catania, she supports learners at different levels.

She can be reached at : roberta.lazzaro15@gmail.com

Executive Summary                                        

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The One-day International Conference on Palestine: Exploring Asian Perspectives, held on 4 November 2024 at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was a collaborative initiative organized by the Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC), University of Malaya, and the Hashim Sani Centre for Palestine Studies. The conference aimed to provide a platform for experts, academics, policymakers, and activists to engage in discussions on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, with a specific focus on the role and responses of Malaysia and the broader Asian community.